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Cybernetics in Music:  




This thesis examines the use of cybernetics (the science of systems) in music, through 
the tracing of an obscured history. The author postulates that cybernetic music may 
be thought of as genera of music in its own right, whose practitioners share a 
common ontology and set of working practices that distinctly differ from traditional 
approaches to composing electronic music. Ultimately, this critical examination of 
cybernetics in music provides the framework for a series of original compositions 
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1. Cybernetics in Music – Thesis Introduction 
 
The physical functioning of the living individual and the operation of some of the newer 
communication machines are precisely parallel in their analogous attempts to control entropy 
through feedback (Wiener, 1950). 
 
This thesis is an examination of cybernetic theories and their application to musical 
composition. The primary concern of this study is to define a certain type of 
electronic music in a new way, with the aim of uncovering a common ontology that 
underpins the work of a number of eminent composers of electronic music, while 
tracing the development of a genre of music that has hitherto been obscured by other 
dominant trends. In the process, a framework will be generated in which cybernetic 
music may be viewed. This framework will then be utilised to interrogate these 
research findings within original musical compositions.  
 
The first question that may justifiably be asked is: What is cybernetics? It is true that 
the words cyberspace, cyborgs and cyber-men and any other word that shares the 
cyber-prefix have their cultural root in cybernetics. Thus, it may be rightly assumed 
that cybernetics is synonymous with computers, machines, and robotics. However, 
the mathematics of cybernetics and its philosophical underpinnings have little direct 
connection with these tropes.  
 
Cybernetics is the study of systems, or more precisely, the study of organisation in 
complex systems. The term cybernetics comes from the Greek word kybernetes, 
meaning the art of steersmanship when piloting a boat, and has the same root as the 
word for ‘government’ (Wiener, 1948). First used as a term by Plato, and later by 
Ampère in the nineteenth century, cybernetics was conceived in its inception as the 
science of effective government.  
 
Modern cybernetics was defined by the mathematician Norbert Wiener in his 
formative publication Cybernetics, or Communication and Control in the Animal and the 
Machine (Wiener, 1948). Wiener’s cybernetics pertains to the study of systems, their 
structure, regulation, constraints, and possibilities. His thesis outlines a number of 
related mathematical theorems that pertain to time, statistics, information, feedback, 
the nervous system, the perceptual senses, the brain, language, and society. His 
cybernetic vision came from the interdisciplinary nature of the government military 
projects on which he worked during the Second World War. The field of cybernetics 
as we understand it today was born in this milieu and coalesced at the Macy 
conferences – a series of meetings among a group of interdisciplinary scientists and 
medical doctors that took place in New York between 1941 and 1960. In the late 
1960s and 1970s, cybernetics began to broaden its appeal as its theories and ideas 
became incorporated into the social sciences and eventually found an expression in 
art, music, and popular culture.  
 
Cybernetics is peculiar among modern sciences because of its major influence and 
yet relative obscurity in modern academia. Since its inception, cybernetics has played 
a major role in the development of many scientific fields, such as artificial 
intelligence, complexity science, information theory, chaos theory, control theory, 
general systems theory, and robotics. However, due to its interdisciplinary nature 
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(there are currently many more sociologists, biologists and architects practicing 
cybernetics than computer scientists), cybernetics as an overarching and autonomous 
discipline has struggled to become established. One fundamental reason for this is 
that research departments and academic programmes have not hitherto been in the 
habit of catering to holistic disciplines. Furthermore, the spin-off fields mentioned 
above have been far more effective in gaining funding, often due to their military 
and defence applications. Artificial intelligence, in particular, gained almost all of its 
academic funding in the United States from the DARPR, an agency of the US 
Department of Defence (Chapman, 1995).  
 
While the early preoccupations with command and control in cybernetics infer 
seemingly sinister implications, after his experiences working in defence research for 
the United States government, Wiener himself sought to present cybernetics as a 
non-militaristic science. He outlines this cybernetic liberal-humanist agenda in his 
book, The Human Use of Human Beings (1950), which prefigures the sociological turn 
that cybernetic study took during the early 1970s. On the implications of the 
compartmentalised use of science during the Second World War, Wiener asserted: 
“The measures taken during the war by our military agencies, in restricting the free 
intercourse among scientists on related projects or even on the same project have 
gone so far that it is clear that if continued in time of peace, this policy will lead to 
the total irresponsibility of the scientist, and, ultimately, to the death of science. [...] 
The interchange of ideas, which is one of the greatest traditions of science, must of 
course receive certain limitations when the scientist becomes an arbiter of life and 
death. [...] I do not expect to publish any future work of mine which may do damage 
in the hands of irresponsible militarists.” (Wiener, 1947) 
 
Cybernetics is at its root a science of analogy and metaphor (Hayles, 1999), of which 
the most pertinent is that machines are like living organisms. This analogy can be 
demonstrated from an information perspective; analogical relationships can be 
constructed between living and mechanical systems that demonstrate similar 
patterns of information and behaviour. It is important to note that in cybernetics, 
“analogy is not merely an ornament of language but a powerful conceptual mode 
that constitutes meaning through relation” (Hayles, 1999). It allows us to cross 
boundaries, for the opposite of drawing an analogy is to construct a boundary. 
Analogy offers a different line of enquiry and a powerful conceptual framework in 
design. 
 
Cybernetics also concerns the study of self-sustaining entities. Louis Kauffman, 
President of the American Society for Cybernetics, gives this definition: "Cybernetics 
is the study of systems and processes that interact with themselves and produce 
themselves from themselves" (Kauffman, 2007). An important facet of this line of 
enquiry is that cybernetics, in the main, is not concerned with linear cause-and-effect 
processes. Instead it seeks to examine emergent properties that a system may exhibit 
and recognises the probabilistic processes and circular causality that may act upon, 
and are at play within, a system. To the cybernetician, the world is not a set of truths 
or epistemologies that lay concealed waiting to be uncovered, but instead presents a 
continuing “dance of agency” (Pickering, 2011) in which discovery is only 
meaningful in a performative context. Cybernetics holds the view that learning, 
intelligence, and creativity take place in an embodied setting; they are formed when 
agents interact with their environment. They are not constructed in the mind alone, 
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but happen via an interactive feedback process, which is a very different conception 
from the traditional Cartesian view. This particular meta-systemic focus allows us to 
ponder how entities, living or otherwise, contravene entropy to create structures that 
are self-sustaining and have meaningful emergent properties.1 This constructivist 
approach underpins this thesis and helps to address the creation of self-sustaining 
musical works that have emergent musical properties. 
 
Cybernetics is also unusual because of the peculiar ontology its investigation evokes, 
which runs counter to much modern thinking. The philosopher Bruno Latour (1993) 
argues that modern thinking is dualistic, in that it separates people from things. He 
observes that this dualism is institutionalised in our schools and universities, which 
split the natural sciences (from which people are distinctly absent) and the social 
sciences (the human realm), and thus a dualist ontology presides. Conversely, 
because cybernetics is concerned with systems, it is much less interested with what 
things are (the epistemology) than what they do. Animate and inanimate entities 
gain equal footing when considering flows of information and performative action in 
the world. One such example of this is cybernetician Gregory Bateson’s thought 
experiment in which he ponders, “Is a blind man’s cane part of him?” In addition, 
classic cybernetic research projects concerned with such things as synthetic brains 
and interactive machines “threaten the modern boundary between mind and matter, 
creating a breach in which engineering, say, can spill over into psychology, and vice 
versa. Cybernetics thus stages for us a non-modern ontology in which people and 
things are not so different after all” (Pickering, 2010).  
 
Cybernetics not only stands as a challenge to modernity and modern thinking in 
science. In its application to other subject areas and in particular relevance to this 
thesis, its application to music, it stands as a challenge to many modernist ways of 
thinking about composition. For example, rather than music being formulated in the 
mind of individual composers to be disseminated hierarchically into the world, 
cybernetic music sees the compositional process and forming of meaning-making as 
being an interaction between composer, technology, audience, and environment, 
with each element playing an integral part. Cybernetic music is not fixed 
compositionally, either by the symbolic representation of notation, or by a platonic 
idea of a perfect musical form. Instead it is an ephemeral dance of agency, which 
may exhibit emergent properties that we may define as music.2  
 
The organic, constructivist viewpoint that cybernetics offers provides a different 
perspective from which to examine and create music and organised sound with 
technology. It offers a design ethos that seeks to uncover underlying structures and 
modes of organisation that may assist in creating musical works that may be 
reflexive, interactive, or self-organising. It is particularly useful as an ethos that may 
be employed in the creation of works that do not seek to obey formal musical 









language beyond formal notation that speaks to what is common between human, 
machine, and environment. 
 
According to Heinz von Foerster, circularity is the central theme of cybernetics (von 
Foerster, 1980); autonomous systems are always embedded in environments and 
subject to feedback processes. The feedback loop, the flow of information from entity 
to environment and back again, is at the core of all cybernetic processes. Organisms 
(and machines) may choose to reinforce or suppress environmental stimuli based on 
this constant flow of feedback information. It allows for entities to make internal or 
external changes and to adapt to environmental conditions. Feedback allows for self-
sustaining organisms that have agency within the world. According to the 
cybernetician Peter Cariani, “cybernetics concerns the organisation of effective action 
in the world via the incorporation of ends into means” (Cariani, 2010). This statement 
not only emphasises the performative ontology of cybernetics. It also recognises the 
circular causality of certain types of goal-orientated behaviour, where ends (goals) 
feed back into means. Such feedback mechanisms can be found in both technologies 
and evolutionary processes. This trope is examined in this thesis in its relation to 
how technologies are employed in cybernetic musical composition and how this 
differs from established approaches to using technology in musical composition.  
 
The concept of feedback is integral to this thesis. It will take a central role, both in the 
uncovering of cybernetic tropes and cybernetic commonalities in composers’ works, 
and as a conceptual and physical tool to be employed in the creation of new, original 
works. Feedback, in engineering terms, occurs when an output signal is fed back into 
an input signal. The computer engineer Derek J. Smith states: “Two types of feedback 
need to be identified, namely negative and positive. Negative feedback is where 
corrective action is taken to reduce, or ‘damp’, the amount of an error. This is the sort 
of feedback, which gives us the classic ‘closed loop’ control system (e.g. a 
thermostat). It also gives us the feedback we are already familiar with in biology 
under the name homeostasis (Cannon, 1927). By contrast, positive feedback [for 
example, audio feedback] is where the correction is made in the same direction as 
that of the original displacement. Each pass around the feedback cycle thus 
magnifies the displacement instead of diminishing it” (Smith, 1997). Feedback creates 
a rapid escape from the initial signal or form and results in exponential outputs or 
complex structures. In the work of many cybernetic composers, the nature of this 
complex regeneration is often formed from sound in the environment, which can be 
adapted using DSP processes to evolve in exponential or unpredictable ways. In 
tandem with this generative process, DSP is also used to dampen and control the 
nature of the exponential outputs, thus a state of equilibrium between these two 
processes is sought. This conception of cybernetic music reflects the 
human/machine/environment paradigm, which is central to cybernetic theory and 
the use of feedback to control entropy, thus creating a homeostatic or autopoietic 
state.  
 
The purview of this thesis pertains to cybernetics and electronic musical 
composition. However, it is important to state that this is not composition by 
traditional means; that is, notation is not the primary mode by which composition 
may be represented in this context. Therefore, it is perhaps more epistemologically 
pertinent and relevant that the subject area of music technology be the residence for 
these ideas and modes of approaching composition mediated by technology. Music 
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technology is a relatively new, multi-disciplinary academic field, and as such is still 
searching for overarching theories that encompass technology and music, which 
stand apart from most of the writing on the subject of modern composition that 
stems in the main from formal writings about music. This thesis aims to provide a 
specific academic context by which music composition that does not require notation 
may be justified as part of a music-technology epistemology. This therefore implies 
that this thesis contains critiques of scientific theory, philosophy, philosophy of 
science, technological design, and aesthetics, as well as musicology and music.  
 
The infusion of cybernetics into the music-technology and compositional canons is 
highly relevant to the questions that recent technological advancements pose, as 
Heylighen and Joslyn postulate: “As reflected by the ubiquitous prefix ‘Cyber’, the 
broad cybernetic philosophy that systems are defined by their abstract relations, 
functions and information flows, rather than by their concrete material components, 
is starting to pervade popular culture, albeit in a shallow manner, driven more by 
fashion than by deep understanding. This has been motivated primarily by the 
explosive growth of information-based technologies including automation, 
computers, the Internet, virtual reality, software agents, and robots. It seems likely 
that as the applications of these technologies become increasingly complex, far 
reaching, and abstract, the need will again be felt for an encompassing conceptual 
framework, such as cybernetics, that can help users and designers alike to 
understand the meaning of these developments” (Heylighen and Joslyn, 2001). As 
technology becomes ever more ubiquitous and personalised, the 
human/machine/environment framework that cybernetics offers becomes ever 
more pertinent, and a musical form that reflects this metamodern state seems ever 
more relevant.  
 
Whilst there are many compositions and examples of the musical implementation of 
feedback, there is no research that examines feedback or cybernetics in the terms 
proposed in this thesis, as the basis for a new interpretive framework and generative 
compositional mode. For example, at present there are very few specific titles (and 
almost none outside the writings of some of the composers considered in this thesis) 
that refer to cybernetics in the RILM Bibliography. There is currently only one paper 
(Dunbar-Hester, 2010) that seeks to catalogue a collection of cybernetic composers 
and by the author’s own admission, the diversity of cybernetic music practice 
presented “a major difficulty in addressing cybernetics as a homogeneous or 
monolithic discourse” (Dunbar-Hester, 2010). Put simply, the purview of this thesis 
has not been examined hitherto. This study therefore aims to address the deficit of 
research in this area, and through hermeneutic, scientific, and musicological enquiry, 
seeks to present cybernetic music as a coherent genre of music that shares a common 
ontology and a common set of musical practices. This new analysis and the 
framework it generates will provide an original and important contribution to 
practitioners and the academy, which will enhance current understanding, not only 
in providing a new perspective on composers who have worked in this field, but also 
in new and original creative and technological outputs. This research also runs 
counter to many accepted methods of symbolic artificial intelligence employed in 
music informatics and many compositional systems that utilise computers, and as 
such, it proposes an original way of defining a certain type of electronic musical 





The key aims of this study are to assess the significance of cybernetics and feedback 
in past and potential future musical applications; to provide a new interpretation and 
perspective on existing compositions; to generate useful criteria that will be applied 
in the creation of organised sound; and to interpret and apply research findings in 
musical compositions and performances that will interrogate the relationship 
between feedback, creativity, and technology. 
 
The fundamental objectives of the thesis are as follows: 
 
1. To evaluate the role that cybernetics and feedback have played within music 
composition. 
2. To demonstrate that cybernetic music has a compositional ethos that fits 
within an established canon of musical works. 
3. To interrogate these principles in original musical compositions. 
4. To develop a vocabulary of performative music practice based on cybernetic 
principles. 
5. To design technological and creative systems that aid cybernetic composition. 
6. To critically evaluate the relevance of cybernetic music to composition and 
justify my own work within this paradigm. 
 
Finally, as the philosopher of science Andrew Pickering points out, where 
cybernetics is concerned, “ontology makes a difference” (Pickering, 2011). Pickering 
reasons that the modern sciences are obsessed with epistemology and the assurance 
of ultimate explanations of reality. However, the ontology of unknowability that 
cybernetics presents is distinctly missing from the modern scientific worldview. This 
non-modern ontology comes to the fore when considering exceedingly complex 
systems, which may only be known by interacting with them. According to 
cybernetics, the human brain is the prime example in this instance. However, many 
other much more basic systems exhibit complexity that cannot be predicted by 
mathematical modelling or any other form of scientific representation. Pickering cites 
the work of theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman and the computer scientist Stephen 
Wolfram (among others) as examples of the type of simple systems that exhibit 
exceedingly complex behaviours. Kauffman’s work in computer simulations of 
complex systems in the 1960s demonstrated how simple structures could emerge that 
had their own dynamics, which could be interfered with, but could not be controlled. 
Wolfram’s work with cellular automata demonstrated that under the simplest formal 
mathematical rules, the time evolution of cellular automata can very quickly become 
complex to the point of ‘unknowability’ – the only way to know what such a system 
will do is to run it and see what happens (Pickering, 2011). Pickering argues that this 
type of ‘knowing’ of complex systems is a staging of what he terms “ontological 
theatre”. In fact, he postulates that cybernetic practice, and in particular the building 
of machines and systems in the cybernetic idiom, is peculiar among the modern 
sciences as it stages ontological theatre for us, a different way of imagining what the 
world is, and of explaining how it works. This thesis explores what it means to 
compose electronic music from this ontological standpoint, what this means when 
constructing a technological design ethos for composing, and what music that stages 













































2. Methodology Chapter 
 
Being is a process of becoming (Kierkegaard, 1864). 
 
This section of the thesis examines the theoretical standpoint from which all musical 
works herein will be examined and the framework from which all musical 
compositions herein will be created and evaluated. The methodology described 
below stems from the core interest of this thesis, which concerns the composition of 
electronic music and the new frameworks and possibilities that cybernetic music will 
allow in this creative process.  
 
Before examining the areas of study for the thesis, it is important to state the 
ontological and epistemological framework under which the study will be 
conducted. The following section concerns some of the origins of cybernetic thinking 
and how they pertain to wider philosophical and musical ideas. 
 
2.1. The Ontological and Epistemological Position 
 
Cybernetics offers an ontological and epistemological position that differs from a 
number of conventional and well-established traditions (particularly formalism, 
causality, and artificial intelligence). In considering the purview of cybernetic 
enquiry, it is useful to examine the work of one of the founding fathers of 
cybernetics, Norbert Wiener. He began his academic career in the early part of the 
twentieth century as a mathematician studying Brownian motion. His insights in this 
field brought him to the conclusion that the universe operated in probabilistic terms. 
He hypothesised that initial conditions at the particle level could never predict the 
outcome of a situation, but could only give an indication as to a myriad number of 
outcomes. Moreover, he thought (as did Heisenberg) that initial conditions could 
never be precisely known. This idea is in direct opposition to Pierre-Simon LaPlace’s 
assertion that given the knowledge of initial conditions and enough computing 
power, a system’s evolution could be predicted for all eternity. That is to say, that the 
universe could be precisely knowable (Hayles, 1999).  
 
It was from this probabilistic ontology of unknowability – sometimes referred to in 
relation to cybernetics as ‘black box ontology’ (Pickering, 2011) – that Wiener began 
to develop cybernetic ideas from the then nascent field of information theory. His 
theory equated the uncertainty of the quantum world to uncertainties within the 
world of communication. In commenting on Wiener’s cybernetic vision, the 
postmodern literary critic N. Katherine Hayles postulates: “Statistical and quantum 
mechanics deal with uncertainty on the microscale; communication reflects and 
embodies it on the macroscale. Envisioning relations on the macroscale as acts of 
communication was thus tantamount to extending the reach of probability into the 
social world of agents and actors” (Hayles, 1999). From this perspective conventional 
ideas of cause and effect, of a deterministic universe, become less tangible. Instead, 
events and outcomes become blurred, leading to the notion of circular (not linear) 
causality. The cybernetic framework that Wiener proposed sought to demonstrate 
how messages and structure may arise from pure noise, and how life itself may be 
understood as patterns of organisation (Wiener, 1950).  
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Ontologically, the cybernetic position can also be said to be one of ‘emergence’; 
structure emerges from chaos, living organisms exhibit emergent behaviour and order 
can emerge from the entropic void. Cybernetics de-emphasizes the beginning and 
end, or the cause and effect, and focuses instead on the state between: the emergent 
factors. Emergence in cybernetic terms pertains to structures or patterns that arise 
from the interaction of smaller, simpler discrete entireties, such as, for example, the 
patterns made by flocking birds, or individual ice crystals forming the complex and 
unique pattern of a snowflake. Emergence pertains to the behaviour of complex 
systems and offers a standpoint from which phenomena such as biology; being an 
emergent property of chemistry, or thinking; being an emergent property of the 
brain, may be understood (O' Connor and Wong, 2012). In cybernetic compositional 
terms, music becomes an emergent property of the interactions of smaller sonic 
elements. Composers such as Xenakis and Brün have made emergence central to 
their compositional ideas. In Xenakis’ case, this is incorporated into his theories of 
the interaction of sonic grains forming emergent structures; in Brün’s case, this takes 
the form of serial computer processing of audio elements producing emergent 
sonorities. Emergence is a vital concept in cybernetic composition and all the 
composers considered in this thesis engage with this notion in some form.  
 
To recognise the emergent is to view the world from a constructivist standpoint, 
which recognises the integral role of environmental characteristics at play in any 
dynamic system; an entity is not separate from its environment; it emerges from it 
and is contained within a wider universal system. To use a musical analogy, in this 
new mode of electronic composition, musical works are no longer disseminated 
hierarchically; from composer to musician (and/or technology) to audience, but 
instead, compositions are a negotiation between the composer, the musicians 
(and/or technologies), and the audience. In the hierarchical formulation, 
environmental factors are seen to be irrelevant or superfluous to the transmission of 
information (Eno, 1976). In the cybernetic model, all elements of the system form a 
non-hierarchical balance of control. Environmental factors are recognised and form a 
part of the overall equilibrium. To recognise environmental characteristics in this 
way accords with a number of modern philosophers who assert the primacy of 
context and in particular communities in forming knowledge and shaping being. 
Gadamer, Kuhn, Foucault, Rorty and Fish all share this viewpoint (Coyne, 1995). 
 
States of between, emergence, and transition are reflected in many philosophical and 
cultural texts that have a bearing on the ontological basis of this thesis, particularly 
how one might envisage a state of ‘being’, which is in a constantly emergent state. In 
thinking about being, Hegel states: “after pondering being in this pure way, we are 
led to realise that we are thinking of the possibility of there not being anything at all 
– or, more precisely, the thought of pure indeterminate being slides into the thought 
of nothing. Yet thinking of nothing is not ceasing to think”. He further postulates: “A 
thought slides into its opposite and back again. In the case of being, to think of pure 
being is to think of it disappearing into its immediate opposite. To think of being is, 
therefore, to think of something else, the transition into nothing whatsoever, then 
back again into being. It seems, then, that thought is about something else apart from 
being and nothing. It is about transition” (Houlgate on Hegel in Coyne, 1995). Once 
again, the theme of entities emerging into being from the void is present and this 
relates to ways of thinking about compositional structures explored in this thesis, in 
particular, ex-nihilo (out of nothing) creative processes, or musical structures that 
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emerge from noise or interactions of sonic grains, or some form of exponential 
generative process.  
 
As previously stated in the introductory chapter, the purview of this thesis lies 
within the realm of music technology and therefore when considering a musical 
ontology, technology must also be considered in equal measure. Martin Heidegger 
has provided one of the most important critiques of being and technology in modern 
times. Although somewhat mystical in nature, Heidegger’s philosophy clears a path 
to thinking about how technology may be employed in a meaningful way. 
Heidegger asserts that technology ‘enframes’ existence. It is entwined in the very 
fabric of being, and nothing can escape its thrall. This enframing is so absolute that it 
has led to a withdrawal of being; we are no longer able to see the mystery within 
things. Heidegger says that our response to this withdrawal should be a “letting be”. 
We are not able to control the withdrawal but we are able to be aware of it and 
attempt to be “open to mystery within things” (Heidegger, 1954). In this way we are 
able to participate in the withdrawal in a more radical way. We are thus able to see 
the depths of the abyss and respond in a knowing way (Coyne, 1995).  
 
In a 2002 text on Postmodernism and the Postmodern Novel, authors Keep, McLaughlin 
and Parmer state: “Where modernism thought of itself as a last-ditch attempt to 
shore up the ruins of Western culture, postmodernists often gleefully accept its 
demise and plunder its remains for artistic material.” They also conclude by 
speculating that postmodern authors will “turn the detritus of our collapsing ‘meta-
narratives’ into the stuff of a new mode of representation”. Furthermore, this literary 
experiment will take place in what they term “the ethereal void of the electronic 
word”. Here we see both recognition of the void (as referred to by Heidegger as the 
‘non-ground’), and the allusion to the act of ex-nihilo creation: an emergent creative 
experiment, enframed in a technological milieu. While this is by no means a 
complete encapsulation of postmodernist thought, these ideas are pertinent to this 
thesis as they point toward the technological and creative possibilities inherent in 
postmodernist tropes. 
 
There are other ontological facets that should be considered here, namely where the 
thesis stands in relation to the two overarching movements of our era: modernism 
and postmodernism. Again, the theme of between arises: the argument of this thesis 
oscillates between the modern and the postmodern. It stands in opposition to some 
of the central tenants of modernist music, that is to say, the formal (musical) system, 
hierarchies of ‘low’ and ‘high’ art, and the need for a composer’s individual style.3 
Conversely, it embodies modernist traits, such as an interest in abstraction and 
paradoxes, an interest in an internal ‘I’ (i.e. concerns with consciousness), and the 
creative use of systems. 
 
Furthermore, it is postmodern in some important ways, such as, the atomization of 
the self (in authorship), the creation of meaning from ‘différance’ (Derrida in Berger, 
2003), a concern with self-referential structures, and the “incredulity to 
metanarratives” [formal systems] (Lyotard in Berger, 2003). It seeks to be egalitarian, 





(where there is little distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ art). It posits something 
new, particularly in compositional method, and also in what is ‘asked’ of the 
audience, as meaning is founded in negotiation. 
 
So whilst the thesis encompasses tenets of both modernism and postmodernism, it 
only rejects some modernist ideas and in many respects occupies space both between 
and outside of both paradigms. As Andrew Pickering points out (Pickering, 2011), 
the ontology of cybernetics itself is distinctly non-modern, both in its rejection of 
modern academic dualism and in its emphasis on ontology over epistemology (also a 
preoccupation of Phenomenologists such as Heidegger, and Pragmatists such as 
Dewey (Coyne, 1995)). This boundary-crossing, non-hierarchical position is also 
aligned with the man-machine egalitarianism found in much post-human discourse, 
as ascribed by writers such as Wiener, Hayles, Gray,4 and others. 
 
The cybernetic composer Brian Eno describes two states of being that inform his 
work: “All of the encouragement of modern life is to tell you to ‘pay attention to 
yourself’ and ‘take control of things’. We can invent technologies and we can think of 
ways of organizing the world to our advantage, to our benefit. However, the other 
thing we obviously love doing is almost completely the opposite; putting ourselves 
in positions where we’re not the primary figure, where we are not in control, we’re 
carried along, floating on something. I like this state, which I call ‘surrender’ and 
others call ‘transcendence’” (Eno in BBC, “Arena”, 2010). The practical content of this 
thesis will explore both these states, and their relevance to musical composition: to 
surrender to the automatic flux and flow of generatively created soundscapes, while 
simultaneously being able to focus on them and manipulate them for musically 
beneficially outcomes. This state of surrendering to the flux, while at the same time 
manipulating for advantageous outcomes is best summed up in cybernetic terms by 
Stafford Beer’s prescriptive conceptualisation of how cybernetically designed 
systems work in practice: “instead of trying to specify it in full detail, you specify it 
only somewhat. You then ride on the dynamics of the system in the direction you 
want to go” (Beer, 1972). Beer’s ideas were central in developing Eno’s compositional 
systems that employed technology (Whittaker, 2003). Ideas also parallel Heidegger’s 
response to the withdrawal of being: ‘letting be’ while simultaneously participating 
in the withdrawal in a more radical way. Here again the theme of ‘between’ is 
discovered. 
 
Epistemologically, this thesis does not align itself with Hegel’s ‘positive’ idealism, 
the continuing positive forward movement of knowledge, to which both modernism 
and postmodernism are related. Instead, it is aligned with Kant’s ‘negative’ idealism. 
This position is defined in terms of ‘as-if’ thinking (Vermeulen and van den Akker, 
2010). As Curtis Peters explains, according to Kant, “we may view human history as 
if mankind had a life narrative which describes its self movement toward its full 
rational/social potential […] to view history as if it were the story of mankind’s 
development” (Peters in Vermeulen and van den Akker, 2010). They further define 
this position in relation to metamodernism, as “attempting in spite of inevitable 
failure”, and “seeking a truth that it never expects to find” and go on to state that 
“humankind is not really going toward a natural but unknown goal, but they 




Vermeulen and van den Akker, 2010). It is also worth stating that ‘as-if’ thinking is in 
accordance with ‘black box ontology’ and the notion of circular causality that lies at 
the heart of cybernetic discourse, where the emphasis is not on start and end points 
and a progression from one state to the next, but on the ultimate unknowability of 
outcomes and the sustainability of an emergent state. Ideas of the ultimate 
unknowability of reality in modern times date back to Pascal, who went against 
Aristotelian precepts and the ideas of Descartes to posit that there is no such thing as 
a priori knowledge, but that this should not prevent scientific investigation. In a 
sense, this is a performative ontology, one in which we may only know the world via 
interacting with it (BBC “In our Time”, 2013). 
 
This epistemological position also resonates with Nietzsche’s ‘perspectivism’, a 
position that is “against positivism” (which he believes provides only facts). In 
describing the antidote to this, he states: “in so far as the word ‘knowledge’ has any 
meaning, the world is knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning 
behind it but countless meanings – perspectivism” (Nietzsche, 1987). So the best way 
of knowing something is to attempt to see all perspectives and to accept that all 
perspectives, including one’s own, are driven by “a lust to rule; each one has its 
perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm” 
(Nietzsche, 1987). 
 
Derrida goes further in uncovering the ‘non-ground’ that lies beneath the 
foundations of meaning (in language). No word can be said to have ultimate 
meaning; meanings are constantly shifting in a “play of signs”. Analogies may be 
drawn from Derrida’s work and applied to musical analysis. The underlying 
meaning of a musical work is not just culturally dependent; it is constantly “under 
erasure” (Derrida in Coyne, 1995). Again, from this standpoint, meaning within 
music can no longer be said to be disseminated hierarchically with no loss in 
transmission of intent, that is to say, compositions imbued with meaning by one 
individual, namely the composer, for exact interpretation of meaning by musicians 
and subsequently an audience. Instead, meaning is formed as a negotiation, between 
the composer, technology, and the audience. Herbert Brün’s compositional theory of 
anticommunication, examined in this thesis, shares a strong relationship with 
Derrida’s conception of the non-ground in the meaning of language. Brün’s theory 
was developed from ideas present in communication theory, but it has a striking 
similarity to the implications of Derrida’s ideas and presents a useful philosophical 
position from which to examine meaning-making in cybernetic composition5.  
 
The epistemological approach to the practical work that will be conducted as part of 
this thesis will be drawn from cybernetic analogies or metaphors – what the 
cybernetician Gordon Pask called “defensible metaphors” (Pask, 1966). The strength 
of using analogies in design is in the mapping of a viable model onto a nascent one. 
This is particularly apt in models of self-organising or reflexive systems and those 
that in some way seek to imitate the behaviour of intelligence or living organisms, 








feedback is the central self-regulating mechanism. Organisms can appear to have 
seemingly conscious behaviours and self-regulating and generating properties using 
feedback systems alone (Beer, 1972). There are a number of design metaphors that 
will be utilised in forming self-generating (musical) systems. One such model, 
employed by Stafford Beer in his book The Brain of the Firm, is the most viable living 
system known to us intuitively: the model of human physiology (Beer, 1972). Here, 
Beer maps the functions of the human body onto the functioning of a commercial 
enterprise. Beer’s ‘Viable System Model’ will be further extrapolated in this thesis for 
use within a musical composition system. 
 
Models of cognition and intelligence will also be appropriated, particularly those 
that are aligned with constructive theories of consciousness. Professor of cognitive 
science, Douglas Hofstadter, proposes a ‘something from nothing’ hypothesis of 
consciousness in his book, I Am a Strange Loop (Hofstadter, 2007), by asserting that 
the human brain is a mimetic system that mirrors the external world and is able to 
create ever-greater abstractions of the external world. Hofstadter postulates that at a 
certain level of abstraction the organism is able to observe its own actions within an 
environment and reflect on its place. This self-referential loop is what creates the 
illusion of an ‘I’ (Hofstadter, 2007). In looking to create artificial, self-generating 
systems, it is useful to consider self-referential depictive systems that are formed 
from the ability to create complex abstractions. Suffice to say that on a basic level, 
many art forms have this quality: all are in some ways mimetic systems, some are 
capable of abstraction, and some are also self-referential. This can be seen in forms of 
abstract art, film, theatre, dance, etc. In some instances music may also be viewed as 
an abstraction, for example of environmental sounds. The film sound designer and 
author David Sonnenschein notes that many of our emotional cues regarding sound 
and music are formed from our evolutionary capacity for psychoacoustic 
interpretation: the sounds of predators create fear; the sound of prey promotes 
action; rhythms promote sympathetic movements; the frequency range of human 
speech is heightened, etc. (Sonnenschein, 2001). Nonetheless, while music is a highly 
developed emotional language of abstraction and cultural convention, it is seldom 
self-referential and its abstractions are limited by such things as instrumentation 
(timbre, volume, pitch, playing environment, etc.).  
 
However, in terms of music and sound in relation to Hofstadter’s mimetic systems, 
the medium of recording provides an excellent metaphor; in recording the 
representation or mimesis of the external sound world is ‘exact’. In addition, many 
further sophisticated abstractions can be performed (with DSP processing) and 
signals can easily be fed-back, thus enabling a self-referential perspective. The 
composer Agostino Di Scipio’s work with sonic ecosystems exemplifies this 
paradigm. Di Scipio’s self-organising musical systems are embedded in real spaces 
and utilise sound from these environments, which are manipulated via DSP 
processing and feed back into the environment in an evolving sonic process. Di 
Scipio’s compositional model and his emphasis on composing interactions above the 
composition of sonic structures are explored in this thesis and extrapolated for use in 
original musical works. Arne Eigenfeldt proposes that “real-time composition 
ecosystems”, such as Di Scipio’s, should be considered as separate entities to 
electroacoustic compositions and improvisatory strategies: “They are a subclass of 
interactive systems, specifically a genre of interactive composition systems that share 
compositional control between composer and system. Designing the complexity of 
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interactions between agents is a compositional act, and its outcomes are realized 
during performance” (Eigenfeldt, 2011). As this thesis will demonstrate, sonic 
ecosystems possess strong technological and theoretical links with cybernetic theory 
and in many ways may be viewed as the current culmination of the fusing of 
cybernetic ideas with musical composition. Eigenfeldt stresses that sonic ecosystems 
are different from traditional electroacoustic compositions and improvisatory 
strategies and thus should be considered as a different musical genre. This thesis 
explores the development of this distinct form of electronic composition and seeks, 
through original compositions, to reflect a number of important facets of its 
development and ethos, which differ from conventional norms in electroacoustic 
composition.    
 
2.2. Defining Areas Of Study  
 
There are a number of initial musicological starting points to the hypothesis, each of 
which highlights historical tendencies toward considerations of complex systems 
and self-organization in electronic music composition. As Christina Dunbar-Hester 
points out, in perhaps the only paper written attesting to something approaching a 
cybernetic music movement, “Listening to Cybernetics: Music, Machines, and 
Nervous Systems 1950–1980” (Dunbar-Hester, 2010), there is an oblique but 
longstanding tradition of applying cybernetics to music. However, while she does 
examine some of the main composers in this field (such as Louis and Bebe Barron, 
Herbert Brün, John Cage, Gordon Pask, and Brian Eno), other important contributors 
are not considered (Iannis Xenakis, Roland Kayn, and Agostino Di Scipio, for 
example). It is also fair to state that the paper explores few of the philosophical 
underpinnings and technological implementations of cybernetic music in practice. 
 
In its musicological examination of cybernetic music, this thesis will focus on the 
work of composers who have explicitly cited cybernetics as a formative and 
longstanding influence on their compositional practice. However, one exception, 
Alvin Lucier, has been permitted for consideration, as his work and influence are so 
central to the infusion of cybernetic practice into composition that it was too 
compelling to ignore. Lucier has never overtly espoused cybernetic theory in either 
his written output or musical compositions. However, his musical theories and 
technological practice are steeped in the philosophical precepts of pragmatism – a 
school that is very closely aligned to the cybernetic ontology and thus allies directly 
with the purview of this thesis. There are other composers who it would seem are 
eminently eligible for consideration on similar criteria, in particular, Gordon 
Mumma (specifically for Hornpipe (1967)), and Steve Reich (specifically for Pendulum 
Music (1968)). However, these composers’ works are only considered briefly, as in 
Mumma’s case, cybernetics as a compositional ethos was only employed 
peripherally for a short period, and in the case of Reich, cybernetic ideas are not 
iterated at all and his use of technology and non-notational composition was very 









2.3. Research Areas 
 
The structure of the thesis reflects the hermeneutic analysis of the composers’ 
methodologies and the subsequent interrogation of these ideas and practices in a 
series of original compositions, which are analysed in cybernetic terms. Beyond the 
introduction, methodology, and conclusion, the thesis is divided into six primary 
sections, which illustrate differing practices and philosophical ideas in cybernetic 
composition.  
 
• Chapter 3 outlines cybernetic music in context, providing a brief history of 
algorithmic composition and process music with electronics, and its 
relationship to cybernetic music. This chapter serves to elucidate on the 
milieu of the musical movements and aesthetics form which cybernetic 
music arose.  
 
• Chapter 4 examines some of the pertinent philosophical and technological 
ideas that underpin cybernetic composition. This chapter serves to explicate 
in detail, facets of the argument of this thesis that are important to the 
understanding of composers approaches in subsequent chapters and the 
approach taken in the original compositions examined in Chapter 8. These 
facets include: the non-necessity of notation in this particular form of music 
composition and the pragmatic basis for this compositional approach; the 
cybernetic design ethos that is central to this technological compositional 
approach; and, in relation to this, the theoretical and mathematical 
phenomenon of feedback, which is examined in order to illustrate its 
practical and important role in the technological design of cybernetic 
compositional systems. 
 
• Chapter 5 pertains to ‘first-order’ cybernetic music. It begins by further 
outlining the philosophical and technological basis underpinning cybernetic 
music, and proceeds through a number of founding cyberneticists and 
composers in the field, including Norbert Wiener’s involvement in the 
development of the hearing glove, and the work of composers such as Louis 
and Bebe Barron, Herbert Brün, Alvin Lucier, and Roland Kayn. The term 
‘first order’ pertains to a classification defined by many science historians 
and cyberneticians alike in order to distinguish between specific phases in 
the development of cybernetics as a body of scientific theory. ‘First order’ 
implies the founding period of the field, which was born from the 
interdisciplinary nature of defence research during World War Two and 
culminating in its official inception as a scientific field at the Macy 
cybernetics conferences in 1946, which were attended by a majority of the 
main cybernetic protagonists, including Norbert Wiener, Ross Ashby, 
Warren McCulloch, Claude Shannon, Gregory Bateson, and Margaret Mead. 
The founding of cybernetics displayed a preoccupation with control 
mechanisms, closed systems, homeostasis and analogies between animals 
and machines (Heylighen and Joslyn, 2001; Hayles, 1999). The composers 
studied in this section reflect, not only this time period, but also the 
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philosophical and technological approach of first-order systems that tend to 
reflect the tropes of black box ontology, feedback, and closed systems. 
 
• Chapter 6 is concerned with composers and cyberneticists that represent a 
distinctly ‘second-order’ cybernetic approach. Second-order cybernetics 
pertains to an evolution in cybernetic theory that occurred at the end of the 
1960s. Wishing to distinguish themselves from earlier more mechanistic 
approaches, while encompassing the existing established cybernetic 
scientific precepts, contemporary cyberneticists defined second-order 
cybernetics by emphasising autonomy, self-organisation, autopoiesis, 
cognition, and the role of the observer in modelling a system (Heylighen and 
Joslyn, 2001). The composers chosen for inclusion in this section reflect this 
self-reflexive turn in cybernetic theory. Gordon Pask’s musicolour machine 
and the work of the composers Brian Eno and Agostino Di Scipio exemplify 
and echo this evolved approach to cybernetic theory.  
 
• The preceding research culminates in chapter 7, which presents the 
Cybernetic compositional framework, which defines cybernetic composition 
and informs the author’s original work, which is examined in chapter 8. The 
preceding strands of study will be brought together here in order to assess 
the important musical applications and implementations of cybernetics in 
music, and to investigate where theoretical, aesthetic, semiotic, and 
musicological ideas of cybernetics have penetrated compositional practice. 
This will enable the exploration of the interrelationships of theory, practice, 
influence, and effect in a meaningful context and will prove useful in 
designing new implementations of technologies, which will be utilised in 
compositions that reflect the research. 
 
• Chapter 8 encapsulates writings about three original compositions and 
performances that reflect this research in cybernetic music (the works 
themselves are included in the digital materials accompanying this thesis). 
These works stem from the author’s experiments and implementations of 
feedback and cybernetic theory in musical compositions. These compositions 
utilise existing software from various commercial sources and also 
incorporate some bespoke software design. This section of the thesis is the 
culmination of the preceding research and, as such, provides an important 
element of the original contribution to the field. Further exposition and 
critical analysis of each of these works is also provided in order to exemplify 
the implementation of the cybernetic framework outlined in chapter 7.  
 
Conclusions will be drawn in Chapter 9 from the original musicological and 
hermeneutic study to determine the parameters of cybernetic music and its 
distinctive nature in contrast to traditional approaches in electroacoustic 
composition. Further avenues of research in this area will be recommended and the 
implications of cybernetic music will be assessed in relation to current practice in 
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3. Cybernetic Music in Context: a Brief History of 
Algorithmic Composition and Process Music with 
Electronics, and its Relationship to Cybernetic Music. 
 
“Since antiquity concepts of chance, disorder and disorganization were considered the 
opposite and negation of reason, order and organization. It is only recently that knowledge 
has been able to penetrate chance and has discovered how to separate its degrees“ (Xenakis, 
1971). 
 
While the scope of this thesis on cybernetic music has already been stated and is 
strictly defined, it is worth taking some time to consider where cybernetic music 
might exist within the more general field of experimental and electronic music. To do 
this is to add context as to where the antecedents of cybernetic music lie and the 
areas where its influence may be felt. It is important to state that the following 
chapter does not provide a definitive history of experimental and electronic music, 
but its purpose is rather to cite a number of important touchstones that provide some 
context to this thesis. Cybernetic music may be seen as a type of generative music 
that favours heuristics rather than algorithms as its core procreant mechanism.  
Heuristics are a form of adaptable algorithm in which trial and error are key 
constituents in any formula. We may therefore see cybernetic music as being related 
to algorithmic composition and thus more broadly to experimental electronic music 
in which algorithmic composition forms a significant part. 
 
3.1 The Origins of Algorithmic Composition 
 
Cybernetic music can also be seen as existing within a tradition of music that 
incorporates chance elements in the compositional process. To the casual observer, 
this trend may appear to be a relatively contemporary idea springing from 
modernism and the algorithmic possibilities offered by computers. However, Curtis 
Roads states, “Composers have known for centuries that many musical processes can 
be formalized into symbolic representation” and that “behind modern efforts in 
algorithmic composition is a long tradition of viewing music procedurally” (Roads, 
1996). He thus places algorithmic music in a historic tradition of experimentation in 
music. In addition, he also incorporates Process Music into his taxonomy of 
algorithmic composition. Roads dates the beginning of formal processes being used 
in music to 1026 and Guido d’Arezzo’s development of a formal technique used for 
composing melody to text (Roads, 1996), however in truth this tradition probably 
dates back much further and sees its lineage emerge through instruments such as 
wind chimes, Aeolian harps, and the formalised improvisational techniques of the 
ancient world. 
 
There are many examples in the Western art music tradition that exhibit generative 
qualities, including rounds, canons and fugues to name but a few. Perhaps the best-
known example of formal generative methods being used in this mode is Mozart’s 
Musikalisches Würfelspiel (Musical Dice Game), in which sequences of prewritten bars 
of music were assembled according to the throws of a set of dice (Roads, 1996).  
Victorian parlour games such as the Kaleidacousticon and the Quadrille Melodist 
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used a deck of cards with instructions to randomise musical fragments into 
multitudes of compositional possibilities for pianists to perform in real time.  
 
However, while such methods are interesting antecedents, it is with the advent of 
technologies capable of mechanically or digitally representing formal processes in 
music that composers become more fully engaged in algorithmic, aleatoric, or 
generative procedures in music composition.  This is not to say that all composers 
engaged in these methods were using mechanical or digital means to produce their 
compositions. It is perhaps more prescient to consider that the idea of mechanisation 
and its implications, in all its varied forms, seeped into the artistic consciousness and 
permeated composers’ methods. Cybernetics and cybernetic art and music can also 
be seen as part of this paradigm. This cross-pollination of technology and musical 
process in the modern era arises with the advent of modernism in the late nineteenth 
century. The academic Sara Danius proposes this exact thesis in relation to modernist 
literature in her book The Senses of Modernism: “the high-modernist aesthetic is 
inseparable from a technologically mediated crisis of the senses”, and furthermore, 
“perceiving and knowing are realigned when technological devices are capable of 
reproducing sense data” (Danius, 2002). Within this framework we may see 
modernist music as existing in this technologically mediated milieu and its forms, to 
some extent, as reflecting a technological aesthetic.   
3.2 Serialism 
The 12-tone method created by Arnold Schoenberg (1874-1951) came to dominate the 
later modernist era in music between the 1920s and 1950s. While the development of 
the tone-row method can be seen as a direct progression from late romantic music, 
both aesthetically and in form, there is no doubt that the “formalised and systemic 
methods” of serialism (Roads, 1996) also chime with a technological/mathematical 
aesthetic. The musicologist John Borstlap defines the 12-tone method as “systems 
thinking” (Borstlap, 2017). This technical focus is echoed in Mary Simoni’s statement 
that “algorithmic procedures lend themselves well to serial composition” (Simoni, 
2003), and even Xenakis, a major opponent of serialism, concluded that: “the 
quantitative and geometric part of all music, becomes predominant with the 
Viennese School” (Xenakis in Kollias, 2011).  
However, while the milieu of technological advancement and systems thinking had 
an influence on serialism it appears that this manifested itself in a relatively 
restrictive way. Schoenberg’s student Anton Webern (1883-1945) and those that 
taught Schoenberg’s methodology such as Olivier Messiaen (1908-1992) – and those 
who were taught by Messiaen, including Boulez and Stockhausen – progressed and 
enhanced serial methods, generalising the tone-row method to other musical 
parameters such as note durations and dynamic markings. However, despite these 
apparent advancements, Roads reflects that to some extent composers also became 
burdened with complex “precompositional” procedures. These adjuncts to the 12-
tone method lead former serialist composer Herbert Brün (1918-2000) to remark that 
he eventually became “totally stuck” in an “absurd state of completeness” when 
attempting to compose in this way (Roads, 1996). Roads elaborates further in 
describing the perhaps inevitable backlash to such restrictive and prescribed 
methods: “in an attempt to break out of the extreme determinism of serial 
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composition, European and American composers such as Karlheinz Stockhausen, 
Pierre Boulez, John Cage and Earl Brown experimented with aleatoric (and 
stochastic) methods of composition” (Roads, 1996) 
 
3.3 Chance Music 
 
This ‘opposition’ or move away from Serialism was undoubtedly spearheaded by 
John Cage (1912-1992). Cage, also a student of Schoenberg, is credited by many as 
one of the most influential composers of the twentieth century (Nyman, 1999). Cage 
popularised the use of indeterminacy in composition and significantly broadened 
what might be considered as music, with epoch-defining compositions such as 4’33” 
(1952), Imaginary Landscape no. 4 (1951), and Williams Mix (1952). Cage had a close 
relationship with technology, which can be seen as integral to works such as 
Cartridge Music (1960), Fontana Mix (1958), and Williams Mix (1952), but Cage was not 
alone in combining process techniques with technological means. Karlheinz 
Stockhausen (1928-2007) in particular was at the forefront of a European move to 
integrate technology into process-driven composition. His pioneering technological 
works of the 1950s, such as Studie II (1954), Gesang der Jünglinge (1955-56), and 
Kontakte (1958-60), are all fine examples of a technological imperative in his 
composition.  
 
In the years following World War Two, Europe was particularly well served with 
electronic music studios, especially in comparison to America. Prominent examples 
were the RTF studios in Paris, the NWDR studios in Cologne, Germany and the RAI 
Studios in Milan, and significant European composers such as Berio, Messiaen and 
Stockhausen were thus able to access these technological advances with relative ease 
in comparison to their American counterparts (Holmes, 2002). However, many of 
these early works were still tinged with the pre-compositional burdens of the 
serialist method, Stockhausen’s exhaustive scoring for his early tape work Studie II 
(1953) being such a case in point.  
 
Cage’s involvement with the electronic studios in America, in particular his work 
with cybernetic music pioneers Louis and Bebe Barron (which is examined in some 
detail in chapter 5.2 of this thesis), might be viewed as being more progressive than 
his European contemporaries. However, it should be noted that Cage’s own 
compositional method, as employed in tape pieces such as Williams Mix, while not 
serialist in nature, was every bit as pre-compositionally encumbered as 
Stockhausen’s techniques, with the need for a score of potentially reproducible 
results being a primary concern. It also must be said that these compositional 
methods were at complete odds with the unencumbered, non-score-based cybernetic 
processes employed in the Barrons’ compositions, which utilised exactly the same 
equipment as employed by Cage. Nonetheless, Cage’s stochastic methods, using the 
I Ching to determine musical parameters such as length of note and its envelope, 
were in sharp contrast to the controlled, deterministic, serialist methods employed 
by Stockhausen.  
 
Needless to say, while twentieth-century musical titans such as Schaeffer, Messiaen, 
Boulez, Xenakis, Cage, and Stockhausen were engaged in electronic composition of 
one sort or another, it was only a few who were engaging in composition with 
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aleatoric processes in the early 50s. Furthermore, only Cage employed these 
processes in electronic composition in this early, pioneering era of electronic music 
(Holmes, 2002).  
 
3.4 Process Music and Cybernetic Music 
 
In his book Experimental Music, Cage and Beyond (Nyman, 1999), Michael Nyman 
places Cage at the apex of experimental music. However, Nyman places enormous 
emphasis on experimental music being process music. To illustrate this point he 
quotes Morton Feldman: “In the music of both men (Boulez and Cage), what is heard 
is indistinguishable from its process. In fact, process itself might be called the 
zeitgeist of our age. The duality of precise means creating indeterminate emotions is 
now associated only with the past” (Feldman in Nyman, 1999). Nyman’s seminal 
book covers process music as it emanated in the Fluxus movement in the 1960s to the 
birth of minimalism and beyond, and in many ways serves as historical context for 
the British minimalist movement in which he was to become a prominent figure with 
his compositional work of the 1980s. Nonetheless, Nyman’s book is of particular 
interest to this thesis as it comprehensively documents the role of electronics in 
relation to the development of process music and it is at the intersection of process 
music and electronic music that cybernetic music finds its antecedents. Nyman’s 
comprehensive examination of the electronic works of composers such as Alvin 
Lucier, discussed in detail in a later chapter in this thesis (chapter 5.3), is a prime 
exemplar of this cybernetic intersection. Indeed, in his technological analysis of 
Lucier’s work, Thom Holmes cites him as being “the godfather of process music”. 
 
Nyman also examines the work of Terry Riley (b. 1935), whose early compositions 
also exist at this intersection of process music and electronics. Riley, a major 
inspiration in the development of Brian Eno’s cybernetic music, is notable for being a 
pioneer in tape composition, process music, and a founder of Minimalism. Of 
interest to this thesis is the role his tape compositions played in preceding his 
influential minimalist pieces. In 1963 he produced a piece of tape music entitled 
Music for the Gift from recordings of Chet Baker’s jazz ensemble. The piece was the 
first to use tape delay as a compositional mechanism (Holmes, 2012). In a method 
subsequently used to great effect in works such as Pauline Oliveros’s I of IV (1966) 
and Brian Eno’s Discreet Music (1975), a single loop of magnetic tape is fed through 
the record and playback heads of two widely-spaced tape recorders, so that the 
sound recorded on one machine is played back on the other, creating a tape delay, 
which is heard as long delays with successive, degrading repetitions (Holmes, 2012). 
Of this technique, Riley states that, “by varying the intensity of the feedback you 
could form the sound either into a single image without delay or increase the 
intensity until it became a dense chaotic kind of sound […] the engineer [on the 
recording of The Gift] was the first to create this technique that I know of. This began 
my obsession with time lag accumulation feed-back” (Riley, 1998).  
 
This experimentation with tape loops and tape delay led Riley to a technologically 
influenced music of “repeating figures and pulse rhythms” (Holmes, 2012) and in the 
subsequent year he produced the seminal minimalist work In C (1964). In C consists 
of 53 individual short phrases related to the key of C, which are looped and played 
in loose order by an ensemble of musicians. A single piano note keeps a constant 
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mechanical pulse while the non-contiguous looping phrases combine and interweave 
in a complex laminar soundscape. No two performances of the piece are the same, 
since the musicians make choices over which musical phrases to play in real time, as 
the piece is performed. Both these musical forms, the long tape delay and the 
generative qualities of In C, were hugely influential in the cybernetic compositions of 
Brian Eno and a combination of both mechanisms can be seen in Eno’s tape-based 
works such as Discreet Music (1975) and “2/1” from Music for Airports (1978), and 
also in his work that utilises the KOAN generative music software, such as Thursday 
Afternoon (1985) and Generative Music 1 (1996).  
 
3.5 Iannis Xenakis and ‘Free Stochastic Music’ 
 
The most prominent European composer to influence the development of cybernetic 
music was Iannis Xenakis (1922-2001). Xenakis’ development as a composer was 
distinct and his work sharply contrasted with the serialism of his European 
contemporaries. While Xenakis began his career as a composer studying serial 
techniques with Messiaen in the 1950s, his previous training as an architect with Le 
Corbusier and a love of mathematics had a profound influence on the development 
of his work. Xenakis employed visual scores based on architectural concepts and 
mathematical procedures to produce a dense and complex orchestral music, whose 
key acoustic feature was “pointillistic noise” (Zografos, 2017). Xenakis’ main 
conceptual break with serialism was the use of chance in his compositions. However, 
this was distinct from Cage’s conception of chance operations, in which seemingly 
random processes, typically those determined by the I Ching, were used as a 
mechanism to determine musical parameters. Instead, Xenakis employed probability 
theory and mathematical formulae to create music that was “difficult if not 
impossible to compose manually” (Holmes, 2012). In his book, Formalized Music: 
Thought and Mathematics in Composition (Xenakis, 1971), Xenakis describes the 
mathematical inspiration for his pieces being the stochastic elements found in nature, 
such as the behaviour of crows, the sound of falling rain, or wind blowing through 
the trees. Xenakis states: “Since antiquity concepts of chance, disorder and 
disorganization were considered the opposite and negation of reason, order and 
organization. It is only recently that knowledge has been able to penetrate chance 
and has discovered how to separate its degrees – in other words to rationalise it 
progressively, without, however, succeeding in a definitive and total explanation of 
the problem of ‘pure chance’“ (Xenakis, 1971). Here again we see the influence of 
scientific and technological advances effecting musical process. Xenakis titled this 
mapping of statistical values onto musical parameters as “free stochastic music” 
(Xenakis, 1971). It is precisely this mapping of data onto musical values that has a 
distinctly cybernetic flavour and this theme in relation to Xenakis’ work will be 
explored in some detail later in this thesis (chapter 6.3). 
 
Xenakis was not the only European composer in the 1950s to engage in chance 
processes that were different to Cage’s conception. Stockhausen and Morton 
Feldman, for example, wrote works such as Klavierstück XI (1956) and Intersection No. 
2 (1951) “where the performer is placed in a position to make spontaneous or 
rehearsed decisions about the ordering of the music” (Griffiths, 2001). Nonetheless, 
Xenakis’ rigorous mathematical conception of incorporating stochastic means 
became his signature process. His first two works as a mature composer Metastasis 
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(1953-54) and Pithoprakta (1955-56) exemplify the foundations of his compositional 
approach and aesthetic. In the composition of Metastasis, Xenakis “drew an analogy 
between the movement of a gas molecule through space and that of a string 
instrument through its pitch range. To construct the seething movement of the piece, 
he governed the 'molecules' according to a coherent sequence of imaginary 
temperatures and pressures. The result is a music in which separate 'voices' cannot 
be determined, but the shape of the sound mass they generate is clear” (Choong, 
1996). Le Corbusier’s influence on the piece is also explicit in Xenakis’ use of 
















Fig. 1. String Glissandi, Bars 309-14 of Xenakis’ "Metastaseis"(1953-54), Sourced from: 
http://www.furious.com/perfect/xenakis.html 
 
However, Xenakis also utilised a 12-tone row in realising the composition, reflecting 
his debt to Messiaen. Xenakis’ second breakthrough composition, Pithoprakta, 
reflected no such debt to serialism and is often regarded as Xenakis’ first truly 
mature work, “in a style that acquires all its musical elements [solely] through 
mathematical theories and principles” (Zografos, 2017). Xenakis used probability 
theory as an inspiration for the piece; indeed the word Pithoprakta means “actions 
through probabilities”. He used the statistical mechanics of Brownian motion to 
provide values that were mapped onto musical parameters. It is interesting to note 
that Norbert Wiener, the founding father of cybernetics, cites Brownian motion as 
one of his mathematical inspirations for cybernetics (Hayles, 1999). In Pithoprakta, 
Xenakis equated the individual movement of gas molecules in space to the pitch of 
individual string instruments. Again, he used graph paper to represent the mapping 
of time in the x-axis, and pitch in the y-axis. As Simon Emmerson notes, this 
compositional configuration still displays “the influence of the most traditional 
aspects of Western notation” (Emmerson, 2007). Nonetheless, as Emmerson describes 
it, these “models drawn from observations of the non-human world” (Emmerson, 
2007) defined Xenakis’ conception of a formalised music based on mathematical 
processes, which would form the basis for a compositional career of exploration in 
this area. This investigation led Xenakis to utilise cybernetic principles in a number 
of his works (see chapter 6.3 in thesis for further examination). It would also lead 
him to work extensively with computers on pieces such as Amorsima-Morsima (1962) 
and Stratégie, Jeu pour deux orchestres (1962), which assisted him in achieving his 
probabilistic compositions.   
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The 
unabridged version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry 
University.
	 22	
3.6 Chance in Computer Composition 
 
There is no doubt that the advent in the late 1950s of computer systems capable of 
sequencing musical events greatly increased the possibilities of algorithmic 
composition. Composers such as Xenakis, who previously had to painstakingly 
assemble scores from equations and tables of figures, could delegate much of this 
preliminary work to a computer. Furthermore, with the correct software and 
programming, the computer could produce a score, whether visual or note-based, 
and in addition, it could also play back a synthesised representation of the score. 
However, the ability to create software that could improvise or generate its own 
original compositions was perhaps the most radical formulation of this new 
technological advance. Early forays into this type of compositional conception were 
undertaken with the Barr and Stroud Solidac composing computer at the University 
of Glasgow in 1959 and its “Dice-Music Master Program”, and in Los Angeles in the 
early 1960s, Raymond Scott invented the Electronium, a large computer device that 
was programmed with knobs and switches that produced non-predictable outcomes. 
According to Scott “the Electronium is not played, it is guided” (Roads, 1996). 
 
The work of Lejaren Hiller perhaps best exemplifies these early algorithmic 
compositions with computers. At the same time as Xenakis was writing Metastasis, 
Hiller and his collaborator Leonard Isaacson were producing the first computer-
composed composition: the Illiac Suite for String Quartet (Roads, 1996). Programmed 
in binary code, The Illiac Suite was composed on the ILLIAC computer at the 
University of Chicago, where both men were professors. The score was assembled 
from four ‘experiments’. The first three of these were attempts to ‘teach’ the 
computer different aspects of musical rules, melody, harmony, intervals, dynamics, 
etc., and to generate compositions based on these more traditional data sets. The 
fourth experiment was to use Markov chains, a stochastic mathematical process that 
randomises events in a sequence by allowing the computer to ‘forget’ all previous 
values in a data set except the figure that immediately precedes the next event. In 
musical terms this generates a sequence of notes that very rarely repeat. While Hiller 
pioneered these techniques, a number of prominent twentieth-century composers 
quickly followed, notable examples being Xenakis with Atrées (1962), Cage with 
HPSCHD (1969), Koenig with his Project 1 software (1979), and Truax with Arras 
(1980).  
 
Using chance in computer compositions continues to yield ever more complex 
formulations; the use of Cellular Automata in particular demonstrates a 
preoccupation with Artificial Intelligence and emergent behaviours that at first 
glance may seem to be related in some form to cybernetic composition. While these 
works are interesting in their own right and relevant to the milieu in which 
cybernetic composition was born and continues to grow, they cannot be considered 
truly cybernetic as the composition of cybernetic music consists of a human, machine 
and environment paradigm. The pieces explored thus far do not conform to this axis 
and in almost all cases the inclusion of the environment in the compositional process 




3.7 Composition that Incorporates Human, Machine and 
Environment 
 
The inclusion of the environment in composition is ubiquitous; every time a piece is 
performed live, in a concert hall, for example, the sound of the environment enters as 
a factor in the final sound world. However, the conception being considered here is 
one that is particularly pertinent to cybernetic music, namely the notion of the 
environment forming a conceptual and/or structural part of the composition, one in 
which environmental factors deliberately figure in providing the degree of the 
aleatoricism within a piece and, in turn, form a major part of the sonic outcome of the 
composition. This facet is considered multiple times in this thesis and forms a central 
tenet of what we might consider as cybernetic music. However, there are a number 
of composers whose work is not explicitly cybernetic, but who have nonetheless 
included the environment as a key factor in their compositions. A number of these 
antecedent compositions have also been influential on the subsequent work of 
cybernetic composers. 
 
One of the most basic formulations of the human/machine/environment paradigm 
occurs when a microphone and amplification system is placed within an 
environment with a performer. An obvious starting point here might appear to be a 
work such as Stockhausen’s Mikrophonie I (1964), in which he uses the microphone 
like a microscope, to amplify “normally inaudible vibrations” produced by playing a 
tam tam in various ways (Stockhausen, 1971). The score contains stochastic 
mechanisms and at first glance the piece appears to conform to a human/machine/ 
environment paradigm. However, despite Stockhausen’s conception that “the 
microphone is used actively as a musical instrument, in contrast to its former passive 
function of reproducing sounds as faithfully as possible” (Stockhausen, 1971), the 
piece fails to live up to this promise. This is for two specific reasons: firstly the 
microphone is a passive tool, it is merely capturing the sounds. While filters are used 
to alter the captured sound and this element is a human/machine interaction, the 
environment plays little or no conceptual role in the resultant sound of the piece; the 
only factor here is perhaps the choice of microphone, its placement, and the choice of 
amplification, and all of these facets point to the microphone being a tool, not an 
instrument in its own right. Secondly, the environment plays little or no role in the 
aleatoricism of the composition; instead this is conceptually determined by the score 
and the performer. In summary, there is no feedback loop. The performer is not 
reacting to the resultant sound, but reading from a score and thus the piece consists 
of the interaction of a number of determinate, closed systems, not the open system 
that would arise with the inclusion of the environment as an integral part of the 
composition. 
 
In contrast, composer Robert Ashley’s The Wolfman (1964) uses a microphone in a 
way that incorporates the environment as a core component of the sonic and 
compositional superstructure of the piece. The Wolfman is performed by placing a 
microphone in an environment and amplifying the signal with a P.A. system, which 
is driven to the point of feedback. The performer ‘sings’ a series of vocalisations 
while at the same time modulating the resultant feedback tone by changing the 
shape of the mouth around the microphone. Accompanying material is also played 
on tape during the performance. Ashley states: 
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“In The Wolfman the feedback is tuned for whatever place you’re 
performing in. Then into that feedback are put different kinds of 
modulating material on tape. That modulated feedback product is 
passing through the sole microphone in the space, the singer’s 
microphone. That means by just putting your mouth up to against the 
microphone, and by doing simple vocalisms, you can affect that whole 
feedback system in a very slow, modulation filtering sense. That's the 
principle of the piece. The feedback loop and the tape sound is being 
broadcast into that loop. The bottleneck in that loop is the microphone 
so that by treating the resonant cavity right in front of the microphone 
you actually create a model of the room in the size of the vocal cavity. 
It's a very simple principle. The room just keeps moving around and 
changing shape because of the way you shape your mouth” (Ashley 
in Holmes, 2012). 
 
Ashley’s conception of the microphone is very different to Stockhausen’s. Here the 
use of the microphone is a central determinant in the resulting sound of the piece, 
the ‘bottle neck’ – as Ashley puts it – that closes the performance feedback loop.  
 
A slightly different, but no less cybernetic conception of the microphone as 
instrument – and thus one that allows the inclusion of the environment in the 
compositional process – is Steve Reich’s seminal feedback piece Pendulum Music 
(1968). In Pendulum Music, several microphones are suspended in a row above a 
number of speakers, which are on the floor, pointed upward toward the 
microphones. As the performance begins, the amplification system is pushed to the 
point of feedback and each microphone is swung over the speakers creating an 
audible feedback ‘whoop’ or tone each time it passes directly in front of the speaker. 
This creates a sequence of feedback tones whose timing is dictated by gradually 
decreasing the velocity of each swing. The piece ends after approximately 10 
minutes when each microphone comes to a halt and only one continuous, 
accumulative feedback tone can be heard. Reich describes the piece as “the ultimate 
process piece. It’s me making my peace with Cage” (Reich in Holmes, 2012). It is 
clearly evident that the microphone and amplification system used in Pendulum 
Music are being utilised as a musical instrument, even producing pitched tones. 
Furthermore, the audible outcome of the piece is fully dependant on the acoustic 
nodes in the environmental space, which create the particular feedback resonances 
heard in each performance.  
 
Before examining specific cybernetic composers in the following chapters of this 
thesis, the work of David Tudor (1926-1996) is very relevant to the idea of the 
incorporation of the environment into composition. Pianist and composer Tudor is 
known for being the long time associate and collaborator of John Cage. Tudor came 
to Cage’s attention as an extremely accomplished concert pianist, performing the 
leading avant-garde pieces of the 1950s, including the first American performance of 
the Piano Sonata No. 2 by Pierre Boulez in 1950. Tudor performed the premier of 
some of Cage’s most notable works, including Music of Changes (1951) and 4’33” 
(1952) (Holzaepfel, 2006). However, in the early 1960s, as his collaboration with 
Cage matured, Tudor became less interested in performing the piano and began to 
experiment with electronics. Tudor struggled to find his own voice as a composer. 
Nonetheless, it was through his technological collaborations with Cage in the 1960s, 
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such as WBAI (1960), 0′ 00″ (1962), Variations V (1965), Variations VI (1966), 
and Variations VII (1966), that he found his impetus to compose electronic music 
(Pritchett, 2013). Tudor became a pioneering electronic composer, designing much 
of his equipment from scratch. Most of his work with Cage centred around 
amplifying found objects or instruments in an unusual way, as was the case with 
Music for Amplified Toy Pianos (1960). However, Tudor was also a pioneer of 
composing with circuit feedback, where the output of a device is fed back into its 
own inputs and the resultant audio can be manipulated by controlling filters and 
gain levels. Pieces such as Untitled (1972), Toneburst (1975), and Pulsers (1976) are 
prime examples of this type of electronic composition. However, while this way of 
working has many resonances with cybernetic composition, especially with the 
work of Louis and Bebe Barron, these works do not overtly incorporate the 
environment in the compositional process. Nonetheless, a number of other 
electronic pieces that Tudor composed or collaborated on do utilise environmental 
factors in their composition. One such piece is John Cage’s Variations V (1965). 
Variations V is a multimedia ‘Gesamtkunstwerk’ incorporating dance, video and 
music. Composed in collaboration with Cage’s life partner and choreographer 
Merce Cunningham, Variations V incorporates video work from Stan VanDerBeek 
projected into a space where Cunningham’s dance troop perform and react to the 
surrounding environment. While the composition is credited to Cage, much of the 
technological apparatus that enabled the musical performance was envisioned and 
realised by David Tudor and Gordon Mumma. Mumma describes the performance 
set-up as follows: 
 
“The stage contains two systems of electronic sensors; the first is a set 
of focused photocells, the second a group of five-foot-high antennae. 
As the dancers move about the stage they interrupt the light, which 
falls on the photocells. The vertical antennas are capacitance devices, 
which respond to the distance of the dancers from each other, to the 
proximity of the dancers from the antennas, and the number of 
dancers on the stage. The changes of light intensity on the photocells, 
and the capacitive responses of the antennas, are both transmitted as 
electrical signals to electronic music ‘trigger’ equipment in the 
orchestra pit. The musicians operate an ‘orchestra’ of tape recorders, 
record players, and radio receivers, which contain the sound materials 
composed by Cage. Before these sounds are heard by the audience 
they are fed into the electronic-music ‘trigger’ equipment. The sounds 
are then released to loudspeakers in the audience by the triggering 
action of the dancers’ movements on stage. 
Because the functions of these two separate sensor systems overlap, 
the correspondence of the dancers’ movements on the stage and the 
sound movements in the auditorium are extremely complex” 
(Nyman, 1999). 
 
In this instance, unlike in The Wolfman or Pendulum Music, the sound in the 
environment does not form part of the compositional superstructure. The sounds 
are derived from recorded materials. Nonetheless, other factors in the environment, 
principally the movement of the dancers, determine the structure of the 
composition, in this case by only playing snippets of recorded audio material when 





It is clear from the above circuit diagram that Rainforest was a feedback system in 
which multiple sound sources, either from the original sound source (say a tone 
generator) and the contact microphone source (placed inside the sculpture) could be 
fed back in a variety of complex ways, either into, or out of, the initial sound source 
mixer, or into, or out of, the contact microphone mixer. This means, for example, that 
microphone source could be fed back into the speaker to reinforce the resonance of 
the sculpture, or that the resultant sound could be fed to multiple sculptures in the 
space, and vice versa.  
 
With respect to "Rainforest IV", Tudor said: “the object was to make the sculptures 
sound in the space themselves. Part of that process is that you are actually creating 
an environment. The contact mics on the objects pick up the resonant frequencies 
which one hears when very close to the object, and then are amplified through a 
loudspeaker as an enhancement" (Tudor, 1985). Furthermore, Gordon Mumma 
reiterates the ecological nature of the piece: "the entire electro-acoustic apparatus 




While there is no doubt that Cage, Tudor and Mumma were all exposed to 
cybernetics, and we shall examine some of this acquaintance in later chapters7, they 
never claimed to be cybernetic composers. However, this does not mean that their 
work is to be ignored or their influence overlooked when considering cybernetic 
music, particularly when examining works that have an overt 
human/machine/environment paradigm of the kind that is prominent in some of 
the preceding works. We should also not ignore the importance of algorithmic and 
generative music in the formulation of cybernetic music. Indeed, some notable 
commentators such as Boden and Edmonds trace the lineage of generative music 
directly back to cybernetics (Boden and Edmonds, 2009). However, we must make a 
distinction here because as generative music implies an ecological/non-
deterministic/non-hierarchical character, synonymous with cybernetic music, this 
ethos is largely absent from most forms of algorithmic composition, which are 
primarily concerned with mathematical operations not eco-systemic paradigms. 
 
This is not to say that mathematics is absent from cybernetic music, far from it! 
However, the mathematics of cybernetic music tends not to be the probability-based 
calculations of Stockhausen, Xenakis and Cellular Automata, but the open-ended 
and sometimes paradoxical formulations of feedback, autopoesis and complexity 
theory. 
 
So the conception of cybernetic music that follows is not one that is separate from the 
musical, scientific, mathematical, and technological continuum described above, 
rather it is one that is a very definite and defined example of this intermingling, with 
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4. Musical Notation, Electronic Technology and 
Cybernetics: a Pragmatic Perspective 
 
[Western art music’s] assumptions are those of post-Renaissance humanism and 
individualism, and it has the characteristic virtues and limitations of that viewpoint. If we 
compare it with the music of the rest of Europe’s history, not to mention that of the rest of 
mankind, it begins to look like something of an historical freak (Small, 1996). 
 
Traditionally, composition has been a matter of notation and formal organisation. 
Conversely, many modern musical works that utilise electronic technologies do not 
rely on formal notational systems. This chapter makes the case for cybernetic 
compositional systems that do not adhere to traditional forms, and in particular, 
those that do not elevate notation or score as the ultimate musical artefact. 
 
Three main areas will be examined: firstly, the pragmatic philosophical position 
as it relates to technology, which argues that text-based forms such as notation are 
unnecessary in works that utilise electronic media; secondly, the consideration of 
the value cybernetics may have as a systematic framework for musical 
composition with electronic technologies that does not require notation; thirdly, a 
mathematical explanation of feedback, as it pertains to cybernetics, and some 
description of how it may be incorporated both as a control mechanism and as an 
audio phenomenon in musical composition.   
 
4.1 Musical Notation 
 
The practice of composition since the Second World War has embraced electronic 
and non-musical technologies in an ever-increasing symbiotic relationship. The use 
of these modern technologies has in some cases undermined the necessity for 
traditional notation, particularly where pieces are either predicated by the 
technology – as is the case, for example, with Steve Reich’s Pendulum Music (1968) 
– or where the piece is the result, not of formal musical experimentation, but of a 
‘non-musical’ process, such as with Alvin Lucier’s Music for Solo Performer (1965). 
 
To understand the position of notation within these modern electronic works, 
and its relationship to what we might term the ‘finished piece of music’, it is 
useful to frame notation within a pragmatic philosophical context, in particular 
the notion of the technological means and the artistic ends. The philosopher 
Richard Coyne contends that: “Pragmatism advances the thesis that theory is a 
kind of practice. Pragmatism also embraces liberalism. In contrast to the 
Cartesian tradition, it also affirms embodiment and engagement of the senses in 
human experience. It also asserts the formative power of technology in human 
affairs” (Coyne, 1995). 
 
First expounded by the philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952) and later expanded 
on by Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980) philosophy divides h u m a n  interaction 
with technology into three broad epochs; the first epoch is the “pre-technological 
era”. Here, means and ends are integrated; tools do not signify anything other than 
themselves and their use in achieving short-term goals.  
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Fig. 3. A graphical interpretation of the relationship of means, ends, goals and outcomes in 
McLuhan’s conception of the pre-literate society. 
 
The forms preserved in pre-literate societies today exemplify music of this era. 
Here, music is not notated, but improvised. The act of playing music is often a 
transformative process as part of a rite or ritual (Coyne, 1995). Music is not only a 
product of practice; it is also a tool in itself. It provides both a means – of inducing 
altered states of consciousness in a battle trance, for example – and also mitigates 
the ends – for example, of forming a collective identity and battle cry when 
advancing into conflict (Jordania, 2006). Here, music is formed as group activity, 
where the music-makers and the audience are one in the same. Meaning is 
derived by collective action and interpretation. 
 
 
Fig. 4. A graphical interpretation of the relationship of means, ends, goals and outcomes in 
McLuhan’s conception of the literate society. 
 
The second epoch is the “ technological age” (the literate society) in which means 
and ends are separated; means are subservient to ends and text is the dominant 
technology of this era. This separation of means and ends begins with Plato’s 
abstractions of perfect forms and is perfected in Cartesian Dualism (Coyne, 1995). 
Music of this era begins with the abstraction of musical notation and 
culminates in the romantic era of the nineteenth century. Here notation and 
instrumentation are the technological means. However, the technology in itself 
seldom mitigates the ends, it merely facilitates the ends. The end is not only the 
piece of music; it is also the intended emotional significance. Dissemination of 
meaning is seen to be hierarchical: imbued by one individual, namely the 
composer, for interpretation by musicians and subsequently an audience. 
 
The third age is the current ” scientific/electronic era”. Here, means and ends 
are partially reunited. Means may now direct process and point to new 
discoveries. In the modern era, according to the pragmatic philosopher Larry 
Hickman, “Theory became a tool of practice and practice a means to the 
production of new effects. Theory no longer had to do with the final certainty 
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but instead, as working hypothesis, with the tentative and unresolved” (Hickman 




Fig. 5. A graphical interpretation of the relationship of means, ends, hypothesis and 
outcomes in McLuhan’s conception of the post-literate society. 
 
In the scientific/electronic paradigm, the means mitigate the ends and in some 
cases they converge with no single entity taking precedence in the creative 
process. Electronic and digital tools are the dominant technologies of this era 
(Coyne, 1995). Music of this epoch is mitigated by electronic technologies, which 
take precedence over notation as a way of recreating a musical experience in 
another time and place, and in some cases, the electronic means utilised within 
a composition mitigate the outcomes to such an extent that the “medium 
becomes the message”. In this type of musical work, meaning is no longer 
disseminated hierarchically, but is more often formed by a negotiation – between 
the composer, technology, and the audience. 
 
Marshal McLuhan believed that with the invention of the Gutenberg printing 
press, Renaissance man had traded “an ear for an eye” (McLuhan in Coyne, 
1995). With the invention of the telegraph, however, McLuhan asserted that 
humans had shifted back into the aural-acoustic world, which he termed the 
‘post-literate society’. He further postulated that the post-literate society shared 
many characteristics with the pre-literate society, stating that in the second 
(rational) epoch, the visual sense was dominant, but in pre-literate and post-
literate societies, the auditory sense is foremost (Coyne, 1995). 
 
It is therefore reasonable to assert that in the post-literate society, notation 
(musical text) is no longer the dominant technological means in the compositional 
process, but merely a tool that may be selected from a series of options. In many 
cases, particularly where technology mitigates the end result, notation is often 
redundant, both as a creative tool and a storage medium for accurate 
reproduction. 
 
“For McLuhan, in the electronic era ‘the action and the reaction occur almost at the 
same time’. Electricity produced a great historical reversal in making things 
instant again. ‘Electric writing and speed pour upon humans, instantaneously 
and continuously, the concerns of all others are known and we become tribal 





It is perhaps no coincidence, therefore, that within this context the type of 
improvisational forms found within pre-literate societies have seen a resurgence in 
modern times (Cee, 2010); free improvisation, jazz and new approaches to classical 
music may all be seen as part of this milieu. The burgeoning use of graphical scores 
may also be seen as part of this paradigm. Here, the usurping of the technology of 
traditional notation sees the blurring of means and ends, which mirrors the way in 
which electronic technologies are often utilised to the same effect within 
composition. 
 
4.2 Cybernetic Design and Music 
 
It is important to distinguish, however, between certain musical practices that 
employ technology, as many of these still point toward the logocentric, 
technological age, while others adhere to the less hierarchical scientific/electronic 
model. Creative musical works that utilise electronic technologies tend to fall into 
two broad camps, which (to borrow from the terms of Stafford Beer), I shall refer to 
here as the ‘reductive technological paradigm’ and the ‘generative technological 
paradigm’ (Beer, 1994). 
 
In the reductive paradigm, all the parameters of systems that employ electronic 
means in the compositional process are predesigned and orientated toward a 
known goal. These systems seek to eliminate problems such as circular causality 
and paradoxes. Their aim is to produce ‘perfect’ structures (in the Platonic sense) 
that reduce or eliminate errors. This approach stems from traditional, formal, score-
based composition and (in electronic terms) is related to the field of artificial 
intelligence. The field of music informatics exemplifies this paradigm. Here, musical 
parameters – notes, frequency information, or metadata – are reduced to 
representational information that may be manipulated for the purposes of score 
design, analysis, mimicry, recognition, or categorisation. Technology is employed as 
a means to an end, with the conceptual priority on the achieving of the ends. The 
technology is only a tool in producing the end result (Coyne, 1995). 
 
To provide some concrete examples, this might be, for example, a composer 
utilising the Sibelius sequencing software to produce musical works, or a computer 
program that can recognise the works of specific composers and can also imitate 
such work, or a software program that can recognise melodies, harmonies or lyrics 
and cross reference these with a library of recorded works. This field also 
encompasses some forms of systematic composition, particularly those with fixed 
goals. 
 
It is notable that in all these cases, the emphasis is on pitch over timbre and that the 
act of composition is achieved solely via human intelligence; compositional 
parameters are seen as being conceived by human agency alone with specific human 
goals. This is a ‘top-down’ process, where all the structures within the system are 
defined by the composer and controlled to produce a fixed result. This is a closed 
system paradigm, in which environmental factors are conceptually expunged. If the 
composer or software designer wishes to approach anything like intelligence within 
the software design (as is the case in recognition and mimicry), it is a very 
computationally expensive process (i.e. it uses large amounts of memory, or is 
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concerned with large data sets), as all possible parameters within the compositional 
system must be known beforehand. 
 
Conversely, the generative paradigm involves the symbiotic process of music 
creation between the technology and the composer. It embraces circular causality as 
a central tenet and sees errors as a vital part in any system’s capacity to learn. Here, 
the means mitigate the ends and in some cases they converge, with no single entity 
taking precedence in the creative process. According to Brian Eno, this is a ‘bottom-
up’ approach, meaning the systemic or technological aspects act as a ‘seed’ that will 
‘grow’ the composition, in opposition to an Artificial Intelligence approach where 
the entire ‘tree’ must be known in advance (Eno in Toop, 2004). 
 
This compositional approach is related to the field of cybernetics. Here, the 
control of the output is not imposed from ‘above’, in a hierarchical formation, but 
is instead achieved through a balance of control between all parts of the system. 
Examples of this type of approach would include a composer influencing an 
algorithmic process in real time, the layering of sound in a non-linear, semi-
randomised process, or soundscapes that react to changes in the environment in 
which they are embedded (Toop, 2004). These works are often reflexive or self-
referential and outcomes are not fixed but instead adhere to a “class of goals” 
(Beer, 1994), that is to say that these musical systems can produce unintended or 
unpredictable outcomes, but each iteration (each run of the system) maintains 
enough sonic coherence to theoretically allow a listener to identify it as that 
particular piece of music.  
 
Heuristics are a device that is often employed in this type of creative enterprise. 
These are not algorithms or an aleatoric processes; they don’t produce set results or 
chance outcomes, but rather results that are unpredictable, but which adhere to a 
‘class of goals’. Here, errors are not seen as anomalies to be expunged from the 
process (as in A.I.) but as a vital part in any creative or learning process (Beer, 1994). 
 
According to Stafford Beer, a good way of describing an heuristic would be to 
imagine that you wanted to go to the top of a mountain. If you were to do this 
using a system like artificial intelligence, you would have to describe every 
obstacle, every rock or nook or cranny of the mountainside and provide an 
appropriate map, requiring a huge amount of information. Alternatively, if you 
were to use an heuristic, you’d simply give the instruction “keep going up” and 
this modest command would bypass the need for all the extraneous information 
about the environment. Only feedback from the environment encountered in the 
runtime of the heuristic would be pertinent. Therefore, an heuristic is a very 
simple set of instructions that adhere to a known criterion, which can be 





Generative and real-time compositional processes often adhere to this heuristic, 
environmentally-coupled model. Central to these modes of composition and more 
pertinently to cybernetics is the concept of the feedback loop. Feedback is the 
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mechanism by which a system is able to reinforce or suppress stimulus without 
prior knowledge of the environment. In a living organism, a “criterion of 
stability” (Ashby, 1952) is embedded in feedback mechanisms and this allows for 
the possibility of autopoiesis (a self-sustaining organism). Thus, feedback 
mechanisms can demonstrate characteristics of intelligence; however, the 
amount of data needed to create this type of command-and-control structure is 
extremely minimal (Beer, 1994). 
 
Feedback loops are central to many engineering systems. One such example is a 
lavatory cistern, which is a very simple but effective feedback loop; as the handle 
is flushed, the ballcock sinks to the bottom of the tank, thus opening a valve 
that fills the tank again with water. When the ballcock floats to the top of the 
tank on the ascending tide of water, this closes the valve. According to Beer, a 
system such as this ‘knows’ nothing of its environment but its behaviour exhibits 
some minimal characteristics of intelligence (Beer, 1994). 
 
A cybernetic system is one that can react to environmental stimuli and adapt to 
achieve internal stability. However, it is important to make a distinction between an 
organism or machine being ‘aware of itself’ and being ‘self-conscious’. In his 
elucidatory book Brain of the Firm (Beer, 1994)8, cybernetician Stafford Beer asks us 
to “define awareness behaviourally” (Beer, 1994). Ashby states “machines are what 
they do” (Ashby, 1953). Beer further argues: “We define an assemblage of entities as 
a system because they appear to be acting cohesively.” If the system responds to 
stimulus, “then we can say it is aware”. Stimulus is defined as something that 
“alters the operation of the system” (Beer, 1994). Beer is also careful to point out that 
a system does not require knowledge of the environment to react to stimulus, as this 
is only registered internally. In general, “a system avoids or otherwise counteracts 
stimulus which disrupts its activity, and embraces or seeks to increase a stimulus 
which favours its activity” (Beer, 1994). He further postulates: “responses to stimuli 
by aware systems are either negative or positive […] It follows that the aware entity 
has, in some sense, the ability to judge which is which” (Beer, 1994). A system’s 
criterion of smooth operation is based on internal stability. If we shrink away from a 
burning flame it is because the pain exists inside us; it upsets our internal 
environment. It might be intuitively presumed then that because organisms are able 
to categorise stimuli and know in advance of environmental dangers or advantages 
that this must be an essential component of designing viable systems and machines 
(especially to protect against unforeseen circumstances). “All this is mistaken”, 
asserts Beer. All a system requires is “a way of measuring its own internal tendency 
to depart from stability, and a set of rules for experimenting with responses which 
will tend back to an internal equilibrium” (Beer, 1994). In cybernetics, a system that 
can survive arbitrary and un-forecast interference is known – in Ashby’s terms – as 
an ‘ultrastable’ system (Ashby, 1952). An ultrastable system survives not by 
perceiving external threats, but by adhering to its own internal check system. We 
can conclude from this that ‘intelligent’ systems are often very simple and may have 
the appearance of conscious thought, but are in fact non-conscious entities, 






In order for a system to be self-regulating, feedback mechanisms must be employed. 
Beer states: “what the term (feedback) means strictly is so fundamental to cybernetic 
thinking that its connotations should be unravelled with some care”. He defines 
feedback as “the return of a system’s output to its input, which is thereby changed. 
Positive feedback takes an increase in output back to increase the input; negative 
feedback takes back an output increase to decrease the input and is therefore 
stabilizing in principle” (Beer, 1994).  
 
In the terms of this thesis, it is conceptually important to state that almost all audio 
applications and in particular DSP processes utilise feedback as a mechanism of 
operation. This is particularly true of those that incorporate delay, such as filters, 
equalisation, reverb, delay lines, compression, etc. A basic example, in audio terms, 
is a typical feedback delay circuit (such as in Fig. 6), which consists of a signal input 
(i) and an output (o). A delay line is placed between the input and output (Delta t) 
and a feedback line is routed from after the delay, passed through an amplifier (*) 
and fed back into the signal line before the delay circuit, which allows addition or 
subtraction of amounts of feedback from the signal. This type of circuit can produce 
several effects (depending on the amount of delay time and feedback); typically it is 
known as a feedback delay but with shorter delay times it is also a flanger, or comb 
filter (Davis & Jones, 1990). 
 
 




The delay line minus the feedback line will only produce a single repeat of a sound 
signal. However, if the feedback path is added, multiple repeats are possible. The 
larger the volume of the feedback path, the greater the output volume and number 
of repeats. 
 
The universal feedback circuit Beer describes in Brain of The Firm (Fig. 7) is one that 
is commonly found in electrical and control engineering. It is capable of producing 
positive or negative feedback (reinforcing or negating stimulus). It is also “a self-
regulating mechanism which does not rely on understanding causes of disturbance 
but deals reliably with their effects” (Beer, 1994). This is significant, as it stands in 
opposition to many of the symbolic representation models in A.I. research, which 








criterion of stability, and sends either a positive or negative signal to an ‘effector’, 
which acts to either repel or attract the stimulus. To explain further, “a sensorium is 
anything within a system that can register and classify the existence of stimulus” 
(Beer, 1994). It measures the amount of stimulus against a criterion of stability. For 
example, if this were a temperature scale then ‘very hot’ or ‘very cold’ would be 
registered as ‘pain’ or ‘danger’ by the C of S, which would then set the switch to 
‘avoid’ at these extremities and ‘attract’ in the ‘comfortable’ zone. To decide 
between A and B the system must compare outcomes of making either choice 
against the C of S. “To do this, its simplest strategy is to do a little avoiding and a 
little reinforcing, testing out the results on its criterion, and then firmly setting the 
switch. Error is an important and necessary part of decision-making and a vital 
element in the creation of a stable system. It is worth noting that if experimentation 
goes on too long, the system will go into oscillation. All systems are prone to this 
phenomenon, in engineering it is called ‘hunting’ and in physiology ‘ataxia’” (Beer, 
1994). 
 
4.4 Variety and Recursion 
 
In addition to the notion of feedback, Beer introduces us to some further 
“conceptual components” essential to the understanding of cybernetics. These 
include ‘heuristics’, ‘variety’, and ‘recursion’. As we have already noted, Beer 
defines an heuristic as “a set of instructions for searching out an unknown goal by 
exploration, which continually or repeatedly evaluates progress according to some 
known criterion” (Beer, 1994). It is important to note that this is in contradiction to 
an algorithm, which “is a technique for, or mechanism, which prescribes how to 
reach a fully specified goal”. An algorithm will produce a fixed outcome, whereas 
an heuristic will produce an outcome within a “class of goals”. Beer further 
elucidates that “heuristics prescribe general rules for general goals”. To return to his 
axiom, which is so critical in terms of cybernetic musical composition, it is in 
connection with how heuristics work when interacting with complex systems that 
he states: “instead of trying to organize it in full detail, you organize it only 
somewhat; you then ride on the dynamics of the system in the direction you want to 
go” (Beer, 1994). 
 
In complex systems, the amount of external stimulus flowing into an agent can be 
very large. We have seen how noise/error can be reduced but even allowing for this 
function, the sheer amount of pure information being input, processed and output 
from a system can be incomprehensibly vast. In cybernetics, the term ‘variety’ is 
used to describe “the total number of possible states of a system, or of an element of 
a system” (Ashby, 1952). According to Ashby’s ‘Law of Requisite Variety’, “control 
can be obtained only if the variety of the controller (and all parts of the controller) is 
at least as great as the variety of the situation to be controlled” (Ashby, 1952). 
Variety must also incorporate error. This poses a problem in engineering terms, as 
the internal variety of the system must ‘mirror’ the external situation, creating large, 
complex, and inefficient control systems. So, in order to maintain operation of 
accurate and complex perception, decision-making, and action processes, ways of 
reducing variety must be found, if efficiency is to be achieved. Beer cites the 
Algedonode (Beer, 1994), a cybernetic machine of his own creation, as a mechanical 
example of such a feedback circuit, which effectively reduces complex variety and 
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produces ‘correct’ responses to dynamic circumstances. Analogous to this, in audio 
technology, the act of recording sound (by analogue or digital means) very 
effectively mirrors the external sound environment and reduces variety to 
manageable states, in what Shannon terms ‘redundancy’ (Shannon, 1948 & 1951). 
Once audio information is captured in this way (particularly in digital form), it can 
be measured and manipulated to produce (via measurement and manipulation of 
DSP) responses or desired outcomes. Audio processors may also be considered as 
variety reducers or amplifiers. For example, an audio filter can greatly reduce the 
variety of an audio signal, while harmonic distortion will increase it. 
 
So, in thinking about the cybernetic design of electronic music composition systems, 
we may envisage a method of recording and means of signal processing that 
interacts with the environment in real time. The concept of ‘recursion’ is also 
important; in the context of designing such a cybernetic system, this pertains to a 
recursive coupling, in which, by a series of feedback loops, all components of a 
system (including those that route out to – and back from – an environment) are 
linked; a change in one area of the system will affect all components of the system 
by incremental interlinked degrees. Thus each element is recursively linked and no 
one element of a system exerts overall control. Within such a system, switches (or 
criterions of stability) may be set to reinforce or suppress stimulus, based on a 
continuous feedback process, which tests the composition for certain 
oppositional parameters. This is a  dialectical, conversational process that exists 
within an environmental context. These operational parameters may be derived 
from measurements of information from the soundworld, such as amplitude, 
frequency, rhythmical content, etc. These parameters may then be compared in 
relation to each other and linked together to form a matrix of control functions; a 
change in one area may indicate the need to adjust another compositional 
component. Via this process, the machine may shape this material into a 
compositional structure, either independently or with human interaction.9  
 
It is also important to emphasise that, in general,  cybernetic works of music are 
ephemeral and each iteration is unique. Musical works are formed in real time as 
they interact with an environmental space, and the act of composition tends to be in 
the composition of the interactions between human, machine, and environment, 
with the aim that these interactions produce emergent behaviours that may be 
heard as music (Di Scipio, 2003).  
 
4.5 Representational Versus Non-representational Systems 
 
The above examination could conceivably beg the question, why bother to take the 
cybernetic route to making a compositional system, rather than the well established, 
symbolic artificial intelligence approach? Firstly, musical notation is a good tool to 
use with computers if one wishes to produce music that adheres to the traditions of 
Western art. However, as Denis Smalley and others have pointed out, notation is a 
poor descriptor of many modern electronic musics (Smalley, 1997). This is 
particularly true when the medium mitigates the message in a technologically 





(beyond notation) that speak to common systemic control factors in a 
human/machine/environment paradigm. 
 
Secondly, as Douglas Hofstadter points out, artificial intelligence is not able to 
solve the problem of computer compositions sounding creative or original 
(Hofstadter, 2007). Furthermore, according to the technological philosopher, 
Richard Coyne, computer interfaces are also very poor at interacting with 
human behaviour in a meaningful or creative way (Coyne, 1995). There are 
some good reasons for this, with the lack of feedback mechanisms in many A.I. 
systems, the inability to creatively utilise ‘error’, and the Cartesian dualism that 
permeates much of this research, to name but three. Finally, A.I. makes systems 
based on the Cartesian paradigm function more ‘efficiently’, whereas cybernetics 
focuses on sustainability, which encapsulates the creative act and creativity as 
fundamental elements. So in order to create a self-sustaining musical system 
that can respond to its environment and interact with a composer in a 
meaningful way, we must turn to the more pragmatic approach that cybernetics 
offers. 
 
To summarise: New forms of compositional structures are akin to pre-literate 
forms of musical practice, where performance and process are mediated by 
technologies, and ends or outcomes are not fixed but held within a frame of 
ritual or ontological beliefs. Within this context, the technology of notation can 
be seen as the dominant technology of a past era and not of the current time. 
New technologies are directing us toward an expanded musical epistemology 
and an ontology that is more akin to the pre-literate society than the literate. 
 
Composers such as Lewis and Bebe Barron, Herbert Brün, Roland Kayn, Brian 
Eno, Agostino Di Scipio, Gordon Pask, I a n n i s  Xenakis, and John Cage, 
amongst others, have laid the theoretical and creative foundations for utilising 
cybernetics within musical composition. Cybernetics offers an engineering 
framework that allows composers to design electronic musical systems that are 
meaningfully interactive or self-creating without needing to utilise notation. It also 
adheres to a pragmatic position, which sees the blurring of means and ends in 
the compositional process. A.I. views computers as tools – the artificial thinking-
machine is a subservient entity. Cybernetics offers an alternative view, one in 
which computers can be vibrant, symbiotic entities that may partner us in our 
creative acts, assisting and enhancing our creative endeavours in reflexive, 
























































5.1 Norbert Wiener – Cybernetics and the Inception 
of Electronic Assistive Audio Technology 
 
We know that for a long time everything we do will be nothing more than the jumping off 
point for those who have the advantage of already being aware of our ultimate results 
(Wiener, 1953). 
 
This examination of Norbert Wiener’s (1894-1964) involvement with the 
development of the  ‘hearing glove’ is something of an aside from the main purview 
of this thesis, which is concerned with musical composition. However, it is an 
important perspective to consider, as it demonstrates an interlinking of cybernetics 
and audio technology at an early stage in the development of both fields. Assistive 
technology is important in the context of this thesis in relation to the 
Human/machine/environment paradigm of cybernetics and the implications this 
has for music composition.  
 
Music making is intertwined with tools and technologies, from instrumentation to 
notation. Though we may imagine a Platonic, idealised musical piece in the mind, in 
the attempt to realise it in the real world, it becomes mediated by many contingent 
conditions. Even a-cappella vocal singing is mediated by environmental factors and 
social or musical conventions (such as the aforementioned technology of notation). 
These contingent conditions can alter the Platonic idea of the music in unforeseen 
and unpredictable ways. We may say that the ‘idea’ of the music becomes somewhat 
subject to probabilistic processes in its translation from the mind to the finished 
work. In thinking of this phenomenon, one might assume that the more contingent 
or ‘abrasive’ the mediating technology, the less fluid it is at ‘translating’ our idealised 
form, and thus the more probabilistic processes come into play in this translation. 
Thus, there exists a tension between the imagined and the realised, and this 
dichotomy comes into sharp relief when we consider how machines assist us in 
creating music.  
 
A common conception in music composition that utilises technology is that the 
machine perfectly assists the user in realising imagined pieces of music and that 
probabilistic processes are not an issue in any ‘translation’ process. In examining the 
extent to which technology may introduce probabilistic processes into compositions, 
it is worth considering assistive technologies that aid severely disabled composers; 
here the focus of how a technology is assistive is at its most pertinent and much 
might be considered about the degree of mediation or translation involved in the 
design of such a system. An example here might be using voice recognition to trigger 
a music-sequencing package. While this technology might be enabling in the sense 
that it ‘gets the job done’, the process itself might be very laborious and time 
consuming. The rigidity of the machine might well constrain the possible options. 
We might also consider that in this model the technology is not an equal partner, it is 
merely a subservient tool, a means that only exists for the ends. There is very little 
that is adaptive or reflexive about this technology.  
 
Another factor that needs to be considered with the voice-triggering example is the 
extent to which the technology is replacing a part of able-bodied functionality. This 
question is important as it points to where much of the thinking behind this type of 
assistive technology comes from, which is deeply rooted in Platonic ideas concerning 
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‘perfect forms’ and the mind/body split that is synonymous with Cartesian dualism. 
So rather than ‘accepting’ the body as it is, the technology seeks to force the 
functionality of the physique; to make the body be of comparable ability to one that 
conforms to an idea of a perfect form. This thinking also elevates the mind over the 
body; the body is a tool that can manifest ideas that correspond to internal perfect 
forms in the external world. 
 
Clearly, these aspects of assistive technology present us with some problems, 
particularly when we move beyond designing tools with clear-cut goals and begin to 
consider technologies that might drive process and point toward new creative 
possibilities. ‘Straightforward’ tools are useful and have a justified role to play in 
assistive technology, but they are not akin to technologies used in many scientific 
applications. According to Marshal McLuhan, in the scientific/electronic era, we see 
the blurring of means and ends, where the technology has the ability to direct 
process and point toward new conclusions and discoveries (Coyne, 1995). A good 
musical example of this type of technologically-driven process in music making 
would be Alvin Lucier’s I am Sitting in a Room (1969), where the technology and the 
environment mitigate the outcome to such an extent that ‘the medium becomes the 
message’. What is imagined by the composer may only be realised through the 
enframing power of the technological and environmental milieu; the sound of the 
piece and the composer’s intensions are wilfully at the mercy of these conditions. 
 
In order to improve human/machine interaction in music making, it is worth 
revaluating the design and use of creative machines that assist process. A new 
framework is needed for this type of endeavour, one that embraces circular causality, 
breaks with the Cartesian tradition, and points toward new creative possibilities. 
Cybernetics offers us a constructive way of examining these issues. Indeed, as shall 
be demonstrated, cybernetics lies at the core of much of the thinking behind the first 
electronic assistive technologies that were designed for audio applications.  
 
One interesting consequence of applying cybernetic principles when studying 
systems is that boundaries between entities can become buried or broken down; 
when one conceptualises information, control, and communication as an integrated 
system, entities may no longer be separate but seen as part of a unified whole. This 
idea is most pertinent when we consider the boundaries of the human subject. The 
anthropologist and cybernetician Gregory Bateson pondered this conception of 
boundaries when he considered the question, “Is a blind man’s cane part of him?” 
(Bateson, 1972). In general we would consider human boundaries to be defined by 
epidermal surfaces. However, N. Katherine Hayles asserts, “cybernetic systems are 
constituted by flows of information. In this viewpoint, the man and the cane join in a 
single system, for the cane funnels to the man essential information about his 
environment.” This viewpoint is the same as when we might consider a “deaf 
person's hearing aid, a voice synthesizer for someone with impaired speech, a helmet 
with a voice-activated firing control for a fighter pilot" (Hayles, 1999) – and for that 
matter, a music ecosystem capable of autonomous composition and reflexive 
interaction with performers.  
 
We might observe in the above list of assistive technologies that it moves "from 
modifications intended to compensate for deficiencies to interventions designed to 
enhance normal functioning" (Hayles, 1999), and that this transitional list further 
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demonstrates how conceptually difficult it is, from a cybernetic perspective, to draw 
distinctions between these categories. However, one of the founding fathers of 
information theory and cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, considered that it was critical to 
draw distinctions between certain types of assistive technologies; namely those that 
fall into the categories of being either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ machines. In his book The 
Human Use of Human Beings (Wiener, 1950), Wiener states that machines become evil 
when they are rigid and inflexible. "The ultimate horror is for the rigid machine to 
absorb the human being into itself, co-opting the flexibility that is the human 
birthright" (Hayles, 1999). By contrast, the cybernetic machine is flexible and 
adaptive, maintaining homeostatic stability in the face of all-consuming entropy. For 
Wiener, the "cybernetic machine is ranged alongside man as his brother and peer" 
(Hayles, 1999). The cybernetic machine reinforces rather than threatens the 
autonomous self: "when boundaries turn rigid or engulf humans they lose their 
agency, the machine ceases to be cybernetic and becomes simply and oppressively 
mechanical" (Hayles, 1999). And thus we see the paradigm of the repetitive and 
restrictive vs. the symbiotic and enhancing. 
 
Cybernetics is a science of analogy and metaphor, the most pertinent one being that 
‘living organisms are like machines.’10 This analogy can be demonstrated from an 
information perspective; analogical relationships can be constructed between living 
and mechanical systems that demonstrate similar patterns of information and 
behaviour. It is important to recall that in cybernetics, “Analogy is not merely an 
ornament of language but a powerful conceptual mode that constitutes meaning 
through relation” (Hayles, 1999). It also allows us to cross boundaries and offers a 
powerful conceptual framework in design. Cybernetic machines are not merely 
compensating for lost behaviour; they are working symbiotically with human entities 
to enact new analogies or new approaches to outcomes. 
 
Cybernetics lies at the core of the inception of electronic assistive technologies. In her 
paper “Cybernetics and Disability” (Mills, 2011), the academic Mara Mills writes: 
“Information theory and cybernetics emerged in a milieu committed to the 
materialisation and control of communication, rather than the ‘erasure’ of materiality 
and bodies. As a consequence, these fields prioritized certain kinds and 
arrangements of bodies above and beyond the sheer isolation or transfer of 
information” (Mills, 2011). “Early cyberneticians paid an obsessive attention to 
embodiment – through a policing of human difference that required as much 
physical labor as information exchange – as well as to physical media, which were 
evaluated in terms of their efficiency for carrying signals and their compatibility with 
human norms” (Mills, 2011). 
Norbert Wiener’s ‘Hearing Glove’, was just such a cybernetic device. An early 
electronic haptic interface, it was developed in the electronics labs at MIT in 1949. 
Designed as an aid for deaf people, it converted sound waves into electromagnetic 
vibrations that could be felt in the fingertips. The hearing glove was built upon 
technologies such as the Vocoder and the Spectrograph that were developed at Bell 
Labs almost a decade earlier. The device was most notably associated with Helen 
Keller, who visited the MIT labs on a number of occasions to test the device. Wiener 





cybernetics to human beings” (Keller, 1950). “The prosthesis Wiener designed can be 
understood as operating through analogy, for they transformed information from 
one modality into another” (Hayles, 1999).  Machinic analogues were required to 
mediate between sensory domains. “The hearing glove was a ‘strong analogy’, a 
concrete analogue that replicated the speech processing performed by the inner ear. 
Although the glove was not a digital device (it did not quantize speech waves), it did 
filter the ‘information’ from the ‘non-information’ or redundancy in speech. This 
abstraction of information from speech waves was not abstract in the sense of being 
immaterial: the frequencies subtracted from the human-generated speech wave were 
transferred directly to other material media. Moreover, the information transmitted 
by the glove was defined with reference to certain physiological parameters” (Mills, 
2011). Beyond tactile hearing, Wiener conceived of the glove as a feedback device to 
correct what he called the “grotesque and harsh intonation of deaf speakers” (Mills, 
2011).  He also suggested that these principles could be used as a basis for further 
work in sensory replacement. In his 1950 overview of cybernetics for the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, Wiener discussed the glove as a prime example of 
both feedback and information compression (Mills, 2011).  
Fig. 9. Norbert Wiener using the Hearing Glove: https://arts.mit.edu/stefan-helmreich-
discusses-upcoming-symposium-material/(2017) 
Cybernetic music is rooted in questions about how technology might best assist us. 
In the hearing glove we can see a cybernetic model of an assistive technology that 
mirrors the use of cybernetics in electronic composition, one that utilises analogy to 
cross boundaries and operates in real time. It also works symbiotically with the user 
by filtering out unnecessary information in order to make the ‘translation’ experience 
seamless and un-rigid. The example of the hearing glove demonstrates that 
conceptions of technological interfaces and audio technology have been with us since 
the earliest days of electronic music. Yet, even today, the cybernetic model 
encapsulated in the hearing glove is rarely made explicit in electronic music. From 
this point forward, this thesis examines the story of cybernetics in musical 
composition and how these conceptions of non-subservient tools are becoming ever 
more accepted as common assistive technologies in this realm. The hearing glove 
points toward how a cybernetic machine might partner us in a creative endeavour 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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and if we apply the spirit of these ideas to music composition this manifests in a 
rejection of perfect Platonic forms and an embracing of probabilistic processes; we 
may only realise the piece of music by interacting with the technology, the 
technology mediates the outcome in real time and therefore mitigates the outcome, 















































5.2 Louis Barron, Bebe Barron & John Cage 
 
In order to create electronic life, you have to be free to abuse the circuit 
(Louis Barron in Greenwald, 1986). 
 
One of the most prominent examples of cybernetic analogies being utilised with 
early electronic audio technologies is the work of Louis (1920–1989) and Bebe (1925–
2008) Barron. These pioneering composers not only produced the first piece of 
electronic music to tape in America, Heavenly Menagerie in 1950 (Holmes 2002), they 
are also credited with creating music using cybernetic principles, most notably for 
the seminal 1956 science-fiction film Forbidden Planet (MGM, 1956).  
 
Louis and Bebe originally hailed from Minneapolis and both studied music to degree 
level at the University of Chicago and the University of Minnesota respectively. After 
the couple met, they moved to New York and married in 1948. As a wedding present 
they were given a gift of one of the first tape recorders to be imported into the United 
States from Germany (Wierzbicki, 2005). Intrigued by the possibilities of this new 
technology, Bebe Barron recalls that they “did the usual experiments: slowing the 
tapes down, running them backwards, and adding echo” (Juno and Vale, 1994). To 
support themselves during the early 1950s, the Barrons opened a recording studio 
business in Greenwich Village that catered for the burgeoning New York avant-
garde scene. This was the first electronic music studio in America and one of the first 
in the world, predated only by Schaeffer and Henry’s studio at RTF in France 
(Holmes, 2002). Louis’ expertise with electronics allowed him to expand the studio’s 
equipment, building oscillators, speakers, and delay and reverb units.  
 
Concerning the studio’s technology, Bebe recalls: “We were using the same 
equipment that the classic electronic studios were using, although we were more 
limited because, number one, we were considerably earlier than most of them and 
we had to make a lot – in fact almost all – of our equipment. We were also limited 
financially because we didn't have an institution behind us” (Holmes, 2002). 
 
 
Fig. 10. Louis and Bebe Barron in their Greenwich Village Studio in 1956 (Taylor, 2013) 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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After moving to California for a brief period, the Barrons refined their knowledge of 
the German tape machine by making recordings of a number of notable authors, 
including Anaïs Nin, Henry Miller, and Aldous Huxley. These were later released 
under the title of Sound Portraits on the Barrons’ own record label (Wierzbicki, 2005). 
 
The couple returned to New York in 1950 and quickly became part of the bohemian 
art scene in Greenwich Village, gaining a reputation for their work with sound and 
electronics. It was here that they met John Cage (1912–1992). At the time, Cage was 
predominately interested in utilising chance operations in his compositions. 
According to Holmes, Cage’s interest in engaging chance procedures in his works 
had three main motivations. Firstly, to “create music for which the outcome was not 
preconceived – composition that was indeterminate of its performance” (Holmes, 
2002). Secondly, to disengage “a composer from their natural instinct for making 
pretty music” (Holmes, 2002). And thirdly, to “remove the composer’s taste entirely 
from the process of making composition” (Holmes, 2002). It was from this 
philosophical position, which on the surface appears akin to cybernetic precepts 
concerning order from chaos, that Cage proceeded to engage in composing by 
electronic means.  
 
Cage contacted the Barrons to ask if they would act as sound engineers for a series 
of tape-based compositions that Christian Wolff, Earle Brown, and Cage himself 
were proposing. Cage had recently received a grant of $5000 from a young 
millionaire, Paul Williams, with which to achieve these experimental tape-based 
pieces (Wierzbicki, 2005). The most prominent work to emerge from these 
experiments was Cage’s Williams Mix (1952). Cage conceived of the piece as a mix of 
environmentally recorded sounds that were to be spliced together on a series of 
tapes. The order, length, and dynamic contour of the recorded material were to be 
determined by his method of chance operations. Cage’s favoured technique for 
producing random number sequences in this period was the I Ching, the ancient 
Chinese Book of Changes. He took the numbers generated by the I Ching process and 
assigned them as operators to determine different musical parameters within the 
piece. Cage stipulated that recorded sounds should be in six categories: city sounds, 
country sounds, electronic sounds, manually produced sounds (including musical 
instruments), wind produced sounds, and small sounds requiring amplification 
(Holmes, 2002). The recording and editing of the score was a major technical 
achievement, not least because many of the environmental sounds had to be 
recorded on location, not an easy feat with equipment that was far from portable 
(Holmes, 2002).11  
 
Williams Mix took nine months of work to complete and saw its first performance in 
1953 at the Festival of Contemporary Arts at the University of Illinois. The piece was 
performed using 8 tape recorders and was the first octophonic piece of music 
(Collins, 2010a). Its controversial reception can be heard in the raucous, mixed 
reaction it received from the audience at a notable recorded live performance at 
New York Town Hall in 1958, where applause and cheers can be heard mixed in 
equal measure with verbal disdain and displeasure (Cage, 1952). While Williams Mix 
was surely groundbreaking in its utilisation of technology coupled with random 





academic Simon Biggs contrasts Cage’s work of this period with that of Iannis 
Xenakis, and concludes that while Xenakis’ work is derived from cybernetic 
principles, Cage’s work by contrast may be “cosmetically similar”, but it 
nonetheless derives from different sources of inspiration, namely that of neo-Dada, 
Fluxus, Eastern philosophy, Jazz, and traditional African music (Biggs, 1987), and as 
such it cannot be considered cybernetic in its inception. At this time, Cage’s instinct 
toward chance operations also has a different impetus from the cybernetic 
recognition of probabilistic processes. Cage wished to remove the self, ego, and 
emotions from the compositional process, in order that it might be unaffected by the 
composer’s memory or taste (Andrews, 2012). Furthermore, the influence of Eastern 
music and philosophy gave Cage his primary view of music’s purpose, that of 
producing a “sober and quiet mind, thus making it susceptible to divine 
influences”. This was in contrast to what Cage saw as the traditional view of music’s 
purpose as “communication” (Cage, 1991).  
 
While on the surface, some of Cage’s aspirations appear to chime with a cybernetic 
compositional perspective,12 for the cybernetic composer there is no overt desire to 
remove ego and emotions from the compositional process, rather there is a 
recognition that there are always probabilistic processes at play within the 
compositional process. The process of cybernetic composition focuses on the 
interaction of man, machine, and environment, and the information flow between 
the elements of the system and the composition of these elements take precedence 
over any musical notation or implied emotion imbued by a composer. There is also 
a recognition that there is no innate meaning within music and that the audience 
will imbue the work with its own meaning, therefore, the memory and taste of the 
composer does not need to be usurped; it is incorporated as an equal element in the 
compositional process, but it is by no means the primary focus. 
 
And again, while superficially, it would appear that Cage’s Eastern influence might 
find favour with many cybernetic composers, his view that music should produce a 
“sober and quiet mind, thus making it susceptible to divine influences” (Cage, 1991) 
is entirely absent from the cybernetic standpoint. And while some cybernetic 
composers, such as Brian Eno, produce music that could be said to induce such a 
state, others such as Roland Kayn distinctly do not. Nonetheless, in neither case can 
it be said that it is the intention of these cybernetic composers to produce music 
with an overt ‘purpose’ or implied meaning.   
 
While it is almost certain that Cage had some familiarity with cybernetic ideas 
before the composition of Williams Mix, despite initial impressions, the piece itself is 
quite distinctly un-cybernetic in its compositional approach. Firstly, it is not designed 
to be ephemeral (a characteristic of almost all cybernetic composition and a trope to 
be examined many times in this thesis); the score attempts to define a consistent and 
repeatable piece of music, which theoretically, is the same in each performance. 
Secondly, the composition does not overtly include the environment in its 
performance; while environmental noises are used as the basis of the recorded 
material, no environmental factors are used as control mechanisms or live sonic 
inputs in the performance. Finally, the technology is used simply as a means to an 





or as something that drives process and points to new discoveries: man, machine 
and environment are to a large extent kept separate in the compositional process.  
 
By contrast, the Barrons’ own compositional approach was overtly cybernetic. After 
completing Williams Mix in 1953, the Barrons gained a reputation for composing 
electronic music for films, most notably in collaboration with the film-maker Ian 
Hugo (husband of Anaïs Nin), and also in commercial advertising work (Holmes, 
2002). These projects provided the opportunity for introductions to major 
Hollywood studio executives and in 1955 the Barrons gained their most important 
musical commission, composing the music and designing the sound effects for the 
seminal science-fiction film Forbidden Planet (1956). It was their work on this film 
that cemented their reputation as pioneering electronic composers and it also 
established their cybernetic compositional method.  
 
Louis had a passion for electronics and the emerging field of sound synthesis and he 
saw these new technologies as fertile ground for creating new forms of musical 
expression. In the quest to design more sophisticated audio circuitry, he studied 
Norbert Wiener’s 1948 book, Cybernetics: Or, Control and Communication in the Animal 
and the Machine. Here, Wiener makes several references to the practical application 
of vacuum tubes to mimic or replicate systems found within living organisms. For 
example, on page 130, Wiener discusses modelling the function of a neurone (nerve 
cell) and states: “it is perfectly possible, for example, to cause any message going 
into storage to change in a permanent or semi-permanent way the grid bias of one 
or a number of vacuum tubes, and thus alter the numerical value of the summation 
of impulses which will make the tube or tubes fire” (Wiener, 1948). Furthermore, 
electronics engineer and musician Phil Taylor notes: “An entire chapter is devoted 
to the topic of feedback and oscillation and describes a non-linear oscillator more 
commonly known as a relaxation oscillator. This type of circuit is used to generate 
the sawtooth waveform that drives the raster scan in a T.V. set, creating the picture. 
Relaxation oscillators were constructed from gas – usually neon or argon – filled 
tubes known as thyratrons. These relaxation oscillator and ring modulator circuits 
were a few of the building blocks that Louis used to create his unique sounds” 
(Taylor, 2013). Following the principles and equations described in Wiener’s text, 
Louis constructed many variations of custom oscillators and ring modulator circuits 
using the valve technology that was ubiquitous to the electrical engineering of the 
day. His approach was not to think in terms of classical signal processing, but to 
treat the circuit as a living organism going through a lifecycle – of birth, life, and 
eventual death (Wierzbicki, 2005). Bebe states: “What we did was to build certain 
types of simple circuits that had a peculiar sort of nervous system, shall we say. 
They had characteristics that would keep repeating themselves” (Holmes, 2002). 
 
Analogue valve circuitry is distinct from subsequent transistor or digital sound 
technologies as it can be overloaded by hundreds of volts beyond its normal 
operational capacity, thus pushing the circuitry into unknown and inherently 
unstable states of operation, something that is impossible to achieve with transistors 
or micro-processors. Of this phenomenon, Louis stated: “in order to create electronic 
life, you have to be free to abuse the circuit” (Greenwald, 1986). In order to produce 
the unique tones heard in Forbidden Planet, Louis built individual circuits for 
different themes or motifs. Taylor notes that “this was an innovative approach to 




Fig. 11. An example of Louis Barron’s cybernetic circuit diagrams (Taylor, 2013) 
 
The sound circuits often tended to burn out irreparably, which made the process of 
recording essential in capturing these ‘never to be repeated’ sounds. Bebe recalls: 
“No matter what we did, we could never reconstruct them. They just seemed to have 
a life span of their own… We never could predict the movement of them, the 
patterns of them. It really wasn't like composing music at all” (Holmes, 2002). The 
ephemeral noises created by overloading the circuits were edited and compiled by 
Bebe, who also further manipulated the sounds on tape, using effects such as reverb 
and tape delay, to produce a rich and dynamic electronic soundscape. Although both 
had trained in composition, they did not consider this creative process to be 
composition but rather a cybernetic process; instead of the circuits producing ‘notes’, 
they were defined as ‘actors’, which could be designed to replicate the actions or 
characters within the film. It was not until they worked with John Cage that they 
were persuaded by him to consider their soundscapes as music (Chaudron, 2011).  
 
It is also interesting to note that the Forbidden Planet soundtrack blurs the distinction 
between music and sound effects. The Barrons were originally hired to produce 
sound effects for the film, but the studio was pleasantly surprised with the 
musicality of the results and asked the Barrons to score the entire soundtrack for the 
film (Wierzbicki, 2005). In film sound-theory terms (Bordwell and Thompson, 1985), 
the Barrons’ soundtrack blurs the distinction between music and sound effects, 
between what is diegetic and non-diegetic sound (that which may be heard by the 
characters within the story world of the film, and that which is not). While, the mise-
en-scène of a film is not a ‘real’ environmental space (it is a fictional one constructed 
on a film set), the use of film sound in this way displays similarities to Brian Eno’s 
approach to ambient music, in that it is music that is designed to mingle with the 
surrounding environment and the sounds of each should interact in the audible 
space, blurring the distinctions between music and environmental sound.13  This 
mingling of music and sound effects is very unusual in conventional film sound 
(more commonly, it tends to be a feature of cartoons); however, it does share traits 
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When considering this notion of the environment playing a role in cybernetic 
composition, it is also worth noting that real environmental factors affect analogue 
circuitry in a way that is not found in digital or transistor technology. Room 
temperature, humidity, and changes in mains voltage greatly affect the performance 
of valve circuitry, and just as in conventional musical instruments, this has an 
important effect on the pitch and timbre of electronic musical instruments that utilise 
valve technology. While this may be regarded as a minor interaction in the real time 
compositional process, it does comply with the human/machine/environment 
paradigm at the centre of cybernetic ontology.  
 
However, it is the way in which the circuits were used in the compositional process 
that highlights the Barron’s cybernetic intentions. Louis was primarily interested in 
designing audio circuits that had an organic ‘built-in uncertainty’ and was, by 
contrast, decidedly unimpressed with the electronic synthesisers that were to follow 
his inventions. For Louis:  
 
“[A synthesiser is] designed to do something precisely and repetitively, even 
if the repetition is just the cycles of a sine wave. It’s locked in, it’s 
lobotomised – it doesn't have a chance to express itself. It simply expresses 
what you want to express, nothing more. But to turn that around, to ask 
what the circuit wants to express regardless of my intention, now that has 
authenticity. It's an authentic expression; it produces certain qualities that 
have feelings to them… synthetic to me is the opposite of organic. Synthetic 
music lacks this life-like quality. I think that to some extent, I’ve been able to 
create circuitry that doesn't have a complete description of what it's going to 
do. It makes sounds that you can resonate to; it creates emotional rapport… 
With synthesisers you tell the machine what you want and then hope that it 
can do it. With me, I don’t know what I want – I've given up wanting. I 
might have an expectation, but I’m process orientated. I care about what 
goes on, and I accept what comes out. If it sounds good I accept it gratefully” 
(Greenwald, 1986).  
 
The Barrons saw their audio circuits as models of organic life, which is a distinctly 
cybernetic viewpoint. It is also interesting to note that when Louis speaks of 
“emotional rapport”, it is not as a response to a composer’s intended emotional 
meaning but in relation to a performative interaction with a technology as it is 
producing sound. Thus, we see the presence of the performative ontology that is 
central to cybernetic thinking. Sources such as Holmes, Wierzbicki, Greenwald, and 
others state that Louis’ interest in Wiener’s work underpinned not only his approach 
to building audio electronics, but also the philosophical approach to their working 
method.  
 
According to scientific historian, Andrew Pickering, one of the central tenets of a 
cybernetic ontology is a performative image of the world, a ‘black box ontology’, in 
which the world is only knowable through our interactions with things in it. “A 
black box is something that does something, that one does something to, and that does 
something back – a partner in, as I would say, a dance of agency” (Pickering, 2011). 
In describing the Barrons’ compositional process, the necessity of performance and 
interacting with a black box (in this case the analogue audio circuitry) is central to 
the Barrons’ approach. In conversation with Ted Greenwald, Louis describes 




“’It could be a voltage coming in from the outside, or it could be letting more 
current pass internally by changing a resistance, or by adjusting some kind 
of feedback.’ The method of control is always manual [performed], a variable 
resistor or capacitor built right into the circuit. Louis doesn’t think in terms 
of filtering, amplifying, oscillating, or any of the component sound-shaping 
processes that synthesists are familiar with. ‘The circuit itself would have a 
number of those things going on internally to get the total result. If it 
sounded good to us, we’d try to capture it on tape. From then on we’d have 
the tape as working material […] these circuits are as if a living thing were 
crying out, expressing itself. There’s an organic type of behaviour going on. 
[…] This life-like quality makes our approach very different from what’s 
called the classical electronic music studio, which uses oscillators, filters, 
equalizers, and other laboratory instruments. Luening and Ussachevsky 
were getting started with that at the same time we were. I felt that that was 
the wrong direction, because laboratory instruments are made to be very 
precise and very definite, and people aren’t. Art isn’t. In working with the 
circuits, you think they’ll do one thing, and usually they do something even 
more interesting that you hadn’t expected. […] So I tried to make a circuit, 
not unpredictable, but with a built-in uncertainty” (Greenwald, 1986). 
 
There are other cybernetic traits evident in the preceding quotations. Firstly, a will on 
the part of the Barrons to be distinct in their approach to composition, on this aspect 
Louis noted that: “The musical community absolutely hated the word electronic. Our 
greatest enthusiasm came from painters, poets, and dancers. Musicians felt that we 
were betraying the whole cause” (Greenwald, 1986). Furthermore, they also wished 
to be distinct from other electronic music studios, they did not use the same 
approach or instrumentation (filters, oscillators, etc.) as other contemporary 
electronic sound studios. Louis was explicit in that he wished to build circuits with 
inherent instabilities and then drive them beyond their operating capacity in order to 
obtain interesting and uncertain results. This approach embraces a performative 
human/machine/environment paradigm and is distinct from all other forms of 
composition with electronic music except the cybernetic approach. Secondly, it is 
clear that within the technological compositional process, the means and the ends 
have become blurred; the means (the technologies) are no longer simple tools, to be 
utilised with a fixed goal in mind. Here, the means are driving the process and 
pointing to new discoveries. This is in keeping with McLuhan’s hypothesis of the 
post-literate society (Coyne, 1995), which also postulates a non-utilisation of text-
based scores and an emphasis on performance in the process of making meaning. 
 
It is also worth noting that Louis Barron identified other types of compositional 
processes that were akin to his own cybernetic approach. In discussing his disdain 
for enforcing notation-based composition on electronic instruments by adding 
musical keyboards to synthesisers, Louis stated: “I see more interaction in the way a 
Theremin works. It made some charming ballet numbers if the proximity of the 
dancers was controlling the music. That’s an example of a looser relationship, an 
opportunity for the performer to do something different – not just different for the 
sake of being different, but meaningful – different in a way that makes sense“ 
(Greenwald, 1986). To reinforce this interactive, performative approach, Baron states 




“But a computer is a very rigid thing… The greatest performing musicians 
almost always take liberties to stretch something, or to tighten it up. They’ll 
play with it; they’re not rigidly tied to a metronome. It’s actually the attitude 
with which you engage yourself, and the machine that determines what 
comes out. There will be people who want to explore, but that exploration 
can’t be conducted with a computer at the moment. I’m interested in things 
that present computers can’t, or don’t bother, to do. They’re working on 
machines, which will take their input in natural language, rather than 
artificial language. We should be able to throw a switch that allows 
occasional errors – not so much errors as discrepancies” (Greenwald, 1986). 
 
Here we see Louis’ frustration at a community of electronic music composers and 
manufacturers who are, in his opinion, increasingly ‘going in the wrong direction’ – 
away from a cybernetic ontology and toward a more traditional reductive approach. 
Louis’ viewpoint chimes with Heidegger’s view of technology as an all-consuming, 
constrictive and reductive force, one, which he believes, conceals true being. 
Heidegger states that we cannot escape the concealing power of technology; we can 
only participate in it in a more radical way, one in which we might, if only fleetingly, 
reveal true being. The Barrons’ approach would suggest a recognition of the 
revealing possibilities of the technology that they utilised, a technology that was 
designed to create sounds, but was unconstrained by musical convention or notation; 
a technology that was usurped in unconventional ways in the hope that it might 
produce or reveal unconsidered insights.  
 
By orthodox standards, even in a modern context, the Barrons’ music is unusual; in 
conventional parlance it is ethereal, mysterious, and otherworldly, but it is also well 
structured, intriguing, and strangely beguiling. Its originality is a testament to the 
Barrons’ singular cybernetic vision, something which stands as a beacon for all other 
























5.3 Alvin Lucier  
 
No ideas but in things (William Carlos Williams, 1927). 
 
The work of Alvin Lucier (b. 1931) exemplifies the transition that a number of 
prominent composers underwent during the second half of the twentieth century: a 
shift that moved away from a classical, modernist approach to composition, in 
favour of a process-driven, postmodern, cybernetic approach. The study here traces 
Lucier’s musical progression and examines his impact on cybernetic composition. 
Lucier’s arrival at compositional forms that are essentially cybernetic in nature is 
largely autodidactic and this is reflected in the somewhat biographical nature of 
some of the following exposition. Although Lucier would not necessarily recognise 
himself as a cybernetic composer, it is certain that he knew something of Norbert 
Wiener and cybernetics (Lucier, 2012). Because of his associations with Edmond 
Dewan and Gordon Mumma, it is possible that he knew something of the detail of 
the central tenets of cybernetics, but if that is indeed the case, it is only expressed in 
the briefest of terms in his writings. However, his work does exhibit a fundamental 
identification with cybernetic thinking, in particular the recognition that (in the 
creative act) human, machine and environment form an interlocking and symbiotic, 
holistic system. As the philosopher of science Andrew Pickering notes, “real-time 
feedback coupling between performer and performance” and “the decentering of 
the self into a technological apparatus” (Pickering, 2011) are prominent features of 
Lucier’s compositions. Lucier’s work also sees the incorporation of ends (goals) into 
means (technologies), where outcomes (of musical works, for example) are not fixed 
but contingent on the probabilistic processes and complex interactions between 
these elements. Pieces such as I Am Sitting in a Room (1969), Vespers (1968), and 
Music for Solo Performer (1965) allow ends to be incorporated into means by letting the 
technologies involved in their creation drive process and point toward new 
discoveries.  
 
Alvin Lucier was born in 1930 in Nashua, New Hampshire, to a musical family. 
Alvin’s parents wanted him to study the piano, but he displayed little interest and 
instead preferred to obsessively practice the drum kit that was set up in the basement 
of the family home (Miller-Keller, 2011). This early attachment to rhythm would 
have an impact on many of his subsequent compositions, such as Music for Solo 
Performer (1965) and Vespers (1967), which both utilise percussion instruments, and 
have strong rhythmic elements. As a teenager, Lucier developed a passion for buying 
and listening to records, primarily jazz and big band music, but also classical music 
such as Schoenberg, Beethoven and Brahms: “I knew I was being a little bit snobby 
climbing a rung above my family’s taste, although in no way would I ever knock that 
taste” (Lucier in Miller-Keller, 2011). Nonetheless, Lucier’s personal discovery of this 
music led to a broadening of his palate and an interest in new musical possibilities.  
 
In 1949 it was decided that he should attend Portsmouth Priory boarding school in 
order to attain the grades necessary for him to enter university. Lucier describes his 
education with the Benedictine monks as a formative period. This was a time in 
which he discovered insights into mathematics, sang Gregorian chant every day, and 
took heed of an art teacher who would “rant and rave against sentimentality in Art” 
(Lucier, in Miller-Keller, 2011), certainly something Lucier could not be accused of in 
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his compositions. For him, it was a time of mysticism, scholasticism, ritual, and 
contemplation, which would have a profound influence on his life and work. Of one 
incident at the Priory school he recalls “going into the chapel and watching this 
Trappist monk in the act of contemplation. He wasn’t praying the way I remembered 
pious parish priests prayed. He wasn’t pious at all. I got the idea that he was simply 
thinking. I went back a couple of hours later and he was in the same kneeling 
position. I thought if there’s any such thing as pure thought, this man is doing it. 
Pure thought would have to be thinking about something specific, without tension or 
argument. With contemplation one focuses the mind on some thing or idea; with 
meditation one is supposed to empty the mind. That experience has stayed with me 
all my life” (Lucier, in Miller-Keller, 2011). This very personal encounter with 
meditation is intriguing as it chimes with the “perfectly meditative alpha state” 
(Lucier, 1995) that is central to Lucier’s work with bio-feedback, in particular his 
performance state in his groundbreaking composition Music for Solo Performer (1965). 
 
After the Priory school, Lucier gained a place at Yale University, majoring in Music 
and graduating with a BA in 1954. By now an ardent Stravinskyite, Lucier decided in 
1958 to further his studies at the Tanglewood summer school in Boston, studying 
under Aaron Copland. In the autumn of the same year he commenced his MFA 
study at Brandeis University, studying with what Copland referred to as the 
“American Stravinsky School” (Miller-Keller, 2011) of Harold Shapero, Arthur 
Berger, and Irving Fine. After graduating in 1960, Lucier gained a Fulbright 
scholarship and spent two years in Rome. During his time in Italy, Lucier attended 
the now infamous Cage-Tudor concert at Teatro La Fenice in Venice in September 
1960. Many in the audience responded to the concert with great anger and it gained a 
scathing review in Time magazine. Stravinsky, who also attended the performance, 
wryly commented that the riot was not as spectacular as the one that had greeted his 
Rite of Spring (Haskins, 2012). Lucier admits that he was among the audience 
members who had a violent reaction to the performance: “I even remember yelling 
something like ‘Johnny! Johnny!’ from the balcony. I’m embarrassed to think about it 
now. However, this experience profoundly changed my way of thinking, particularly 
when I got home. Something about that concert broke through the malaise I was 
having as a neoclassic composer, knowing there was no future in it. Cage offered a 
real alternative” (Lucier, in Miller-Keller, 2011). 
 
During his time in Italy, Lucier spent two weeks working at the RAI, Studio di 
Fonologia in Milan (Lucier, 2012), which was the premier Italian electronic music 
studio of its day. For several reasons, Lucier’s use of this studio was a significant 
factor in the formulation and style of his subsequent work: Firstly, Luciano Berio and 
Bruno Maderna, the founders of the studio, were determined that it should not align 
itself with the musique concrète of Pierre Schaeffer’s Paris studio, or the elektronische 
Musik being produced by composers such as Karlheinz Stockhausen at the WDR 
studio in Cologne. With this purpose in mind they equipped the studio with a range 
of technologies that would not have a particular leaning toward purely tape-based or 
purely synthesis-based composition (Holmes, 2012). An unusual and influential 
feature of many notable pieces produced at the Italian studio is that they were 
speech-based. Another important facet was that a number of significant pieces (and 
in particular the work achieved in the studio by cybernetic composer Roland Kayn in 
1968) were performed in real time – a significant feature of cybernetic composition. 
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In subsequent years Lucier would use both these traits in the creation of a number of 
his seminal early electronic works.  
 
It is also notable that Cage produced Fontana Mix (1958) in the RAI studio a few 
years before Lucier’s visit. When writing about this piece specifically, Lucier chooses 
to focus on the composer’s choice of relinquishing control to probabilistic processes: 
“Once the score (determined by chance processes) is fixed you don't alter it. Cage 
would never throw something out he didn’t like on the basis of taste. […] 
Indeterminacy gets personal preference out of the compositional process. Isn’t that a 
shocking idea? Weren't we always taught that art was about self-expression? What 
have Cage’s pieces got to do with self-expression? Nothing. They’ve got everything 
to do with discovery” (Lucier, 2012). It is interesting that Lucier chooses to focus on 
this aspect of the piece; namely the denial of self-expression in favour of a 
probabilistic process, 14  the recognition of the fundamental role of probabilistic 
processes at play in the universe is a key tenet of cybernetics. Here too is the 
recognition that the composing of the interactions between human, machine and the 
environment (determined in this case by Cage’s chance operation score) is placed at a 
higher priority than the composer’s own personal preference; this decentering of the 
composer is again a key feature of cybernetic musical composition.  
 
Nothing is known of the work that Lucier produced in this two-week tenure at the 
RAI studio. It is highly likely that nothing of significance was achieved in this short 
time period. However, it did provide him with a useful introduction to the electronic 
studio and the ethos of the RAI studio in particular, which influenced the direction of 
Lucier’s work in subsequent years. It is also worth noting that in 1964, 
contemporaneous with Lucier’s time in Italy, a collective of composer-performers 
was founded in Rome by Franco Evangelisti: the Gruppo d'Improvvisazione Nuova 
Consonanza (also known as The Group), which contained eminent members such as 
Aldo Clementi, Ennio Morricone, and the subsequently self-proclaimed cybernetic 
composer Roland Kayn (Patterson, 2010). It is possible that the formation of this 
group (the first of its kind in the world) may have had some influence on the 
founding of the Sonic Arts Union in 1966: a group of American composer-performers 
that was founded by Alvin Lucier, Robert Ashley, David Behrman, and Gordon 
Mumma, all of whom were former collaborators of John Cage and David Tudor and 
who, in contrast to the Italian Group, all utilised electronic means in live 
performance. 
 
On his return to America, Lucier took up a teaching position at Brandeis University 
in Massachusetts and in 1965 he invited Cage to perform at the University’s Rose Art 
Museum. This concert saw the premiere of two subsequently iconic works: Cage’s 
Rozart Mix and Lucier’s Music For Solo Performer. It would also mark the beginning of 
a working relationship and long friendship between the two composers. Initially, 
Lucier had only thought to invite Cage to perform works of his own, but Cage 
insisted that Lucier write a work that would also be performed at the concert 
alongside his own: “At that time (1965) I was not composing music” (Lucier, 2012). 
After returning from Europe (and following the revelatory Cage/Tudor Concert in 






was good because I could then let ideas come into it unobstructed by previous 
notions of what music should be” (Lucier, 2012). At this time he had made the 
acquaintance of Edmond Dewan, a scientist at the local Hanscom Air base, who was 
researching epileptic fits in helicopter pilots, which he believed were induced by 
looking into spinning propeller blades or by the fast-moving shadows they cast in 
the cockpit. Dewan had deduced that this might be due to propeller speeds being 
sympathetic to alpha brainwave frequencies. In the course of his research Dewan had 
used a differential amplifier with electrodes attached to the head, to amplify 
brainwave patterns. Dewan, a keen organist and amateur musician, approached 
members of the Brandeis music department with the idea that the brainwave 
amplifier might be utilised in a musical performance of some kind (Miller-Keller, 
2011). It is often overlooked in musicological examinations of Music For Solo 
Performer that Dewan was a friend and associate of the founding father of 
cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, and that without Dewan’s cybernetic influence, Lucier’s 
composition would not have come into existence (Kahn, 2013). And thus it was 
decided that with Dewan’s technological assistance, Lucier would utilise the 
brainwave amplifier to form the basis for his Rose Art piece. In the concert program 
for the performance Dewan is listed as “Technical Assistant”, however after the end 
of the piece, when the applause had died down, Lucier introduced Dewan to the 
audience as the composer (Kahn, 2013); in that moment, in Lucier’s mind at least, 
Dewan had played a central role in the instigation of the work.   
 
Music for Solo Performer (1965) was the first musical piece to utilise brainwaves (but 
certainly not the last). In the performance, electrodes are attached to the back of the 
performer’s head and alpha wave signals are passed via a differential amplifier to a 
series of normal hi-fi amps. These are then connected to speakers, which are placed 
against the surface of several percussion instruments, so that the vibration of the 
speaker cones will in turn resonate the skins (and other surfaces) of the instruments. 
8 hi-fi amps and 16 percussion instruments were used in the original performance, 
including snares, bass drums, timpani, cymbals, gongs, piano strings, a trashcan and 
a cardboard box (Lucier, 2012). The alpha brainwaves pulse at a frequency of 
approximately 10Hz. This is not audible to the human ear, but with enough 
amplification the speaker cones will oscillate forcefully in a regular rhythm (ten 
times per second), which will in turn vibrate the percussion instruments to which 
they are connected. Alpha waves only occur when the visual cortex is not stimulated 
and the body is in a state of rest. So the performer is seated and meditative; the 
performance begins when the performer closes his/her eyes, and ends when they are 
opened again. During the performance another operator pans the output of the 
amplifiers to alternate speakers to vibrate the different instruments.  
 
From the outset Lucier was determined that the composition be a live performance 
work: “live sounds are much more interesting than taped ones” (Lucier, in Nyman, 
1999). The element of theatre was also important to him: “I was touched by the 
image of the immobile if not paralysed human being who, by merely changing states 
of visual attention, can activate a large configuration of communication equipment 





These elements indicate the cybernetic qualities to be found at work in the piece. The 
qualities of feedback and circularity are central cybernetic tenets and can be found 
here in the output sound being fed back to the performer to affect his/her mental 
state, which will in turn affect the output sound. The use of metaphor in design, the 
mapping of one system (human) onto another (machine), is also an important facet of 
cybernetic practice; in this case, translating brainwaves into audio waves via a 
machine interface. Lucier’s insistence that the work be performed live (despite the 
potential technical difficulties) and also the inherent role that the environment plays 
in the realisation of the piece, demonstrates a recognition and embracing of 
probabilistic processes at play within such a performance ecosystem, in which 
temporal interaction with the environment has a large bearing on the resultant sound 
of the piece. This reflects the concern in cybernetics that all organisms (living or 
machine) are situated in environments and shaped by them in a circularly causal 
way. The recognition that the universe operates by probabilistic processes and that 
these tend toward entropy (or noise) was Norbert Wiener’s starting point for 
cybernetics, which initially concentrated on how order (and ultimately organisms) 
might arise from this ‘noise’. Lucier asserts: “Cage said he was interested in nature’s 
manner of operation, which he thought was random. Cage didn’t like my work too 
much because he said it was too ‘cause and effect’. Cage was indeterminate; he 
would intervene in his compositions with all sorts of randomising processes. I was 
never interested in that idea. What Cage didn’t realise is that systems are naturally 
chaotic; no interaction is necessary. I want systems to be as neutral as possible 
because that highlights that the cause and effect are not predictable” (Lucier, in 
Harder and Rusche, 2013). 
 
Vespers (1968) was a piece that further explored the interaction of human, machine, 
and environment. Like nearly all of Lucier’s work, Vespers interrogates acoustic 
phenomena, in this particular case echolocation. The piece grew from his continuing 
desire to create original work: “in the late sixties I was looking for something outside 
of music to inspire me. I didn’t want to write the kind of music everyone else did” 
(Lucier, 2012). The idea for the piece had a long gestation, dating back to his days in 
Rome. Lucier was working on a composition assignment and during his research he 
stumbled across Monteverdi’s Vespers (1610), a work that used echo as a musical 
theme. It occurred to Lucier that real echoes might be used as a device in 
composition, echoes that naturally occur in real acoustical spaces (Moore, 1981). In 
1967, Lucier was also reading a book entitled Listening in the Dark by Donald Griffin, 
specifically about bats and echolocation; a ‘vesper’ is also a common type of bat 
found in North America. Around the same time, he happened to have a chance 
meeting with a man who worked for a company called Listening Incorporated. The 
company had developed a handheld device called a ‘Sondol’ (sonar-dolphin), with 
the express purpose of rudimentary communication with dolphins. Lucier borrowed 
a prototype and discovered it to be a good device for describing acoustic spaces via 
echolocation. After his experience with the Sondol, Lucier had a vivid dream in 
which astronauts were exploring a dark alien environment with sound guns. The 
dream was the final catalyst to inspire the making of the piece; he bought four 
Sondols and waited for an opportunity to realise the work (Lucier, 2012). Again, we 
see an example of the critical role certain technologies had in the formulation of 




In 1968, Robert Ashley and Gordon Mumma invited Lucier to perform at Once, an 
experimental music festival in Ann Arbour, Michigan. Although the piece was to be 
presented in the large ballroom of the graduate centre of Michigan University, Lucier 
was unsure as to exactly how the piece would be performed, and had no idea how to 
proceed until he was in the space with the performers. In the end the piece had to be 
designed in the dress rehearsal (Holmes, 2012). The work consisted of four 
blindfolded performers holding Sondols, positioned in four corners of the space. 
They are told to make their way to a central spot in the space using only 
echolocation, avoiding each other and objects that had been placed strategically in 
the space. The performers were instructed to only play when they needed to receive 
an echo to give them location information. When all the Sondols sounded 
simultaneously, the noise was cacophonous and the echoes became useless. Natural 
pauses developed as the performers listened to each other’s echoes and waited to 
play uninterrupted echoes of their own. The performers were also instructed to not 
speed up or slow down the echo pulses or in fact do anything for musical effect: “It 
had to be based on survival and task” (Holmes, 2012). This interaction of human, 
machine, and environment as an integrated system, further reflects themes Lucier 
explored in Music for Solo Performer. It is also noteworthy that goal-oriented 
behaviour of this type, and the complex interactions it produces, between organisms 
and in systems, is an often-explored area of cybernetics and also of the fields that 
grew from cybernetics, such as systems science, complexity science, and artificial 
intelligence. 
 
Electronic composer Nicolas Collins, a student of Lucier’s at Wesleyan University, 
recalls his involvement in a performance of Vespers that took place during his time as 
an undergraduate:  
 
“Earlier in the semester, Lucier had introduced Glass’s Music in Parallel Fifths 
as a ‘return to the year zero’ in western music: going back to the first rule of 
counterpoint, violating it, and seeing what kind of music would evolve 
along this new branch. In Vespers, Lucier reached back even further, to a pre-
hominid time before the divarication of music from all other sound, and he 
invented something that re-connected music to physics, architecture, animal 
behavior and social interaction – subjects that had intrigued me since 
childhood, but that I had never directly associated with music. Vespers 
seemed to tell me that I could make music about anything, not just some 
finite set of concepts handed down by the European classical lineage, that 
composition was not an activity bound by five lines, but an amorphous glue 
that could hold together my disparate interests” (Collins, 2010). 
 
Collins expresses several interesting themes here, firstly his joy on encountering 
Vespers and discovering his own return-to-the-year-zero moment that freed him from 
conventional compositional modes. Secondly, his assertion that Vespers evoked a pre-
hominid way of understanding sound as music; this theme echoes theories put 
forward by pragmatic philosophers such as John Dewey, Marshall McLuhan, and 
Larry Hickman, maintaining that the modern electronic era (the post-literate society) 
shares many characteristics with the pre-technological, pre-literate society, and not 
with those of the technological age epitomised by works from the European classical 
lineage (Coyne, 1995). While McLuhan’s theory does not encompass a pre-hominid 
era it is certainly pointing in a direction sympathetic to Collins’ sentiment. 
Furthermore, Collins’ statement also has echoes of a post-human conception that 
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humans are principally not different to other animals (Gray, 2002) and therefore a 
pre-hominid conception of music is not necessarily all that different from our own, 
which in turn evokes a non-modern ontology. Finally, Collins’ desire, under Lucier’s 
influence, to make his own compositions from disparate interests (including, as he 
states earlier in the article, electronics, archaeology, linguistics, history of science, art, 
geology, and music) reflects the multi-disciplinary purview of cybernetics itself. 
 
I Am Sitting in a Room (1969) is the composition Lucier is known for in a wider public 
sphere (Harder and Rusche, 2013). This is perhaps because in a very clear and 
distinct way it is the distillation of the essence of his long-term musical project, 
which is best summed up by his favourite line of poetry; “No ideas but in things” 
(Williams, 1946–1958); there is no idea or meaning behind the work other than the 
innate properties of the process and the materials themselves. Lucier has often stated 
that his main activity in composing is to eliminate the many different possibilities 
within a piece, leaving only the essential components. It is a minimalist approach, 
which is very well exemplified by I Am Sitting In A Room. The piece is regarded as 
“one of the ‘classical’ pieces of the twentieth century and a prototype of process-
based music” (Harder and Rusche, 2013). Thom Holmes writes: “This is a work 
whose reputation often precedes it, and many composers mention it as an influence 
even if they've only read about it” (Holmes, 2012). 
 
Essentially, the piece explores the resonant sound qualities of a room. A performer 
reads out a section of text in a room. The speech is recorded and subsequently played 
back from tape, via a loudspeaker into the room. This new version is then recorded 
back to tape via the microphone and then played back into the room again, via the 
loudspeaker, and so on. Over time, the generations of the successive recordings 
played back into the room produce a degenerative effect on the speech, as more and 
more of the resonant characteristics of the room can be heard on each recording. In 
the final generations the speech is barely audible, only the musically resonant 
frequencies of the room can be heard. The room acts as a filter, reinforcing certain 
resonant frequencies, while cancelling out others. This process is akin to the visual 
effect that is gained by making successive photocopies of an image until all aspects of 
the original picture are obscured (Holmes, 2012). In typical Lucier style, the 
parameters of the piece (the process, what is to be achieved by it and what you will 
hear) are succinctly encapsulated within the text-based score: 
 
“I Am Sitting In A Room” (1969) 








Choose a room the musical qualities of which you would like to evoke. 
Attach the microphone to the input of tape recorder #1. 
To the output of tape recorder #2 attach the amplifier and loudspeaker. 
Use the following text or a text of any length: 
 
“I am sitting in a room different from the one you are in now. 
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I am recording the sound of my speaking voice and I am going to play it 
back into the room again and again until the resonant frequencies of the 
room reinforce themselves so that any semblance of my speech, with 
perhaps the exception of rhythm, is destroyed. 
What you will hear, then, are the natural resonant frequencies of the room 
articulated by speech. 
I regard this activity not so much as a demonstration of the physical fact, but 
more as a way to smooth out any irregularities my speech may have. 
 
Record your voice on tape through the microphone attached to tape recorder 
#1. 
Rewind the tape to its beginning, transfer to tape recorder #2, play it back 
into the room through the loudspeaker and record a second generation of the 
original recorded statement through the microphone attached to tape 
recorder #1. 
Rewind the original second generation to its beginning and splice it onto the 
end of the original recorded statement on tape recorder #2. 
Play the second generation only back into the room through the loudspeaker 
and record a third generation of the original recorded statement through the 
microphone attached to tape recorder #1.  
Continue the process through many generations. 
All the generations spliced together in chronological order make a tape 
composition the length of which is determined by the length of the original 
statement and the number of generations recorded. 
Make versions in which one recorded statement is recycled through many 
rooms. 
Make versions using one or more speakers of different languages in different 
rooms. 
Make versions in which, for each generation, the microphone is moved to 
different parts of the room or rooms. 
Make versions that can be performed in real time. 
 
(Lucier and Simon, 1980) 
 
Although the piece is widely regarded as important and influential, it had very 
humble beginnings. In 1968 Lucier had a casual conversation with Edmond Dewan 
about a professor at MIT called Bose who had tested the response of the loudspeaker 
he had designed by recycling sounds into the loudspeaker to see if the response was 
flat (Lucier, 2012). This gave him the idea that he might be able to realise a musical 
piece in this way. In early 1969 he borrowed 2 Nagra tape recorders from the Music 
Department at Wesleyan University where he was teaching, and over the course of 
an evening he made the piece in the living room of his rented apartment. The work 
took 16 generations to realise and Lucier stayed up all night playing and recording 
the speech into the room and splicing the tape together to create a continuous piece. 
He recalls: “As the process continued more and more resonance of the room came 
forth; the intelligibility of the speech disappeared. The speech became music. It was 
magical” (Lucier, 2012). Lucier specifically chose speech as he felt it was “rich in 
sounds. It has fundamental tones (formants) and lots of noisy stuff – P’s, T’s, S’s, K’s” 
(Lucier, 2012). His choice to use speech is perhaps also recognition of his time at the 
RAI studio. However, perhaps in a nod to his art teacher at the priory boarding 
school, he was also insistent that the speech should not contain any poetic or 
romantic imagery, nothing with high aesthetic value, it should merely describe the 
process at work within the piece. Lucier recalls seeing the dancer Trisha Brown do 
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exactly this, describing what she was doing as she moved and this also proved to be 
influential on the compositional form of I Am Sitting in a Room (Lucier, 2012). 
 
There is a double function at play in the score’s text: the sound of it makes up the 
piece, but it also describes the score and the process at the same time – a synecdoche 
in which a part of something refers to the whole of something, or vice-versa. The text 
appears to ‘fold back’ on itself in a strange way; the instructions for making the piece 
are in fact making the piece in real time, there is a sense in which the work is ‘making 
itself’. The elements of looping and feedback are also the main functional 
mechanisms of the piece. As the process loops from human to machine to 
environment and back again in an ongoing process, the natural resonances of the 
room are picked out by the speech. It is interesting to note that the quickest way to 
find out how the dynamics of a particular microphone, amplifier or speaker system 
react to room resonances is to simply place them in a room, connect then together 
and turn up the gain on the amplifier to induce feedback. Here, the frequency of the 
feedback produced would be dependent on the innate resonance frequencies in the 
microphone, amplifier, and loudspeaker, the acoustics of the room, the directional 
pick-up and emission patterns of the microphone and loudspeaker, and the distance 
between them (Davis and Jones, 1990). All these determinant factors are present in 
the compositional process of I Am Sitting In A Room and the method of making the 
room resonance audible in the piece is achieved by a kind of ‘slow motion feedback’, 
where the room resonances picked out by the speech in each recorded iteration are 
gradually layered on top of each other to produce a controlled set of feedback tones 
that are synchronous or sympathetic in rhythm and pitch to the sound being 
produced by the speaker. Also, the inherent complexity of the (seemingly simple) 
system means that in one sense the work is ephemeral. No two performances of the 
piece will sound the same; it has an organic complexity built into the system and 
probabilistic processes are always at play in the performance. 
 
There are other aspects of the piece that should be considered. In interviews and in 
writing about the work, Lucier tends to emphasise the acoustic nature of the piece 
above the technological aspects (Lucier and Simon, 1980), but we should not 
underestimate the role that the technology played in the making of the piece. Lucier 
asserts: “I didn’t choose to use tape, I had to, because in order to recycle the sounds 
into space, I had to have them accessible in some form. Tape then, wasn’t a medium 
in which to compose sounds, it was a conveyer, a means to record them and play 
them back one after the other in chronological order. Without tape I wouldn't have 
been able to do the piece” (Lucier and Simon 1980).  Even here in this admission of 
the importance of the technology in creating the piece, Lucier is a little disingenuous 
about the central role that the technology plays in forming the work, seeing it as 
merely a ‘means’. However, the fact that the piece could not be achieved without the 
technology indicates the central role it had in making the structure and style of the 
composition. To a degree the equipment directs and drives the process of the piece. 
Also, the technology and the environment mitigate the outcome of the work to such 
an extent that in many ways, “the medium becomes the message”. 
 
Another element of the piece that should be considered is that despite Lucier’s wish 
to eradicate all sentimentality form the performance, it remains a deeply personal 
work. Lucier purposefully included this coda to the text: “I regard this activity not so 
much as a demonstration of the physical fact, but more as a way to smooth out any 
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irregularities my speech may have.” As a pronounced stutterer, Lucier was 
interested in how the process of making the work might smooth out any perceived 
irregularities. Earlier in the same year, Lucier wrote a companion piece to I am Sitting 
in a Room entitled, The Only Talking Machine in the World (1969), which was explicitly 
concerned with this ‘smoothing out’ process. The work was specifically designed for 
people with irregular speech patterns, those with stutters, stammers, lisps, or faulty 
or halting speech. They were to speak through a PA system with a delay effect added 
to their voice until anxiety about their voice is relieved or the system fails to produce 
this effect	 (Nyman, 1999). Using electronic systems in this way also has obvious 
analogies with other assistive technologies, such as Wiener’s Hearing Glove, and 
consequently with a cybernetic oeuvre. I Am Sitting in A Room was originally 
designed as a companion piece to The Only Talking Machine in the World, but in its 
realisation it took on greater significance. It is also worth noting how, as the piece 
progresses and becomes more musical, it seems to attain some characteristics of a 
Gregorian chant. Lucier focuses our attention to the rhythm of the piece in the text: 
“any semblance of my speech, with perhaps the exception of rhythm, is destroyed.” When 
writing about beat and meter, Lucier muses that in Gregorian chant “the rhythm 
follows the words” (Lucier, 2012). This meter is also heavily defined by the acoustic 
space; rooms with long reverb times, such as churches or cathedrals, will require a 
longer meter, so that the words can be clearly heard. This metaphor of Gregorian 
chant is not one that Lucier has alluded to in connection to this piece, but it may 
indicate a subconscious influence from singing Gregorian chant every day as a 
teenager in the Priory school. 
 
To conclude, Lucier’s contribution to the canon of cybernetic music is significant, 
even though he himself would perhaps shy away from such a distinction, favouring 
instead to emphasise the role of the composer and the significance of the acoustic 
phenomena produced by his work. Nonetheless, Lucier was among the first and was 
certainly the most prominent composer of this early era of electronic composition to 
fully realise the human/machine/environment paradigm as envisioned in a 
cybernetic ontology, and this fact has held significance for a number of cybernetic 
commentators. Douglas Kahn writes of Lucier’s chance encounter with Dewan as a 
prime exemplar of why “it becomes impossible to talk about American 
experimentalism in any comprehensive way distinct from the knowledge and 
technologies flowing from the militarised science of the cold war, more specifically 
cybernetics” (Kahn, 2013). Furthermore, Kahn writes of Dewan’s impression of the 
collaboration with Lucier as being inspired directly by Norbert Wiener’s work: 
“Wiener’s influence on [Dewan] and many other scientists was substantive and 
liberating and, for this reason, Dewan thought that the situation was parallel to John 
Cage’s influence on Alvin Lucier and other musicians. Music for Solo Performer can 
thus be understood as a manifestation of cybernetics, a meeting of Wiener and Cage, 
one step removed” (Kahn, 2013). 
 
While it could be said that Lucier stumbled into cybernetics rather than pursuing it, 
his friends certainly noted that while he had a respect for science and technology, he 
wasn’t interested in studying it (Kahn, 2013). It is interesting that the figure he has 
cited as his predominant artistic influence outside of music is the writer and poet 
William Carlos Williams (1883–1963). Williams’ work is associated with literary 
modernism, however, it has strong pragmatic and phenomenological leanings, a 
desire to emphasise the practicalities of life and an interest in things in themselves. 
	
	 64	
Lucier’s two favourite quotations from Williams are: “Don't ask me what I mean, ask 
me what I’ve made”; and “No ideas but in things” (Harder and Rusche, 2013) and he 
often uses these as an explanation of the philosophical underpinning of his work. 
The intriguing analysis here is how closely these quotations align with Pickering’s 
ideas of cybernetics staging ontological theatre for us; that cybernetic projects can 
demonstrate an understanding of our being in the world and what is more, that the 
cybernetic ontology is a performative one; we can only know the world through 
interaction with it (Pickering, 2011). This is mirrored in Lucier quoting from Williams 
in order to signify that the work in itself demonstrates its own meaning, that the 
thing in itself (that particular use of that technology or that acoustic phenomenon in 
a composition) demonstrates its own idea and in so doing reveals to us something of 
our state of being in the world. From a musicological standpoint, James Tenney 
reinforces this idea of revealing: “The sounds that are ‘allowed to be themselves’ in 
Lucier’s work have always had a mysteriously ‘expressive’ quality, sometimes I 
think it is inarticulate nature speaking to us here.” (Tenney in Lucier, 1995) This 
conception is also a Heideggerian ‘revealing’, where a certain use of technology can 
lift technology’s enframing veil and reveal aspects of true being. Furthermore, the 
ephemeral nature of Lucier’s compositions, the fact that they are performed live and 
their outcomes are different in each iteration and yet fall within a ‘class of goals’ 
indicates the cybernetic imperative that lies at the heart of his work. The emphasis on 
the composition of interactions over musical notation – Lucier once said of Music for 
Solo Performer that “It isn’t a sound idea, it’s a control or energy idea” (Kahn, 2013) – 
also points to a cybernetic compositional mode. These factors are not oblique 
elements in Lucier’s compositions, they are core signifiers and thus his work can be 
considered as distinct from many forms of electroacoustic composition of this era 


























5.4 Herbert Brün 
 
If you want to turn perfectionism into an accusation then you have to use cybernetics. 
Everything but cybernetics is success orientated. Cybernetics is resource orientated. 
Cybernetics explains why [something] could happen even though according to you it’s totally 
false. If you don't have such problems, you don't need cybernetics. If everything is the way 
you want or it is perfect… if perfection is your goal, you don't need cybernetics. If fluctuation 
control… how one thing flows into another, without having to need causality or violence… 
transformation, mutation, how does that happen? You need cybernetics (Brün, 1993). 
 
In many ways, Herbert Brün (1918–2000) stands as a contradictory figure in the field 
of cybernetic music. On the one hand, his work is steeped in cybernetic theory and 
his connections to some of the leading figures in cybernetics, especially Heinz von 
Foerster, should mark him as one of the leading lights of cybernetically influenced 
composition. On the other hand, his compositional work is centred on the sonic 
capabilities of early computer programming and rarely breaks free of a linear, 
closed-system approach. The composer Agostino Di Scipio notes that: “Brün’s 
[musical approach] could be seen as thoroughly deterministic, or even hyper-
subjective” (Di Scipio, 2002). 
 
Born in Germany in 1918, Brün fled Nazi persecution in 1936 to study piano and 
composition at the Jerusalem conservatory in Palestine. After the war he continued 
his musical study at the Tanglewood summer school and at Columbia University, 
from 1948 to 1950 (www.herbertbrun.org, 2016). As was also later the case with 
Alvin Lucier, Brün drew early formative influence from his time at Tanglewood, 
which would culminate in his permanent move to the United States in 1962. Like 
many of his contemporaries (including Stockhausen, Cage, and Kayn), he toured 
Europe in the period from 1955 to 1961, making use of the prestigious electronic 
music studios in Paris, Cologne, and Munich that were “producing some of the 
earliest examples of non-serial electroacoustic music” (Brün in Feller, 2006).  
 
In 1962, after a lecture tour and series of broadcasts on the function of music in 
society in the United States, Lejaren Hiller invited Brün to teach at the University of 
Illinois (herbertbrun.org, 2016). Hiller and Leonard Isaacson composed the first 
computer-assisted piece of music, the Illiac Suite for string quartet, in 1953. This 
breakthrough established the University of Illinois as a major centre for electronic 
and computer music. The academic milieu of Illinois was rather unique in that it 
actively encouraged collaboration between departments and disciplines, including 
sharing teaching and research projects between subject areas as diverse as electrical 
engineering, cognitive theory, cybernetics, and music (Feller, 2006). 
 
During Brün’s time at the University of Illinois, he established a lifelong friendship 
with Heinz von Foerster, one of the founding fathers of cybernetics. With the aid of 
Pentagon funding, Von Foerster established the Biological Computing Laboratory at 
the University of Illinois in 1958 (Hutchinson, 2004). One of the very few 
institutionalised cybernetic research centres ever to have existed, it is credited with 
the development of one of the first parallel computers and the creation of a 
computerised model of autopoiesis. Eminent cyberneticians such as Ross Ashby and 
Gordon Pask were among the researchers to work at the laboratory (Hutchinson, 
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2004). Brün and Von Foerster taught together on a number of courses, including 
cybernetics, composition, cognition, and social change (Feller, 2006). Brün’s 
immersion in the field of cybernetics, coupled with his access to some of the most 
advanced computer music compositional systems available – including the 
MUSICOMP software package for the IBM 7094 (Chadabe, 1997) – led Brün to think 
about his compositional work in a distinctly cybernetic way.  
 
Von Foerster is credited as being one of the main initiators of second-order 
cybernetics, which distinguishes itself from the original conception of cybernetics as 
formulated by Wiener, Ashby, and others as a meta language of command and 
control, in favour of an evolved conception, more concerned with self-referential 
systems, the observed system, and autopoiesis. It is interesting to note that while a 
number of Brün’s writings reflect this ‘second order’ preoccupation (see, in 
particular, his writings on cybernetics in Brün, 2004), his systemic compositional 
systems are in many respects distinctly ‘first order’, reflecting a preoccupation with 
information theory and the closed system that early computer composition 
represents. Nonetheless, his compositional theory (be it of the first or second-order 
variety) is distinctly cybernetic.  
 
Brün’s initial forays into computer music composition were exploratory, but took a 
form already familiar to him, namely the combination of live instrumentation and 
tape-based soundscape. It involved programmed scores for musicians in conjunction 
with computer-generated soundscapes recorded to tape, to be played back in synch 
with each other in live performance. An early example of this approach was 
Soniferous Loops (1964), which utilised the MUSICOMP software and the CSX-1 for 
audio synthesis (Brün, 2004). On this composition, Brün writes: 
 
“The structure of the composition, defined by elements and rules together 
with an algorithm which, in numerous passes (loops), operates in and on the 
structure as generating function, was translated by the computer into two 
programs, one for the instrumental sections and one for the tape section” 
(Brün, 2004). 
 
“The composition and programming of this work represents an attempt at 
coming to musical terms with two possibilities first offered to the composers 
by the computer: 
1. Random-flight sequential choices channeled and filtered under 
control to form-generating restrictive rules; this process created the 
shape, density functions and parameter details of the instrumental 
sections. 
2. The transformation of speed of sound sequences and colour and 
timbre of sound; this method was used for the production of the tape 
sections” (Brün, 2004). 
 
It can be seen from Brün’s description of the composition that the construction of the 
piece depends to a large extent on computer-randomised and automated processes, 
which would in some senses suggest a non-cybernetic approach. However, Brün 
stated in later interviews that his entire impetus for the composition was to see if it 
was possible to imbue the composition with human attributes: “My desire was to 
prove to myself and to Hiller and to other colleagues that I could program a 
computer with their software so that they would recognise it as a piece by Brün. It 
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was a polemic. The idea was in response to rumors that personality can’t get 
through, that you can't compose with a machine. I wanted to show that that’s 
bullshit” (Chadabe, 1997). Brün’s compositional approach to Soniferous Loops (1964) 
can be seen as cybernetic in several senses. Firstly, in seeing the computer as an equal 
partner in the compositional process, the composer attempts to ‘come to terms’ with 
the musical possibilities the computer offers. Rather than the technology being a 
mere tool, it creates musical structures that the composer would not otherwise have 
thought of, and there is an inherent respect for the generative nature of this process 
and its non-hierarchical role in the overall composition. Secondly, the predominant 
process at work is the composition of interactions that have audible traces rather 
than creating wanted sounds via interaction with the computer, and although Brün 
is using a strictly closed system, this attribute chimes with Di Scipio’s cybernetic 
methodology of ecosystemic systems design (Di Scipio, 2003). Finally, Brün’s desire 
for his personality to be audibly evident in the computer composition demonstrates 
what N. Katherine Hales defines as being one of the most “disturbing” implications 
of first-order cybernetics, namely the blurring of boundaries between human and 
machine (Hayles, 1999). Christina Dunbar-Hester notes that this possibility of human 
personality being made evident though composition mediated by computer was not 
“an idea that was readily accepted in the world of composition” at the time (Dunbar-
Hester, 2010), and perhaps this idea still remains problematic in many respects.15 
Nonetheless, in interview, Brün described the MUSICOMP software as being 
“extremely intelligent” (Chadabe, 1997). Dunbar-Hester believes that with this 
statement, Brün was further “invoking a cybernetic ideal” by “indicating a 
commonality between human and machine ‘minds’” (Dunbar-Hester, 2010).  
 
Perhaps one of the most original and cybernetically inspired of Brün’s compositional 
ideas was “anticommunication”. Originating in ideas contained within information 
theory (again displaying a confluence with first-order cybernetics), 
anticommunication displayed a preoccupation with the inherent meaning, or lack of 
it, contained in music. Brün drew parallels with information theory as it pertained to 
language and musical composition. He postulated that just as in theories that relate 
language to information transfer, where words or bits of information are sequentially 
expressed, the information or meaning of a message decayed to a state of 
understanding. The musicologist Ross Feller writes:  
 
“For Brün, communication speeds the decay of information in a system, 
whereas anticommunication retards or delays the decay because of its 
required use of systems or mechanisms not yet available. Restated within a 
semiotic frame – communication encourages the objects of signs to couple, 
while anticommunication attempts to discourage this coupling, if only for a 
brief amount of time. The gap opened by this delay contains, for Brün, 
possibilities for non-trivial, non-status quo connections to occur, alternatives 
to the convenience of recognition” (Feller, 2006). 
 
For Brün this meant the disrupting of recognised musical chords or motifs so that 
their recognised ‘meaning’, at least in the sense of the Western art tradition (major, 
minor, happy, sad, triumphal, melancholic, etc.), would not be immediately 








For Brün, anticommunication should not be confused with a lack of communication 
or non-communication (where no communication was intended). Instead it was an 
attempt to supplant obvious meaning with more open possibilities: 
“Anticommunication is an attempt at saying something, not a refusal to say it. 
Communication is achievable by learning from language how to say something. 
Anticommunication is an attempt at respectfully teaching language to say it” (Brün, 
2004). In musical terms this may be seen as a rejection of non-deterministic, aleatoric 
or chance procedures – such as Cage’s Music of Changes (1951), or Stockhausen’s 
Klavierstück XI (1956) – in favour of a new kind of determinism that utilises methods 
such as placing familiar sounds or musical phrases in a “new contextual 
environment”, or by using “gesture inhibiting materials” (Brün, 2004). 
Anticommunication is an attempt to impose a system of disruption based on a 
philosophical viewpoint, a way of usurping traditional musical meanings and the 
imposition of traditional compositional structures such as textural notation. In 
cybernetic terms this would imply that the composition be mediated by technology, 
an approach that Brün is renowned for. If one further implies that language and 
modes of communication are technologies, then anticommunication may be subject 
to a Heideggerian analysis in which technologies conceal true being, and 
anticommunication can be seen as an attempt to subvert those technologies and 
hopefully reveal true being.  
 
One of the most prevalent examples of anticommunication in practice is Brün's 1964 
piece, Futility. Although written in the same year as Soniferous Loops, Futility has a 
very different musical form, one that is much less musically conventional (for 
example, it contains no live instrumentation), and interestingly, contains a number of 
features that are reminiscent of the work of other cybernetic composers such as 
Roland Kayn, Alvin Lucier, and the Barrons. In particular, these include the placing 
of speech as a central component and its juxtaposition with a soundscape of 
synthesised and acousmatic sounds that express an extreme variety in frequency, 
content, and dynamics, from loud and noise-like, to ethereal and dreamlike. The 
piece takes a strict antiphonal form, oscillating back and forth between several 
seconds of computer-generated sound interjected with several seconds of spoken-
word material. This can be jarring and has a somewhat disorientating effect, where 
you don't quite know what to expect from one moment to the next, whether it be the 
extreme sonic differences in the electronically generated soundscape, or the disparate 
words spoken by the narrator. This jarring effect is Brün's attempt at putting 
anticommunication into practice in a compositional context; to deliberately usurp 
expectations, thus delaying the decay of information into a recognised meaning and 
creating the potential for “free-floating signification” (Feller, 2006). The text, written 
by Brün, specifically refers to the decay of information. Academic and dispassionate 
in tone and content, it has the air of an information-theory text. The delivery, by a 
female narrator, is monotone and robot-like. The narrow bandwidth filter placed 
upon the voice further emphasises the machine-like tone. Both these tropes signal the 
cybernetic imperative that underpins this work (both in a theoretical sense and from 
a popular culture perspective; imagine cyberman as composer!).  
 
It is also important to note that anticommunication is not only a compositional 
stance, but also a mode of listening. The knowing involvement of the audience in the 
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meaning-making process chimes with ideas expressed in artist Roy Ascott’s 
cybernetic art manifesto The Construction of Change16	(Ascott, 1964) in which “the 
participant becomes responsible for the extension of the artwork’s meaning” (Ascott, 
1964). Although it is unclear if Brün had ever read Ascott, the idea of the audience’s 
perception having a large bearing on the outcome of an artwork’s meaning was 
certainly in the general milieu of the times. Both Di Scipio (2002) and Feller (2006) 
cite Theodore Adorno’s constructivist theories as being a major influence on Brün’s 
thinking and compositional approach, which lends further credence to a 
constructivist/cybernetic ontology underpinning anticommunication. Di Scipio also 
equates Brün’s approach, particularly in his Sawdust project (a series of computer 
compositions from the period of 1976–1981), as being akin to Xenakis’ cybernetic 
methodology: “Xenakis defined his ‘mechanism’ as a minimal set of rules capable of 
allowing the emergence of musical flow of particular properties. This approach was 
shared by Brün, whose Sawdust program actually included a very limited set of 
machine instructions” (Di Scipio, 2002). However, while Di Scipio cites Brün’s work 
as a formative influence on his own, he also believes that the theoretical 
compositional approaches of both Xenakis and Brün display a kind of “ecological 
inadequacy” (Di Scipio, 2002), in that “they tended toward self-organising systems, 
but only to the extent that they resulted in homeostasis, namely a progressive 
reduction of information, a compulsory path towards a definite, although unforeseen 
end” (Di Scipio, 2002). Di Scipio’s focus on homeostasis (rather than autopoiesis) 
frames Brün’s work as having distinctly first-order cybernetic attributes.  
 
By his own admission, Brün saw his musical work, particularly after 1962, as a 
cybernetic project. Despite Di Scipio’s view that Brün’s work was limited in its 
cybernetic purview, it still remains a valid and important contribution to the field 
and to computer music more generally. Brün remained a committed cyberneticist, he 
received the Norbert Wiener medal from the American Society for Cybernetics in 
1993 and he remained dedicated to utilising cybernetics in his work, writings, and 
public lectures until his death in 2000. Brün’s composition Infraudibles (1967) was 
included in the seminal Cybernetic Serendipity exhibition at the ICA in London in 
196817, and thus he may be viewed as one of the leading public exponents of 
cybernetic music. His work and ideas are still pertinent today, and his influence on 
Agostino Di Scipio, in particular, signals the resilience and relevance of his music 


















5.5 Roland Kayn 
 
Music is sound - and sound is self-sufficient (Roland Kayn in Ricci, 2005). 
 
A number of composers who have utilised cybernetic methods in their compositions 
have been ostracised from the general musical and scientific communities, either 
because their compositions have not been considered as music (as was the case with 
Louis and Bebe Barron (Wierzbicki, 2005), or because their work as cyberneticians 
was not considered scientifically rigorous enough – as was seen in a general concern 
about the ‘pollution’ of cybernetics due to popular exposure, voiced by Warren 
McCullock, Julian Bigelow, and Heinz von Foerster, among others (Dunbar-Hester 
2009). Roland Kayn (1933–2011) is one such composer who released a significant 
body of electro-acoustic work drawing on themes and methods derived from 
cybernetics and information theory, yet he was ostracised from the ranks of the 
Darmstadt composers and did not gain significant public recognition in his lifetime 
outside of Germany and Holland.  
 
Kayn was born in 1933 in Reutlingen, Germany. As an undergraduate student in the 
period from 1952 to 1956, he studied composition and organ in Stuttgart and at the 
church music school in Esslingen. Between 1956 and 1958, he studied scientific 
theory as a master’s student at the Technische Hochschule in Berlin with the 
philosopher Max Bense. He also simultaneously studied at the Musikhochschule 
with Boris Blacher (composition) and Josef Rufer (analysis). While there he also 
attended seminars by Fritz Winckel and Oskar Sala (Kayn, 1977a).  
 
Max Bense, in particular, appears to have exerted a strong influence on the young 
Kayn (Patterson, 2009). Bense’s lifelong project was an attempt to remove the 
separation between the humanities and the natural sciences to integrate philosophy 
with mathematics, semiotics, and aesthetics in a combined perspective that he 
termed existential rationalism. Bense’s work with mathematics in art and language led 
him to be interested in the then nascent fields of information theory and cybernetics. 
Bense read Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics or control and communication in the animal and 
the machine (Wiener, 1948) in 1949, just one year after its publication and twelve years 
before the German translation (Walther, 1999). Indeed, in July 1955, Bense invited 
Wiener to speak at the Technical University of Stuttgart and in addition, Bense wrote 
prefaces to a number of prominent books on cybernetics by European authors, such 
as Louis Couffignal’s Thinking Machines (Les Machines à Penser, 1952) and Cybernetic 
Basic Concepts (Les Notions de Base, 1958), and Gotthard Günther's The Consciousness 
of the Machines, A Metaphysics of Cybernetics (1973). Bense also instigated a series of 
articles entitled "Cybernetics and information" which were published by Agis Verlag 
in Baden-Baden in l960 (Walther, 1999; www.wikipedia.co.uk, 2013). 
 
Although Kayn did not fully realise his first piece of cybernetic music until 1966, 
Bense’s integration of mathematics and art can be seen as an important influence on 
Kayn’s composition post-1958. In the following years, his music saw a gradual move 
away from traditional instrumentation and musical structure, culminating in a 
complete departure from traditional composition and a full embracing of cybernetic 




Kayn’s musical tutors, Boris Blacher and Josef Rufer were both strong proponents of 
modernism, and as such, perhaps cannot be seen as being influential on Kayn’s 
cybernetic approach, particularly the musicologist Rufer, who was Schoenberg’s 
chief assistant between 1925 and 1933 and a vital witness and documenter of the 
development of the 12-tone technique and serialism (Stuckenschmidt, 1977). 
However, Blacher studied mathematics and architecture as an undergraduate before 
studying music and exhibited some of these influences in his application of 
mathematical techniques to create ‘variable metrics’, as in works such as Piano 
concerto no.2 (1952). He also understood what it was to be ostracised as a composer, 
as his music was declared ‘degenerate’ by the Nazi regime, forcing him into internal 
exile during the war (Boosey and Hawkes, 2013). So there is a greater claim to be 
made for a formative influence emanating from Blacher, if only, perhaps, in ways 
that tended to be non-musical.  
 
Although the influence of serialism is evident in Kayn’s works as a student, he 
refutes this, citing “ideological differences” with the tenets of 12-tone composition 
(Kayn, 1977b). Perhaps of greater import to Kayn’s later work with technology and 
compositional progression is the academic influence of Fritz Winckel and Oskar Sala. 
Along with Boris Blacher, Winckel founded the Working Group for Electronic Music, 
which culminated in 1953 with the instigation of the electronic music studio of the 
Technical University in Berlin (Wikipedia.de, 2013). He was also an electronic 
instrument builder and had a particular interest in synthesising speech. Oskar Sala, 
like Kayn, studied piano and organ as an undergraduate, but developed an interest 
in early electronic instruments, in particular the Trautonium. Sala further developed 
the design of the Trautonium, which he later used to score a number of notable film 
soundtracks, including films by Fritz Lang and Albert Hitchcock’s The Birds (Holmes, 
2012) A reconfiguration of the Trautonium (the monochord) was also used in the 
NWDR studios in Cologne and its tone generators may be heard in many pioneering 
German electroacoustic works produced in this studio in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
This exposure to the principles of the electronic music studio and early sound 
synthesis provided Kayn with insights he would later utilise in his technological 
compositions. 
 
According to Kayn, his first contact with electronic music came when he was 
studying as an undergraduate in 1954. He became acquainted with Herbert Eimert, 
the then director of the NWDR music studio. Eimert granted Kayn use of the studio 
for a limited period, which unfortunately proved to be “relatively unsuccessful” 
(Kayn, 1977b). However, as a student and for a number of years after his graduation, 
Kayn gained some reputation as a traditional composer. Composing works for piano, 
organ, and orchestra, he was awarded the prize for the best foreign work at the 
Music of the 20th Century festival in Kairuzawa, Tokyo. In 1960, he was awarded the 
Prix de Rome (Villa Massimo) and in 1965 the music prize of the Biennale des Jeunes 
Artistes in Paris. The Italian contingent of the International Society for New Music 
also awarded Kayn with 2 prizes for Vectors 1 and Schwingungen, his orchestral 
works from 1964 (Ricci, 2005). 
 
However, despite these early successes, Kayn struggled to gain recognition in his 
own country as a traditional composer. Kayn cites the performance of his 1958 work 
Aggregate as making him “persona non-grata on the concert stage” (Kayn, 2013b). 
Without qualification, this is an unusual statement: how can one performance of a 
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work lead to a composer being ostracised from the concert stage? One explanation 
may lie in the fact that the only recorded version of this work is a live recording 
taken from the 1959 Darmstadt International Summer School. While little is known 
of the style of the piece, the instrumentation was for brass, strings, and striking 
mechanism for five Players (Kayn, 2013a). The Darmstadt summer school was 
perhaps the most important and influential meeting point for composers of new 
music in the twentieth	 century. Formed by the music critic Wolfgang Steinecke 
(1910–61) and the composer Wolfgang Fortner (1907–87), initially with the 
permission and then later with the active financial backing of the United States 
military government, its initial purpose had been to promote new music that had 
been suppressed under the Nazi regime. Pierre Boulez, Bruno Maderna, Karlheinz 
Stockhausen, Luciano Berio, Earle Brown, John Cage, Aldo Clementi, Franco 
Donatoni, Niccolò Castiglioni, Franco Evangelisti, Karel Goeyvaerts, Mauricio Kagel, 
Gottfried Michael Koenig, Giacomo Manzoni, and Henri Pousseur were regular 
attendees of the summer school between 1951 and 1961 (Wikipedia, 2013b). 
Following Schoenberg’s influence, the summer school was in the sway of the 
progressions of the 12-tone technique, namely serialism. However inspiring and 
progressive the summer school in this period may have been, it was not without its 
critics. Composers such as Hans Werner Henze reacted against the principles of the 
Darmstadt School, particularly the way in which composers were forced to adopt the 
tenets of serialism or be “ridiculed or ignored”. In his writings, Henze recalls student 
composers rewriting their works on the train to Darmstadt in order to conform to 
Boulez's expectations (Henze, 1982). Franco Evangelisti, who was one of the leading 
figures of the Darmstadt School, was also critical of the dogmatic “orthodoxy” of 
certain zealot disciples, labelling them the “Dodecaphonic police” (Fox, 2006). In his 
writings, the composer Konrad Boehmer also stated that the “concert programme 
[…] featured seriality as the dominant doctrine of the early fifties”. Perhaps in this 
context, Kayn’s compositions, which favoured “mathematical editing procedures” 
(Kayn, 1977b) rather than strict serialist techniques were ridiculed or ignored by the 
Darmstadt inner circle. If this were the case it would certainly explain Kayn’s 
assertion that he was made “persona non-grata” after the performance of his 
composition Aggregate (1958). 
Whatever the cause, after 1959, Kayn switched his attention away from composing 
for traditional instruments toward an approach that treated the electronic music 
studio as a means of composition. Between 1959 and 1963, he worked as a freelancer 
at various electronic music studios around Europe, including Warsaw, Cologne, 
Munich, Milan, and Brussels. While at the experimental studio of the Polish Radio in 
Warsaw in 1959, he began work on a draft version of an electronic composition 
Impulse, for seven 2-channel tape sources. Although the score was submitted, the full 
realisation of the piece proved impossible due to technical limitations in the Polish 
studios (Kayn, 1977b). Kayn tried again to realise the piece at the WDR studios in 
Cologne in 1961, and once more in 1962, at the Siemens studio in Munich. However, 
“even the punched tape technique employed in Munich proved incapable of 
bringing the project to completion in a reasonable period of time” (Kayn, 1977b). 
These frustrations in realising his piece within the confines of the electronic studio 
led Kayn to seek other forms of electronic composition. 
Perhaps what Kayn realised was that even if this project were achieved, it would not 
be able to fulfil his burgeoning cybernetic vision – and nor would any other project 




explore ‘New Consonance.’” (Harrison, 1999). Kayn cites this experience as a “crucial 
detour into improvisation”, which “helped him find his definitive musical direction” 
(Kayn, 2013b). 
The feedback loops associated with cybernetics find a strong resonance with 
improvisatory practice, and are acknowledged by free improvisers such as Evan 
Parker as being one of the models that an improviser may draw upon (Toop, 2004). It 
is possibly no coincidence that the LP released by The Group immediately after 
Kayn’s departure in 1968 was entitled Feed-Back (RCA records). However, it is also 
perhaps not so much the influence of feedback loops that had an effect on Kayn’s 
future work, but rather that his time with The Group demonstrated that the process 
of composition might be achieved in other ways: to “set up some initial parameters 
and ride the dynamics of the system in the direction you wish to go”, as Brian Eno 
has proposed as a cybernetic strategy, quoting the cybernetician Stafford Beer 
(Whittaker, 2003). 
 
This ‘freeing up’ of compositional structure coupled with Kayn’s discovery of 
modular synthesis saw another shift in his musical direction. Between 1966 and 1968,  
Kayn worked on his first fully realised electroacoustic work, Cybernetics I. Writings 
on Kayn’s work are sparse, but his large catalogue of recorded works and their 
accompanying sleevenotes stand as a testament to his approach and methodology. 
Work on Cybernetics I was conducted at the Studio di Fonologia, RAI in Milan (Kayn, 
1977b). There are three reasons why this studio in particular was instrumental in the 
development of this work: Firstly, the RAI studio was one of the best equipped in 
Europe at that time. Secondly (as previously stated in section 4.3 in relation to Alvin 
Lucier’s involvement with the RAI studio), the artistic directors of the studio, 
Luciano Berio (1925–2003) and Bruno Maderna (1920–1973) were determined that the 
Italian studio should not align itself with either the musique concrète being 
produced by the GRM Paris studio, or the rigidly rules-based, serialist compositions 
being produced at WDR in Cologne. Thirdly, one of the hallmarks of the Milan 
studio was the use of speech as sound material (Holmes, 2002). Kayn drew influence 
from each of these attributes in the composition of Cybernetics I in which the sound 
sources were all of “vocal origin, including animal noises” (Kayn, 1977b). These were 
then fed from tape through a series of audio-processing devices, which Kayn asserts 
“act according to the principle of self-organisation” (Kayn, 1977b), to produce 10 
separate sound sources, which were mixed in real time and recorded to tape (Kayn, 
1977b). It is not clear what audio processing took place but the Milan studio was well 
equipped to modulate the sound in a multitude of ways, via LFO, reverb, numerous 
filters, ring modulators, a time regulator, and an amplitude filter (Holmes, 2002).  
One of the main cybernetic elements of the composition (and what distinguishes it 
from the Cologne and Paris schools) is that it was accomplished in real time. As an 
organist, Kayn was well versed in manipulating controls to change the resulting 
timbre in the performance of a piece and this skill was put to good use in the 
compositional process of Cybernetics 1. “The electro acoustic project Cybernetics 
developed from the idea of determining, by means of random repertoire of acoustic 
signals, the course of the composition in real time i.e. while a multiplicity of 
complexly interdependent regulatory procedures are working together. In this 
connection, a further aspect was the removal of the theoretical contrast between 
technical and organic systems by means of the application of cybernetic controls to 
both areas” (Kayn, 1977b). Here we can see Kayn’s biocybernetic imperative in 
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equating the systematic processes applied prior to the recording (the routing of the 
modulation matrix and the order of the initial sound signals from tape) with the 
systematic, human control processes he is utilising as the real time operator of the 
compositional system. He talks of the mixing console as “simulating a heuristic 
situation” (Kayn, 1977b); heuristics are often employed in cybernetic systems (as 
opposed to algorithms), meaning that a goal can be sought by trial and error, the 
outcome of which may not be optimal but will be successful within a margin of error 
(Beer, 1994). Heuristics cut out the need for specifying every operational possibility, 
thus potentially saving computational time and energy. On controlling the system as 
the composition unfolded, Kayn wrote that the “density of the information (the mix 
of sound sources) corresponded to particular parameters of state (entropy values)” 
(Kayn, 1977b), meaning that if too little was happening in the soundscape, more 
sound sources and modulations could be added (in real time) and vice versa.  
 
Fig. 15. A “sign store” and “control system” score for Kayn’s Cybernetics 1, 1968  
(Kayn, 1977b) 
 
Kayn also discusses the aesthetic qualities inherent to the cybernetic composition, 
“the fact that the process of creation is integrated into the acoustic super-signal, and 
remains transparent. […] The listener is thus able to follow the compositional process 
as it develops; the acoustic construct is hence made more lucid and more of a total 
auditory experience for the listener“ (Kayn, 1977b). He also hopes that “the reality of 
what ‘exists’ on a purely ‘technological’ level will surely prove fruitful in terms of 
aesthetic innovation” (Kayn, 1977b). Kayn’s concern with the aesthetic qualities of 
the piece coupled with the technological and mathematical construction demonstrate 
the influence of Max Bense’s work. Kayn also shows this influence when he writes 
the following in explanation of the piece: “For a number of years now it has been 
Some materials have been removed due 
to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 




possible to observe that such apparently diverse areas as sociology, aesthetics and 
medicine have been characterised increasingly by the incorporation of mathematical 
processes and methods [and] since 1957, of the digital computer as an aid to the 
realisation of instrumental and electronic compositions” (Kayn, 1977b). However, he 
goes on to make a distinction between, on the one hand, electronic music that is pre-
programmed into a computer, which forces the composer to think in “mechanical 
terms” and thus create works that tend to be of “a repetitive nature”, and on the 
other, cybernetic composition, which has a “critical degree of indeterminacy, which 
allows a more effective approximation to organic reality” (Kayn, 1977b). He also 
equates the “open system” employed within experimental compositions, containing 
the “usual instrumental ensembles”, with cybernetic composition, stating: “synthetic 
sound processes which are generated by means of open systems do not have 
additive components as their basis, but are derived from functions within non-linear 
programmes” whose “specific character lies in the fact that they do not remain 
stable, but rather proceed in sudden jumps” (Kayn, 1977b), meaning that the 
electronic compositional system he has derived allows for more unpredictability and 
variety than conventional experimental strategies. 
 
Kayn made two further pieces at the RAI studio in Milan with ‘cybernetics’ in the 
title: Cybernetics II (1968), an ambitious piece, which included live vocal 
performances (7 choir groups, a tone generator, sound sources, live electronics and 
tape), and Cybernetics III (1969), which was a refinement and expansion of his first 
electroacoustic cybernetic piece. In 1970 Kayn moved from Italy to Holland to take 
up the position of Programme Officer at the Goethe Institute, Amsterdam. During 
this time he was invited to use the sound studios of the Instituut voor Sonology 
Rijksuniversiteit (Institute of Sonology at Utrecht University), which became his 
compositional base until 1991 (Kayn, 2013b). The move proved to be creatively 
fruitful, with the university studios in Utrecht providing the equipment for him to 
fully realise his cybernetic compositions. The commentator on experimental and 
electronic music, Thomas Patteson writes:  
 
“The composer Gottfried Michael Koenig, director of the studio since 1964, 
had recently overseen the installation of a state-of-the-art analogue 
system of independent modular units, such as oscillators, filters, envelope 
generators, and logic circuits. At the centre of this configuration was a 
‘variable function generator’, essentially a primitive sequencer that could be 
programmed to store a series of voltages, which were then used to control 
the various components of the studio. With this system, Kayn was able for 
the first time to realise his idea of cybernetic music, which involved elaborate 
configurations of connections and feedback loops that create complex and 
unpredictable sonic interactions. Kayn ‘composes’ the initial setup of the 
studio components, but once the sound is set in motion, it is allowed to take 
its own course. In this way, Kayn believes, ‘the electronic system develops a 
sort of capacity to think for itself, a capacity which in a sense can be 
described as artificial intelligence… Existential Being, as it were, takes the 




                  
Fig. 16. A cybernetic music synthesis patch designed by Kayn at the 
Studio de Recherches et de Structurations Electroniques, Brussels 
(Kayn, 1977a) 
 
It was in Kayn’s interaction with the equipment in the Utrecht studio that his 
biocybernetic vision became realised in the way he had first envisioned. The capacity 
of the modern synthesizer modules and the complexity of the patching matrix 
allowed for the construction of self-sustaining musical systems, which, once fed with 
initial sound sources, could, with little interference, produce almost indefinite 
soundscapes of great variety and musical scope. The 3-LP and 4-LP box sets he 
produced at this time attest to the prolific output this compositional system could 
generate. The music critic Frans van Rossum describes Kayn’s working method in 
this era:  
 
“His electronic pieces start with defining a network of electronic equipment. 
The nature of the network, and its inherent potential, play a large role in 
determining the final audible result. Next, the composer collates the basic 
information about this network and develops a system of signals or 
commands that it can obey and execute. These have to be incorporated in a 
system of controllers, adjustments and operations which can realise the 
composition. This demanding work may take years of construction and tests, 
and when the system is activated, the resulting composition is recorded to 
tape once only from the beginning to the end” (van Rossum, 2011). 
 
Kayn’s works Infra (1979–80) and Tektra (1980) are perhaps the artistic zenith of this 
period. Infra was produced using orchestral sound sources and Tektra with 
electronic sources (van Rossum, 2011). Tektra, in particular, achieves a very audibly 
organic aesthetic, with musical structures seeming to exist only in reference to their 
own ecological rules; soundscapes that constantly evolve, while always seeming to 
maintain an internal, self-referential consistency. This is perhaps no coincidence as 
the production of electronically synthesised sound sources could also be tied into 
the electronic compositional matrix (via a patch bay of physical inputs and outputs), 
rather than merely providing the initial sound energy, as would be the case with a 
source from tape. In this type of coupling, control sources could be used to directly 
affect waveform production and vice versa, thus making it possible to form what 
Von Foerster called a recursive coupling (Von Foerster, 1960): a feedback loop that 
enables a balance of control between elements in a system, wherein a change in one 
element affects all the others, including (recursively) the initial change state 
component. This type of system is also synonymous with living systems (Von 
Foerster, 1960). While it is not known to what extent Kayn achieved recursive 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd 
party copyright. The unabridged version can be 




coupling in his compositional structure, it is technologically concurrent with the 
equipment he had available and the sonic aesthetic would seem to suggest that this 
had been achieved to some extent.  
 
Fig. 17. Synthesizer patch and performance set up of Simultan, van Gogh Museum 1976 
(Kayn, 2013b) 
 
Before concluding this examination of Kayn’s cybernetic compositional 
methodology, it is worth making two further points. Firstly, Kayn not only 
abandoned traditional (or more often any) notation in his cybernetic works, he also 
gave up on ideas of conventional musical structures having any bearing on his 
composition, instead favouring evaluation in cybernetic terms. As van Rossum notes: 
“Concepts like melody, harmony and rhythm, atonality or serialism do not apply to 
Kayn’s music, which is more like a continually changing resonating structure. More 
than that, the composer presents his music as an artifice which he constructs and sets 
in motion, but once he has done this, it is left to move through space, without outside 
interference, according to its own internal laws” (van Rossum, 2011). Secondly, as we 
can infer from this comment, Kayn wished to understate the role of the composer in 
cybernetic music, perhaps the only possible position when rigorously advocating 
self-organising works of music. The music critic Massimo Ricci further elucidates: 
“The concept according to which every musical piece should be defined in every 
single detail by its author is firmly contrasted by Roland, who insists that cybernetic 
music is self-regulated, leaving behind both the narrative element and the 
psycho/emotional minutiae usually associated with the idea of the ‘author’ and with 
‘art’. This means that not even the ideator of this framework can predict the 
definitive outcome, since the sonic processes do not have a real epicenter, but 
instead, every sound bears the very same weight and importance in comparison to 
the others. ‘Music is sound – and sound is self-sufficient’, declares Kayn.” (Ricci, 
2005) It is worth noting that this statement from Kayn is extremely similar to an 
assertion from the cybernetic composer Agostino Di Scipio, in which he declared: 
“sound is the interface” (Di Scipio, 2003). However, they have slightly different 
intended meanings. In Di Scipio’s case this declaration relates to all functions in a 
recursively coupled compositional system taking place in the audible domain, and 
alternatively, in Kayn’s case, his statement pertains to the non-necessity of 
representational systems, such as notation, in composition. Nonetheless, they both 
assert the primacy of sound in the compositional process and this is perhaps 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party 
copyright. The unabridged version can be viewed in 
Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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testament to the common cybernetic ontology shared by both composers. There are 
also some striking similarities in the two composers’ methodologies, in particular, Di 
Scipio’s emphasis on composing interactions as opposed to interactive composition18	
(Di Scipio, 2003). This is mirrored in Kayn’s meticulous and complex patch 
preparation, so that a performance may be realised when open systems19 interact by 
means of “a complex network of interlocking regulatory and operative procedures” 
(Kayn, 1977b), which can in turn create a self-sustaining system. These ideas are 
strikingly similar, which is unusual considering the composers’ major cybernetic 
compositions are almost thirty years apart, but they do strongly indicate a common 
cybernetic ontology underpinning both their methodologies.   
 
To conclude, perhaps we should turn our attention once again to ontology. Kayn’s 
work is undoubtedly aligned with the non-modern ontology of cybernetics. 
However, another interesting facet here is the composer’s own stated preoccupation 
with being, particularly as it pertains to modes of listening to cybernetic music:  
 
“Existential being, as it were, takes the place of a logically functioning 
consciousness. The characteristic impression made on the listener by sound 
events which arise in this way [i.e. cybernetically composed] seems to be one of 
simultaneity or dependencies between control structures and programme 
structures – that is, the fact that the process of creation is integrated into the 
acoustic supersignal, and remains transparent. The control structure lies within 
the range of audibility, thereby forming an integral component of the 
generating process. The listener is thus able to follow the compositional 
process as it develops; the acoustic construct is hence made more lucid and 
more of a total auditory experience for the listener – the acoustic sphere is, so 
to speak, ‘socialised’”  (Kayn, 1977b).  
 
Here Kayn wishes to emphasise that the listener is made aware of how the piece is 
compositionally constructed and that this is realised by technological means. This is 
undoubtedly Heideggerian ‘revealing’ in the sense that Kayn wishes to emphasise 
existential being taking precedence over logical consciousness in the listening act and 
that it is a technological process that is allowing this to happen. In Heideggerian 
terms, this particular subversive use of the technology is lifting technology’s inherent 
enframing veil so that we may glimpse, if only fleetingly, a facet of the nature of true 
being (Heidegger, 1954). 
 
It is also of note that Kayn wished to stand apart from other compositional modes. 
He coined the term ‘cybernetic music’ in the late 1960s (Kayne, 1977b) in order to be 
radical and propose a new form of compositional practice that stood outside of 
conventional electroacoustic and modern classical norms. While it is fair to say this 
idea did not become established in the public imagination or in experimental music 
circles, it did pave the way for a consideration that cybernetic music could be a 



















































6.1 Gordon Pask and the Musicolour Machine 
 
“Cybernetics is the art of manipulating defensible metaphors”  
(Gordon Pask in Von Glasersfeld, 1992). 
 
Gordon Pask (1928–1996) is one of the few cyberneticians to engage directly with 
musical practice. Pask was not, however, a composer. The majority of his work 
centred on inventing adaptive learning machines – interactive technological devices 
that were designed to aid in the process of learning. One such device of particular 
interest to this thesis was the Musicolour Machine, which was designed to enhance 
musical creativity, as well as acting as a new form of interactive entertainment. 
 
Pask was an eminent academic, who obtained three PhDs. He was a Visiting 
Professor and also taught at many academic institutions, including Brunel 
University, University of Chicago, the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 
Concordia University, Georgia Institute of Technology, The Open University, 
University of New Mexico, Architectural Association School of Architecture, and 
MIT. However, his pre-eminent vocational preoccupation was with his own 
commercial research company, Systems Research (Glanville and Scott, 2001). Like 
many cyberneticians, Pask’s academic study was eclectic, encompassing the study of 
mining engineering (Liverpool Polytechnic, graduating 1949), physiology (Downing 
College, Cambridge, graduating 1953), and psychology (University College London, 
graduating 1974) (Glanville and Scott, 2001). It was while at Cambridge that Pask 
was introduced to Norbert Wiener and the science of cybernetics. Pask was asked by 
his professor to assist Wiener while he was visiting and giving his lectures in 
cybernetics to Cambridge students. According to Pask’s wife, Elisabeth: “Wiener was 
describing the very science he [Pask] had longed to work on, but had not known 
what to call. He had known for some time that what he wanted to do was to simulate 
how learning took place, using electronics to represent the human nervous system 
[…] in order to study how an adaptive machine could learn. Gordon decided to use 
his expertise in theatrical lighting to demonstrate the process.” (Elizabeth Pask in 
Pickering, 2011). 
 
6.1.1. The Musicolour Machine 
 
While studying at Cambridge, Pask rekindled a childhood interest in theatre and 
joined the Footlights Club. Here he became involved in writing sketches, set design, 
and theatrical lighting, and it was from this milieu, combined with his passion for 
practical electronics and cybernetics, that Pask’s first interactive learning device, the 
Musicolour Machine, was born (Pickering, 2011). In the early 1950s, off-the-shelf 
electronics were expensive and hard to come by. In order to build their nascent 
adaptive machines, Pask and his collaborator Robin McKinnon-Wood would 
cannibalise domestic electronics, mechanical devices (such as a calliope organ), and 
bits of bombsite computer technology, to build electronic devices that would lend 
themselves to theatrical performance. The early machines they built included a 
musical typewriter, a self-adapting metronome, and the Musicolour Machine 
(McKinnon-Wood, 1993). 
Musicolour was a responsive light show that was designed to interact with the sound 
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input generated by an improvising musician. This thesis is primarily concerned with 
cybernetics as it relates to musical composition. However, the Musicolour Machine 
shares a common ontology and systemic similarities with a number of approaches 
used by cybernetic composers: the use of technology to aid in musical activity 
encompassing a distinctly performative ethos and the use of sound from the 
environment to drive a generative process, with feedback loops that thread back and 
forth between performer, technology and a musical output. Pask’s emphasis on the 
design of interactions between human, machine, and environment also shares a 
particular similarity with the work of composers such as Agostino De Scipio and 
Roland Kayn. 
 
The inspiration for building Musicolour also stemmed from Pask’s interest in 
synaesthesia; he was intrigued by the possibilities of a machine that could detect 
patterns in sound and light and form relationships between the two (Pask, 1971). 
Furthermore, the interaction with a human performer was integral to the inception of 
the design. The machine was designed to ‘listen’ to a musical performer and 
transmute changes in pitch and rhythm to changes in lighting intensity and colour. 
However, the mapping of sound to light was not linear; it was designed in such a 
way as to encourage the musicians to adapt their playing to create aesthetically 
pleasing effects from the lighting array. The performer “trained the machine and it 
played a game with him. In this sense, the system acted as an extension of the 
performer with which he could co-operate to achieve effects that he could not 
achieve on his own. Consequently, the learning mechanism was extended and the 
machine itself became reformulated as a game player capable of habituating at 
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6.1.2. Musicolour Design & Operation 
 
Musicolour worked by receiving a sound input from a performing musician. The 
signal was fed via a microphone to an amplifier and then passed through a bank of 
analogue band pass filters, which split the signal up into different frequency bands, 
thus the machine could register changes in pitch. Further filters were utilised to 
detect the rhythm and attack of each sound (Bird and Di Paolo, 2008). These filters 
are not specified, but it is most likely that they were a form of envelope follower, 
common to many subsequent modular synthesisers. The band pass filters were split 
into 8 bands which trigger specific lighting arrays to select different colours; we 
might imagine high frequencies triggering green, upper-mid frequencies triggering 
blue, lower-mid triggering red, and so on (the colours were selected mechanically 
using a servo-controlled, rotating colour wheel gel, which the light would shine 
through). The outputs of each filter were averaged over time using a root means 
squared operation (realised through analogue circuitry) to produce a threshold 
value. If the value exceeded the threshold, it would register as a 1, if not, then the 
value would register as 0. Thus, the threshold value would determine when a light 
would be on or off (Bird and Di Paolo, 2008). We may equate these threshold values 
to be internal criterions of stability as outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. However, 
the sound-to-light mapping was not directly linear, but adapted over time, as 
Andrew Pickering explains: 
 
“The internal parameters of Musicolour’s circuitry were not constant. In 
analogy to a biological neurone, banks of lights would only be activated if 
the output from the relevant filter exceeded a certain threshold value, and 
these thresholds varied in time as changes built up on capacitors according 
to the development of the performance and the prior behaviour of the 
machine. In particular, Musicolour was designed to get ‘bored’ (Pask, 1971). 
If the same musical trope was repeated too often, the thresholds for the 
corresponding lighting pattern would eventually shift upward and the 
machine would cease to respond, encouraging the performer to try 
something new. Eventually some sort of dynamic equilibrium might be 
reached in which the shifting patterns of the musical performance and the 
changing parameters of the machine combined to achieve synesthetic 
effects” (Pickering, 2011). 
 
Thus Pask and McKinnon-Wood had created an adaptive light show, which 
responded to sound in a non-linear way that was analogous to a biological response. 
Furthermore, the musician was able to ‘train’ the machine to respond in a way that 
was aesthetically pleasing to the performer. However, it is important to underline the 
non-linear nature of this adaptation, as Pask himself notes (Pask, 1971) that when a 
musical performer would initially interact with the machine it would respond in an 
obvious and knowable way, but as the machine would cycle through its adaptive 
mechanism (‘get bored’ and respond) it would change its behaviour and respond 
with increasing levels of abstraction, which the performer would continue to train 
while not being fully aware of what actions were facilitating what changes in the 
machine’s behaviour; the performer would be aware that they were effecting a visual 
style from the lighting array and that this was representing a general mood in their 
performance. It is through this mechanism, this dance of agency, that Pask believes 
“the performer conceives the machine as an extension of himself” (Pask, 1971).  
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6.1.3. Ontological Theatre 
 
In his 2011 book, The Cybernetic Brain (Pickering, 2011), Andrew Pickering uses the 
term ‘ontological theatre’ to describe how cybernetic machines such as Musicolour 
stage a particular ontology for us, one that is distinct from conventional modern 
norms. It is also worth examining this term in further detail, as it is a useful 
elucidation of how a machine can become an extension of one’s self and an equal 
partner in the creative process. 
 
When considering how cybernetic machines stage ‘ontological theatre’ for us, we 
must first consider the peculiar non-modern ontology of cybernetics itself. As 
previously explored in this thesis, the philosopher Bruno Latour argues that modern 
thinking separates the natural sciences from the social sciences and thus a distinctly 
dualist ontology permeates modern thinking. Conversely, the multi-disciplinary 
science of cybernetics purposely crosses boundaries and thus demonstrates a non-
modern ontology, in which, from an informational perspective, “people and things 
are not so different after all” (Pickering, 2011).  
 
One of the distinct facets of this non-modern perspective is the rejection of notions of 
ultimate truth. This recognition of the ultimate unknowability of things reciprocates 
a performative ontology, one in which the world and the things in it are only 
meaningfully knowable through interaction. For the cybernetician this performative 
ontology manifests itself in the building of models or machines that replicate the 
behaviour of complex systems – such as Ashby’s Design for a Brain (1952) or his 
Homeostat machine (see Pickering, 2011) – and then interacting with them to discover 
their behaviour. 
 
Cybernetic machines, such as Musicolour, are thus designed to be performative and 
to demonstrate things about the world in a performative context. Thus, Pickering’s 
term ‘ontological theatre’ describes how cybernetic machines or systems ‘act out’ this 
non-modern worldview. Pickering states that cybernetic projects stage ontological 
theatre for us in two senses: Firstly, as an aid to our ontological imagination, helping 
us to consider a different understanding of our being in the world (one that 
encompasses ultimate unknowability and a performative world view) and as an 
invitation to think that the world in general might operate in such a way. Secondly, 
cybernetic projects are examples of what might happen in practice if we adopt this 
non-modern imagining of the world and enact a performative ontology (Pickering, 
2011).  
 
To give an example of how the Musicolour machine ‘acts out’ this ontology, we can 
consider the fact that it is, in Beer’s terms (Beer, 1972), an exceedingly complex 
system, which interacts with another exceedingly complex system (the musician), 
and thus, in practical application, it demonstrates its own complex behaviour. 
Nonetheless, the wiring diagram for the machine is relatively straightforward in 
technical terms and there is no way we can know its complex behaviour by studying 
a graphical representation of the circuitry, or the circuitry itself; we can only know 
the behaviour of the machine by interacting with it and thus a performative ontology 
is enacted. Furthermore, the simple circuitry giving rise to complex behaviours 
enacts the cybernetic trope of exceedingly complex behaviours arising from very 
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simple systems. From the cybernetic viewpoint this also theoretically begs the 
question; is the performer’s behaviour, at its core, also derived from similar simple 
internal systems?  
 
6.1.4. Cybernetic Art and Aesthetics 
 
So Pickering uses the term ‘ontological theatre’ in connection with the Musicolour 
machine to describe how it enacts a performative, cybernetic worldview; quite 
literally Musicolour is “ontology in action” (Pickering, 2011). However, it is also 
worth noting that Musicolour was quite literally a theatrical object; a machine 
devised to stage a cybernetic ontology in a theatrical setting. It therefore acts as a 
good model for how a cybernetic machine in an artistic setting might operate 
technically, and it also places the contemplation of such a machine’s performance 
into the realm of aesthetics.  
 
For Pask, the interplay between human and machine and the pleasure that may be 
gained by such an interaction lay at the core of any consideration of aesthetics. 
However, Pask did not restrict his contemplation of aesthetics to interactions with 
machines; he attempted to encompass his critique of his own cybernetic art projects 
within a wider, more general view of aesthetics in art. Pask expounded his theory in 
a paper entitled “A comment, a case history and a plan” (Pask, 1971), in which he 
detailed the technical operation and artistic outcomes of two of his cybernetic art 
machines, the Musicolour Machine and the Colloquy of Mobiles. The latter machine was 
exhibited at the Cybernetic Serendipity exhibition held at the ICA in London in 1968. 
Within the paper he attempted to form a theory of aesthetics based on what he 
referred to as the “cybernetic psychology of pleasure” (Pask, 1971). Pask believed 
that humans are prone to seek out novelty in their environment, and having done so, 
they wish to control, find meaning, or come to terms with it, and in so doing, 
conceptualisations and abstractions arise. Pask states that as humans we find this 
activity inherently pleasurable and that the creative process and our interactions 
with the resultant outcomes are enacting this pleasurable activity. Pask believed that 
the role of an artist engaged in a creative endeavour should be to foster “aesthetically 
potent environments” (Pask, 1971). Pask used cybernetic expressions such as 
‘variety’ to outline the terms of these environments:  
 
 
It is clear that an aesthetically potent environment should have the following 
attributes: 
a) It must offer sufficient variety to provide the potentially controllable 
variety (in Ashby’s terms) required by man (however it must not 
swamp him with variety – if it does, the environment would be 
merely unintelligible). 
b) It must contain forms that a man can learn to interpret at various 
levels of abstraction. 
c) It must provide cues or tacitly stated instructions to guide the 
learning process. 
d) It may, in addition, respond to a man, engage him in conversation 





While it was Pask’s intention to make these precepts significantly broad to 
encompass all forms of art, attribute d) is what concerned him most. Pask’s interest 
in adaptive learning machines and the process of learning itself led him to believe 
that the ‘conversation’ was the primary facet of meaningful interaction. This later led 
him to the formulation of his two career-defining hypotheses, “Interaction of Actors 
Theory” (Pask, 1992) and “Conversation Theory” (Pask, 1976), Attribute d) also 
points toward an artistic facet that might be better served by a cybernetic approach, 
namely that of a meaningful interactive experience. Andrew Pickering writes: 
 
“It is not the case that cybernetics requires us to do art in a different way. The 
analysis is not a condemnation of studio painting or whatever. But 
cybernetics does suggest a new strategy, a novel way of going on, in the 
creation of art objects. We could try to construct objects which foreground 
Pask’s requirement d), which explicitly “engage a man in conversation”, 
which “externalise this discourse” as Pask also put it – rather than effacing or 
concealing the engagement, as conventional art objects do. Cybernetics thus 
invites (rather than requires) a certain stance or strategy in the world of the 
arts that conventional aesthetics does not” (Pickering, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, attribute d) implies a non-hierarchical formulation, one which shifts 
the power relationship between the artist and the audience and in so doing, again 
stages the ontology of cybernetics for us: “In contrast to the traditional impulse to 
dominate aesthetic media, the Musicolour machine thematised cooperation and 
revealing in Heidegger’s sense” (Pickering, 2011). From these assertions we can 
assume that the tropes of ‘conversation’ and ‘revealing’ (in the terms Heidegger 
outlined in “The Question Concerning Technology”; Heidegger, 1954) are elevated in 
any consideration of aesthetics in cybernetic art. 
 
6.1.5 Pask’s influence  
 
The Musicolour machine demonstrates how musical creativity may be enhanced 
through cybernetic means, but Pask’s work also points toward how cybernetic art 
practice may be conducted and the particular ontology that is staged in doing so. In 
this sense, Pask’s work is an important element of the cybernetic music canon. 
However, Pask’s machines were also influential in a wider context. Pask exhibited 
the Colloquy of Mobiles at the Cybernetic Serendipity exhibition held at the ICA in 
London in 1968, along with other eminent artists and musicians such as John Cage, 
Karlheinz Stockhausen, Iannis Xenakis, Herbert Brün, Stafford Beer, Nam June Paik, 
and Peter Zinovieff (Reichardt, 1968). While many of the major musical figures 
among the contributors were confined to an LP that was released to accompany the 
exhibition, Pask’s work took centre stage as the physically largest single work on 
display. The exhibition in London was seen by some 60,000 visitors and was shown 
on the BBC before it visited Washington DC and San Francisco (ICA, 2014). Andrew 
Pickering suspects that the public notoriety gained by Pask in this period implicates 
him as the model for the original Dr Who (Pickering, 2011), and his idiosyncratic 
mannerisms, dress sense and field of study certainly all suggest that this might well 
be possible. The artist, friend, and collaborator of Brian Eno, Peter Schmidt, curated 
the music for the ICA exhibition. While it is unknown if Eno visited the exhibition, it 
is certain that his interest in cybernetics chimed with Schmidt’s and that cybernetics 




Pask’s work is not only significant and influential for contemporary and subsequent 
computer artists and musicians, it also holds significance for current A.I. research: 
 
“Ideas that were dear to Gordon all that time ago, on interactive circuits with 
dynamic growth, are coming back in the form of neural nets, with parallel 
processing in digital computers and also analogue systems, my bet is that 
analogue self-adapting nets will take over as models of brain function – 
because this is very likely how the brain works – though A.I. may continue 
on its course of number crunching and digital computing. Surely this is alien 
to the brain. So we would fail the Turing test, being too good at pattern 
recognition, and much too poor at arithmetic compared with digital 
computers. In short, the kind of philosophy that Gordon nurtured does seem 
to be returning. Perhaps his learning machines have lessons for us now” 
(Gregory, 2001). 
 
Because Pask chose his early forays into practical cybernetics to be artistic ones and 
because Colloquy of Mobiles in particular was well known to a discerning section of 
the public audience, it can be assumed that Pask’s work and ideas were significantly 
more influential on artists working in the computer interaction field than the 
majority of his contemporary cyberneticians. However, Pask’s later work on adaptive 
learning machines and his theoretical work on how learning takes place point 
beyond subsequent studies into symbolic artificial intelligence to a new model of 
how A.I. might be achieved. Pask’s work was visionary and far-reaching and is still 




























6.2 Brian Eno 
 
“I tend towards the roles of planner and programmer, and then become an audience to the 
results” (Eno, 1975b). 
 
Born in 1948, Brian Eno is the best-known exponent of cybernetic music practices, 
particularly in the field of popular and avant-garde music. His work as a composer, 
musical collaborator, record producer and visual artist spans more than forty years 
and his understanding of cybernetics and complexity theory has influenced his 
practice from the very beginning of his career. As a self-confessed non-musician who 
trained in the visual arts, Eno has deliberately sought electronic and creative systems 
to aid him in expanding the possibilities of his musical composition.  
 
6.2.1. Context and Compositional Perspective 
 
Brian Eno was born in Woodbridge, Suffolk in 1948. After studying at Ipswich Art 
School and Winchester School of Art, he went on to join one of the most famous rock 
groups of the 1970s, Roxy Music. He has also released many albums as a solo artist 
and has worked as a producer and collaborator with some of the most commercially 
successful artists of the past forty-five years, including David Bowie, Talking Heads, 
U2, and Coldplay. He is also credited with inventing the genres of Ambient Music 
and Generative Music (Sheppard, 2008). 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Eno’s work as a composer is the ontological 
position he inhabits, and the fact that his work examines ‘being’ and ‘emergence’ as 
core themes makes it remarkable in comparison to traditional compositional norms. 
This ontological position, one he shares with other cybernetic composers, manifests 
itself in his working practice in a number of different ways:  
 
1) Firstly, in the de-emphasis of the composer as author of a piece of music: the 
recognition that his compositional process is a non-hierarchical one, which 
incorporates human, machine, and environment equally. This is typified by his 
use of generative, mechanical, or computer systems, to which he relinquishes 
much compositional control. This de-emphasis represents a move away from the 
romantic and modernist perspective of the lone composer as the sole author and 
bestower of meaning on the work of music. Instead, Eno aligns himself with a 
post-modern or post-human, cybernetic perspective, which is exemplified by 
non-hierarchical, multi-authorship, and autopoietic creative processes. 
 
2) Secondly, in the way that composition is subject to probabilistic process (as 
opposed to being entirely organised by a composer), and large and complex 
musical structures or behaviours can emerge from the probabilistic interaction of 
small sound elements. Again, this is non-hierarchical formation in which ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ organisational structures are of equal importance in the 
final compositional result. Eno’s cybernetic music is also probabilistic in so far as 
it is different in each iteration. His compositions act like ‘seeds’ that ‘grow’ the 
structure of the music and like all organic structures, they are organisationally 
unique, but consistent in form: they are unique in each iteration, but adhere to a 
‘class of goals’. To use Eno’s own example, each tree is different, but it still 
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belongs to the family of trees (Eno, 1996). 
 
3) Thirdly, Eno views the ‘frame’ as being more important than the picture (Eno, 
1996a); here he is referring to the context of the artwork (or composition) as 
having preference over the content (or musical notes). However, this extends to 
favouring the importance of production values over musical concerns, thus de-
emphasising musical notes in favour of timbral composition (this shift was made 
possible through advancements in the recording technology that Eno utilises as a 
compositional tool). This aligns Eno with a non-modern, non-text-based 
ontology. This is akin to the ontology of McLuhan’s post-literate society; in 
which the medium (rather than the text-based abstraction of notation) is the 
‘message’ (Coyne, 1995). This shift in emphasis bears similarity to the ‘process 
over product’ ethic that was imbued in Eno as an art student, and which he 
continues to utilise in his compositions. 
 
4) Finally, his ontological position manifests itself in the mode of listening he asks 
of his audience. Eno’s music does not demand the attention of the audience; it 
sits in an environment. One may choose to listen to his music designed to 
enhance the ambient sound environment, or one may ignore it. The music blends 
with the environment and the resultant sound is contingent on this blend. Eno 
asks that the listener consider that the music, the listener, the technology, and the 
environment are all equal parts situated within the same system.  
 
Each of these compositional perspectives is influenced and shaped by cybernetic 
thinking. In particular, Eno’s art college tutor Roy Ascott and the work of the British 
cybernetician Stafford Beer, with whom Eno had a personal relationship. 
 
6.2.2. Eno’s introduction to cybernetics 
 
Eno’s first encounter with cybernetic ideas occurred after he left grammar school and 
enrolled in the art foundation course at the Ipswich College of Art, which at that time 
was entitled the Groundcourse. Taking a distinctively experimental approach to art 
education, the Groundcourse was designed and run by the telematic artist Roy 
Ascott. Ascott discovered cybernetics in the early 1960s and ideas concerning 
“information, interactive exchange, feedback, participation and systemic 
relationships were to form the basis of his [artistic and] pedagogical practice” 
(Pethick, 2006). He hoped that the Groundcourse would provide “a model for the 
relations between artist, audience and environment, and their positions within a 
wider social system” (Pethick, 2006). Ascott’s cybernetic thinking was to see him 
move away from what he considered to be a reductionist worldview and toward a 
more ‘open-ended’, probabilistic perspective, which encompassed ideas of self-
organisation and autopoiesis into artworks. He utilised this new ontological position 
to form a new kind of art course, first at Ealing Art College and later at Ipswich. 
Ascott’s pedagogy and cybernetic vision, proved to be formative in Eno’s 
development as an artist, and in the formulation of his subsequent approach to 






In order to examine his influence on Eno’s work, it is relevant to examine Ascott’s 
cybernetic beliefs in more detail. During the early 1960s, Ascott’s work focused on 
interactive art, which the viewer was able to change in order to create new 
arrangements. Inspired by cybernetics, he took a holistic view of his practice, in 
which he saw his teaching as an extension of his studio work and where each fed 
back into the other in a ‘mutually reinforcing system’ (Ascott, 1964). Ascott outlined 
his cybernetic and artistic manifesto in a paper entitled The Construction of Change 
(Ascott, 1964). Here he established some of his fundamental artistic beliefs: firstly, 
that all art is didactic; secondly, that behaviour and control are key facets in artistic 
creation; and thirdly, that this should be understood using the science of cybernetics.  
 
In this paper Ascott asserts that cybernetics is a multidisciplinary science, whose 
focus is on finding common control and communication mechanisms, which Ascott 
associated with artistic process and method. To this end he employed teachers on the 
Groundcourse from many different disciplines: “a biologist, a behavioural 
psychologist, an engineer, a sociologist and a linguist; the students also studied 
cybernetics and behavioural sciences. These various disciplines interacted to suggest 
new fields of study. Visiting tutors to the course included Gustav Metzger, whose 
auto-destructive art theories inspired a young Pete Townshend (guitarist with The 
Who) and Gordon Pask (an early pioneer in cybernetics), who became a collaborator 
of Ascott’s” (Pethick, 2006). 
 
Ascott opens Construction of Change with an examination of the cyclical nature of the 
process of making art, the meaning of the artwork and the role of the spectator 
within his own practice: “I make structures in which the relationships of parts are 
not fixed and may be changed by the intervention of the spectator. […] The 
participant becomes responsible for the extension of the artwork’s meaning” (Ascot, 
1964). 
 
In an attempt to rationalise the need for cybernetic practice, Ascott argues that 
society is undergoing massive scientific and technological change and that culture 
and art shape and regulate society. It is therefore the artist’s “moral responsibility” to 
attempt to interpret this change. The artist symbolically represents man’s freedom to 
shape, change and control his world. Ascott believes that the integrative science of 
cybernetics offers the artist the best way to understand his own processes, how these 
shape the world, and how the world shapes the process. He states that cybernetics is 
“a coordinator of science as art is the coordinator of experience” and that this 
cybernetic viewpoint is not only changing our world, but “presenting us with 
qualities of experience and modes of perception that radically alter our conception of 
it” (Ascott, 1964). 
 
To give further credence to the value of cybernetics in practice, Ascott outlines in 
detail the pedagogic methods of the Groundcourse, which were initially designed to 
break apart preconceptions: students were faced with “problems that seem absurd, 
aimless, or terrifying” and it was hoped that “out of this flux, a many-sided organism 
may evolve” (Ascott, 1964), which would subsequently lead to the formulation not 






In order to extend his vision of “process over product” (Ascott, 1967) in artistic 
endeavour, Ascott’s public commentary on cybernetics did not only concern the 
visual arts, but also encompassed experimental music. In 1966 he wrote an article for 
the international scientific journal Cybernetica that included a discussion on the music 
of John Cage and in particular his defocusing of the score and emphasis on the 
process of music making. He cites the writings of John Cage: “If music is conceived 
as an object, then it has a beginning, middle and end, and one can feel rather 
confident when he takes measurements of time. But when it (music) is a process, 
those measurements become less meaningful…” Cage further asserts: “We must 
arrange our music so that people realise that they themselves are doing it, and not 
that something is being done to them” (Cage in Ascott, 1966). Technology historian 
and commentator Christina Dunbar-Hester believes that this selection of Cage’s 
writing represents Ascott’s uncovering of Cage’s cybernetic intention: “Thus, the 
entire process of composition and performance is conceived of as enrolling the 
performers, the instruments, and the audience into a ‘system’ of experience that is 
distinct, and experienced as subjectively unique, and yet is part of an ongoing 
process” (Dunbar-Hester 2010). 
 
Eno’s early encounter with cybernetics was of a very practical nature; the 
Groundcourse was in essence a series of techniques for producing artistic ideas via 
generative processes. In the ‘process over product’ model, students were encouraged 
to think about their practice in a systematic way, through a series of tasks and 
problem-solving exercises. In some cases these were extreme. For example, in one 
instance students were asked to act out an alternative personality for ten weeks, and 
in another, students were locked in the gymnasium and subjected to loud music, 
flashing strobe lights, and marbles thrown on to the floor (Pethick, 2006). The 
methods of discombobulation favoured by Ascott and the Groundcourse were 
transformational in altering the worldview of many a student and Eno was no 
exception. The influence is demonstrated not only in his ubiquitous systemic 
approach to music making, but also in the cybernetic path of his future enquiry and 
practice.  
 
6.2.3. Generating and Organising Variety in the Arts 
 
After completing the Groundcourse, Eno studied for his degree at the Winchester 
School of Art, graduating in 1969. During his time at Winchester, Pete Townshend 
gave a guest lecture about the use of tape machines by non-musicians and Eno is said 
to cite this as the catalyst for him wanting to make experimental tape music 
(Townshend, 2012). He bought two second-hand Revox reel-to-reel tape recorders 
and began to experiment with sound. Under the influence of tutor and friend Tom 
Phillips, Eno began to develop an ardent interest in contemporary, experimental, and 
avant-garde music, in particular the works of John Cage, Terry Riley, and Steve 
Reich (Sheppard, 2008).  
 
Acting on this newfound enthusiasm, Eno joined Cornelius Cardew’s Scratch 
Orchestra; an experimental performance group initiated by the composer. At 
Cardew’s insistence, both musicians and non-musicians were active members. Eno 
was a participant in a recorded performance of Cardew’s The Great Learning, 
Paragraph 7 (1971). He was to later pronounce that this experience was his “own 
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personal discovery of complexity theory: the idea that complex, self consistent 
systems can derive from very simple initial conditions and quickly assume organic 
richness” (Eno, 1996a).  
 
These influences were later examined in a paper Eno wrote for Studio International, 
entitled: “Generating and Organizing Variety in the Arts” (Eno 1976). Here he 
explores his interest in self-generating and self-regulating systems. Very much in the 
mode of Ascott’s writings, Eno proposes that cybernetic theories may be applied to 
creating music, and contrasts experimental composition and performance with 
formal classical approaches. The paper offers a new, cybernetic way of thinking 
about experimental music that transcends classical boundaries.  
 
He states that musical scores are a statement about formal organisation, and that 
classical orchestras have a militaristic hierarchy, which constrains behaviour, creates 
focus (a foreground and background), suppresses variety, and engenders 
predictability due to the training of the individual players (Eno, 1976). 
 
Eno uses the term ‘variety’ (Ashby, 1956) in its cybernetic context: “the variety of a 
system is its total range of outputs, its total range of behaviour” (Eno, 1976). An 
organism’s adaptability and flexibility, in response to an environment, is a function 
of the amount of variety it can generate. The capacity to recognise and respond to 
variety is essential in creating viable organisms and in the successful adaptation of 
an organism to a dynamic environment. Enough variety must be incorporated in an 
organism to allow for deviation and adjustments that are useful in adaptation and 
survival. Variety also plays a vital role in mutation and evolution. Eno contends that 
the primary focus of experimental music has been towards its own organisation and 
as a consequence it is subject to cybernetic principals such as variety. Furthermore, 
unlike classical (or avant-garde) music, experimental music does not offer 
instructions toward highly specific goals or necessarily repeatable results. However, 
he draws a distinction between indeterminate music and experimental composition, 
which seeks a ‘class of goals’ rather than ‘goalless behaviour’.  
 
The exemplar of Cornelius Cardew’s “Paragraph 7” from The Great Learning is used 
in Eno’s paper as an expression of these self-organisational principles. He describes 
how the set of (seemingly indeterminate) instructions in the score, which do not 
stipulate organisation, give rise to a set of ‘automatic’ controls that are “the real 
determinants of the nature of the piece” (Eno, 1976). 
 
The score of “Paragraph 7” is deceptively simple: each singer in the choir is given a 
short text, taken from Confucius. Directions are given stipulating that each word or 
phrase be sung a number of times in a linear sequence. However, it is instructed that 
each member of the choir sings each phrase on the “length-of-a-breath note” 
(Cardew, 1969), which means that the length of each individual performer’s note is 
determined by the length of their breath, and not by a predetermined meter. Another 
crucial, self-governing instruction for the score is that each note sung by a performer 
must be a note that is heard being sung by a colleague. So that the pitch at which 
each performer sings is determined by the loudest note heard by each singer. 
Another stipulation is that that no individual performer must sing the same note 




Eno points out that there are specific differences between what one might imagine an 
idealised performance to sound like and what happens in an actual performance of 
the piece. Firstly, he notes that because the piece has so little instruction and is also 
performed by a group of performers, many of whom are amateurs and therefore 
more unpredictable, one might imagine that the piece is very different each time it is 
performed. Secondly, he suggests that in an ideal performance one might rightly 
assume that the piece begins very discordantly and that over time the piece will 
settle down into some kind of harmonic concordance, but that this will take a 
significant amount of time as each discordant note option is eliminated. However, in 
the actual performance (Cardew, 1971), harmonic accord is achieved much more 
quickly and, once the piece has “settled” harmonically, it sounds much more 
musically structured and interesting (has more variety) than one might imagine. 
 
He postulates that this happens for several reasons. Firstly, there are a number of 
variety enhancers in action. For example, there are some non-trained (tone-deaf) 
singers in the choir, which means that when choosing to sing the note of the nearest 
colleague, they may inadvertently sing a discordant note, which introduces greater 
variety. Secondly, a singer may unconsciously choose an octave or harmonically 
related note, rather than the exact same note, because it is more within their singing 
range. And finally, beat frequencies are occurring, where two almost identical notes 
are being sung, thus causing a third note to sound, which is not harmonically related 
to the first two (Eno, 1976). 
 
However, Eno notes that there are also ‘variety reducers’ in action (other than those 
stipulated by the score). Firstly, the resonant frequency of the room will exaggerate 
(make louder) any note that is sung at this frequency. Because of the self-governing 
nature of the score “sing the loudest note you can hear”; Cardew, 1969), it is much 
more likely that the pitch of the piece will settle around the resonant frequency of the 
room. Secondly, he cites ‘taste’ as a fundamental variety reducer in this case: “it is 
extremely difficult unless you are tone-deaf (or a trained singer) to maintain a note 
that is very discordant with its surroundings” (Eno, 1976), and these combined 
factors explain why the initial discordant notes in the piece rapidly thin out and 
quickly settle into a more harmonious chord.  
 
Eno concludes from this that rather than ignoring or subduing the variety that is 
generated in performance (as is the case in classical composition), variety is really the 
substance of this piece of music. He goes further to describe what he believes to be 
“the most concise description of this kind of composition, which characterises much 
experimental music” (Eno, 1976), namely the statement by Stafford Beer,20 which 
describes cybernetic design practice. Beer wrote: “instead of trying to specify it in full 
detail, you specify it only somewhat. You then ride on the dynamics of the system in 
the direction you want to go” (Beer, 1972). In the case of the Cardew piece, the 
“dynamics of the system [lie in] its interaction with the environment, physiological, 
and cultural climate surrounding its performance” (Eno, 1976). Eno believes that 
Beer’s statement is not only “the most concise description of this kind of 
composition”, but also one of the central epithets of Beer’s thesis, which Eno applies 






In discussing Cardew and Cybernetics in interview, Eno states: 
 
“Cybernetics and systems theory are mechanisms by which you can explain 
this piece. It has strong parallels with biological systems, which again aren’t 
governed by external controls. How do systems like this keep themselves 
intact? In fact, all systems of this nature are what’s called autopoietic, which 
means they tend to maintain their own identity. 
In the old method of composing, you specify the result you want, and then 
you present a number of exact instructions to get there. The Cardew piece is 
radical because he doesn’t do all that, and yet it happens. The behaviour 
remains governed. Political systems are all doing what the old composers 
were doing. By a system of laws and constraints, they attempt to specify 
behaviour. They’re all saying, ‘What kind of society do we want?’ Then they 
say, ‘All right, so lets constrain this behaviour here, and let’s encourage this 
behaviour here.’ They’re trying to govern highly complex systems by rote. 
And you don't need to do that. Instead of trying to specify what you want in 
full detail, you only specify somewhat; then you ride the dynamics of the 
system in the direction you want to go. There are certain organic regulators; 
you don't have to come up with them, you just let them operate. 
One of the central ideas of cybernetics is that the system itself will inevitably 
produce a certain class of results” (Eno in Armbruster, 1984). 
 
Eno’s examination of The Great Learning is germane as it also details his own 
approach to cybernetic music, namely that the simple initial conditions of a complex 
system may be specified by the composer and that they will act as a ‘seed’ that will 
grow the composition. This will produce musical results that have a different 
outcome each time the system is run, but each iteration will still adhere to a class of 
results. 
 
Eno expands the scope of his paper by providing further examples of this type of 
composition, citing the work of Michael Parsons, Michael Nyman, and Gavin Bryars. 
He mentions another feature of these examples, namely the ‘fade-out’ or ‘fade-in’ 
endings and beginnings to these pieces. He believes that this feature has an effect on 
the listener, giving the perception that these pieces of music exist in a hypothetical 
continuum, of which we may only be perceiving a part – there may be other 
permutations and outcomes – and that they do not exhibit a strong feeling of 
progress or resolution (Eno, 1976). The idea that the fade-in creates this viewpoint for 
the listener strongly associates these works with an ontology of becoming or 
emergence; the pieces exist in an evolving continuum, where there is no clear and 
fixed goal as there is in other types of music, yet they exhibit emergent qualities that 
are perceived as music. Furthermore, Eno states that experimental music is about the 
interrelation of a limited number of elements in time and the different permutations 
that may result. He also notes that these tend to be organised in cyclical forms and 
are often based on ‘found materials’, which he believes focuses the composers mind 
to the reorganisation of this material and thus into the cybernetic framework that he 
is proposing (Eno 1976). 
 
It is notable that not only are all the composers that Eno is citing English, but also 
that most of them were known to him on a personal basis. It is also significant that 
the emergent classification of music existing ‘in a continuum’ that Eno is outlining 
here is also a description of his own work at this time, in particular Discreet Music 
(1975), and his collaboration with the guitarist Robert Fripp, No Pussyfooting (1973). 
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The formation of Eno’s own record label, Obscure Records, in 1975, and its 
subsequent release not only of his own records, but also of recordings (that he 
produced) of compositions by Gavin Bryars, Christopher Hobbs, Michael Nyman, 
and David Toop, would tend to suggest that within this paper, Eno is attempting to 
create a cybernetic manifesto of sorts, one that echoes Ascott’s, and which describes a 
certain type of experimental music, with which he is intimately involved in making, 
promoting, and curating. 
 
The fact that his paper is a cybernetic manifesto and not strictly a musical one is made 
more evident in Eno’s non-hierarchical assertions about music: instead of 
experimental and classical music being oppositional, or one essentially usurping the 
other, they both exist on a “scale of orientations” (Eno, 1976). Some classical forms 
such as a piano sonata leave a lot of room for interpretation (in areas such as tempo, 
dynamics, musical phrasing, etc.), and certain types of experimental music are very 
prescribed, or at the very least constrained by the laws of physics (such as Alvin 
Lucier’s I Am Sitting in a Room (1969), for example). Moreover, he makes a further 
cybernetic distinction, namely that some forms of music are organised in an 
algorithmic form and others are organised heuristically (he uses direct quotes from 
Beer to explain these terms). That is to say that some forms of composition are 
algorithmic – organised in a highly prescriptive way, with immutable, clear and 
fixed goals – while others are heuristic – they have a set of simple instructions or 
constraints that produce a class of goals (different in each performance, but which 
adhere to a set of outcomes that are perceptibly coherent). Eno likens this heuristic 
creative approach to processes at work within living organisms, who rather than 
ignoring their environment (as a composer would in classical composition), instead 
regard the environment and its irregularities as a “set of opportunities around which 
it will shape and adjust its own identity” (Eno, 1976). 
 
The final paragraph of the paper echoes Ascott once again in its evoking of 
cybernetics in art as a solution for interpreting rapid technological change. It is worth 
noting that in concluding his paper he quotes from Morse Peckham (one of Ascott’s 
favourite philosophers and also popular among other Groundcourse alumni, such as 
the artist Stephen Willats (Nikolic and Russo, 2012). Eno asserts: “In his book Man’s 
Rage for Chaos, Morse Peckham writes: ‘Art is the exposure to the tensions and 
problems of the false world such that man may endure exposing himself to the 
tensions and problems of the real world’ [Peckham, 1967]. As the variety of the 
environment magnifies in both time and space and as the structures that were 
thought to describe the operation of the world become progressively more 
unknowable, other concepts of organisation must become current. These concepts 
will base themselves on the assumption of change rather than stasis and on the 
assumption of probability rather than certainty. I believe that contemporary art is 
giving us the feel for this outlook” (Eno, 1976). 
 
Here, Eno not only recalls Ascott’s “scientific and technological change” argument 
for embracing cybernetics, but also expounds the unknowability of an increasingly 
complex world. This is concordant with Stafford Beer’s view of the ultimate 
unknowability of exceedingly complex systems and the ‘black box’ ontology 
expounded by many prominent cyberneticians such as Norbert Wiener, Ross Ashby, 
Gordon Pask, and others, namely that the universe is full of ‘black boxes’, whose true 
workings we do not (and may never) fully understand. These range from the 
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obvious (the human brain) to the mundane (Ashby gives the example of a child 
opening a door). We are unaware of the inner mechanisms at work in many systems, 
but we encounter them everyday and may only understand them through 
performative action in the world (Pickering, 2011). Furthermore, when Eno states 
“These concepts will base themselves on the assumption of change rather than stasis 
and on the assumption of probability rather than certainty”, he firmly places his 
conclusion in the ontology of becoming or emergence, which is so synonymous with 
cybernetics.  
 
6.2.4. Eno and Stafford Beer 
 
There is no doubt that Eno would not have written this paper under Ascott’s 
influence alone. Indeed, the many quotes from Stafford Beer point to the source of 
much of the theory underpinning Eno’s thesis, namely Beer’s book Brain of The Firm 
(1972). However, the originality of Eno’s work here should not be undervalued; 
although a number of his musical contemporaries were engaged in what could be 
described as cybernetic practice, very few wrote about what they were doing in a 
cybernetic context or defined their work in this way. Furthermore, none put forward 
an overarching thesis of experimental music as cybernetic practice, which points 
toward a mode of composition that is quite distinct and has a markedly non-modern 
ontology.  
 
Eno came across The Brain of the Firm in 1974 and utilised it as the basis of his paper. 
While Eno claims to have knowledge of other cyberneticians’ works, he states that 
Brain is the only book he has ever read in any detail on the subject (Whittaker, 2003). 
However, this fact should not diminish his understanding; the first five chapters of 
Brain of the Firm are a general introduction to cybernetics that includes reference to 
the work of Norbert Wiener, Ross W. Ashby, Warren McCulloch, Claude Shannon, 
and other founding fathers of cybernetics. He subsequently wrote to Beer including a 
copy of the essay as he thought Beer might be interested in “this unusual application 
of his ideas” (Whittaker, 2003).   
 
Following this introduction, Eno met Beer on two occasions, once at Eno’s flat in 
London in 1975, and again in 1977 at Beer’s cottage in the Welsh countryside. Both 
encounters were characterised by long discussions of Beer’s ideas (Whittaker 2003). 
During the Welsh meeting, Eno remembers that Beer asked him to be a public 
exponent for cybernetics: “I carry a torch, a torch that was handed to me along a 
chain from Ross Ashby, it was handed to him from Warren McCulloch… I want to 
hand it to you, I know it's a responsibility and you don't have to accept, I just want 
you to think about it.” (Eno quoting Beer in Whittaker, 2003). Eno recalls this as 
being a very strange request and politely declined the invitation, but this incident 
does demonstrate the strength of feeling Beer had toward Eno’s work and perhaps 
Beer also saw Eno’s potential as a well- known advocate for cybernetics ‘spreading 
the word’ to the general public.  
 
Despite Eno’s rejection of Beer’s proposal (Whittaker, 2003), cybernetics has 
remained a strong and influential force in Eno’s work. He states that it is “one of the 
most important bodies of theory in my life, it’s still a very underexploited and 
unrecognised body of work… It’s still very current to me” (Eno in Whittaker, 2003). 
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He also cites that Beer’s work was a significant influence on his systems recordings 
and on Discreet Music (1975) and Music For Airports (1978), in particular (Eno in 
Whittaker, 2003).   
 
6.2.5. Eno and The New English Music 
 
Before exploring some of Eno’s overtly cybernetic pieces it is important to examine 
some of his earlier musical practice and trace the development of the cybernetic 
working methods he established. While Eno’s route to cybernetic music was 
arguably predestined by his art school exposure, there are a number of interesting 
musical collaborations that helped to shape Eno’s understanding of music and of the 
possibilities of cybernetic music making. While participating in the Scratch 
Orchestra, Eno also became a member of the Portsmouth Sinfonia (in which he 
amateurishly played clarinet). Modelled on Cardew’s Scratch Orchestra, the Sinfonia 
was also a group of musicians and non-musicians, who attempted to play an 
established repertoire of well- known movements from classical pieces such as the 
William Tell Overture, Strauss’s Also Sprach Zarathustra, and Grieg’s In The Hall of the 
Mountain King (Sheppard, 2008). The Sinfonia gained notoriety as the “world’s worst 
orchestra” (Sheppard, 2008), through a number of memorable performances and 
record releases, two of which Eno produced. Eno made some important connections 
with other members of the ensemble, most notably Gavin Bryars – who conceived of 
and ran the orchestra – and Michael Nyman, both of whom would later release their 
first records through Eno’s Obscure label in the mid-1970s. Although the sound the 
Sinfonia produced “would regularly reduce audiences to convulsions of tear-
streaming laughter” (Sheppard, 2008), there was a seriousness to elements of the 
endeavour, in particular in the desire to rescue the orchestral canon from its 
bourgeois, elitist constituency, and also in Bryars' desire to utilise “mistakes” in the 
creative process.  
 
6.2.5.a. Honouring Error and The Cult of The Beautiful 
 
Michael Nyman sees Bryars’ work of this period as belonging to an English 
movement of experimental music that was making a transition from the 
indeterminacy expounded by John Cage and The Fluxus Movement into Minimalism 
and a new tonality, and which Nyman refers to as the “cult of the beautiful”, which 
began to develop in the late ’60s and early ‘70s (Nyman, 1999). In America, this shift 
took the form of highly controlled musical systems and demonstrated influence from 
non-Western musical forms, exemplified in the rhythmic, repetitive and drone-like 
qualities of the work of Terry Riley, Philip Glass, and La Monte Young. However, in 
England the “return to melody” (Nyman, 1999) was achieved by composers tending 
to draw on Western musical traditions, often using recordings or scores from the 
classical canon as the basis for musical pieces. However, Nyman asserts that it is “far 
less easy to make a hard and fast distinction between ‘indeterminacy’ and the ‘new 
determinacy’ in England than it is in America” (Nyman, 1999). English composers, 
such as Cardew and Bryars, tended to adopt a looser approach to determinacy, one 
which, in structure, displays similarities to Eno’s cybernetic use of heuristics (as 





This ‘looser’ version of the new determinacy and emphasis on melody, adopted by 
the English composers, is seen in a number of Bryars’ works from this period, such 
as The Sinking Of The Titanic (1969) and Jesus’ Blood Never Failed Me Yet (1971), works 
which formed the respective A and B Sides of the first release on Eno’s Obscure label: 
Obscure no.1, 1975). These pieces utilise “found” recordings that are played within 
the performance along with an ensemble of live players. The Sinking Of The Titanic is 
an ‘indeterminate’ piece in which players improvise with a number of tape sources 
associated with the Titanic in order to create the music. The determinacy of Jesus’ 
Blood Never Failed Me Yet is found in the players attempting to adapt to the meter of a 
field recording made of a homeless man singing a well-known religious song. Both 
pieces are melodic, evocative, and moving – a feature the composer expressly wished 
to convey (Bryars, 1998) – but which was atypical of the experimental music of this 
era.  
 
Eno’s biographer, David Shepherd, believes that rather than the melody, it was the 
nature of the indeterminacy – the “mistakes” – that caused audiences to find 
performances of Bryars’ Portsmouth Sinfonia so moving: “Humour was always 
central to Sinfonia activities, but despite their inherent eccentricity, their collective 
tongue was never completely stuck to its check. This became more apparent when 
their flailing attempts at the classics unerringly produced music of naive, crippled 
poignancy that many found unfeasible moving” (Sheppard, 2008). While Titanic, 
Jesus’ Blood, and the Sinfonia were all melodically different, they shared this sense of 
“naive, crippled poignancy” gained through compositional systems that deliberately 
engendered mistakes.   
 
The use of this type of determinism, one formed from restrictions or mistakes, is 
reflected in one of Eno’s best-known maxims; “Honour thy error as a hidden 
intention” (Eno and Schmidt, 1975). He first used this axiom as an instruction on one 
of his Oblique Strategies cards, which were developed in collaboration with the visual 
artist Peter Schmidt. First published in 1975, the cards are a series of instructions or 
maxims designed to be used in creative situations to expand the range of possibilities 
and to assist the participants to view their creative process in a new light (Taylor, 
1995). Eno has used the cards many times both as an artist and producer and they 
have become more widely known among record producers and engineers (Taylor, 
1995). When discussing Eno’s production methods and the use of the Oblique 
Strategy cards, David Bowie stated: “Brian is a born cybernetician. He will take the 
most unlikely juxtapositions and philosophical ideas and throw them together into 
this kind of conceptual stew of his and produce this unfathomable, but fascinating 
animal. And he will continually stop and re-evaluate the work that’s been done and 
then throw it in an entirely unexpected direction” (Sischy, 1995). 
 
While the cards share similarities with exercises prescribed to Eno while on the 
Groundcourse and can be seen as cybernetic in many senses, the interesting element 
here is that Eno perceived errors or mistakes as an important part of the creative 
process. Beer believed that mistakes were an essential part of any learning system. 
He defined heuristics as “a set of instructions for searching out an unknown goal by 
exploration, which continuously or repeatedly evaluates progress according to some 
known criterion” (Beer, 1972). In other words, a process of trial and error in which 
‘mistakes’ are an inherent part of exploration or experimentation. Bryars’ work with 
this type of “new determinacy” influenced Eno in this regard and this was the first 
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instance of Eno witnessing at first hand how ‘mistakes’ could be incorporated and 
built into the compositional process. Furthermore, this view of error as an intrinsic 
part of the artistic process is an acknowledgement and embracing of the probabilistic 
process at play within the compositional process. 
 
Eno also cites another quality of the Sinfonia’s music, one that chimes with the 
qualities of his own ambient music: “What was interesting about this mix [of 
competent and incompetent musicians]… You’d hear a melody of whatever it was, 
hidden somewhere among all those approximations of the melody. It was like a 
blurry version, a soft focus version, of classical music, and it produced some 
beautiful music” (Aikin, 1985). This quotation demonstrates a recognition of the 
approximations (probabilistic processes) at play in the musical composition and that 
in this context they have emergent properties that can produce “beautiful music”. 
 
The evidence suggests that Eno’s work of this period and his development of 
Ambient Music comes from and exists within the new English music movement that 
Nyman describes. Eno’s own reference to “beauty” as an aesthetic consideration in 
his music (Eno, 1996a) and his direct involvement in the production and record 
releases of many of the English composers of this movement (including, in 
particular, Bryars, Nyman, and Hobbs) on his Obscure label and his use of 
probabilistic, “new determinacy” systems in his music making, are all evidence of 
Eno’s immersion in the new English music movement of this period. It is also notable 
that he recognised that these facets of experimental music coalesced with his vision 
of cybernetic music.  
 
In retrospect, this movement of “minimalist” English composers can be seen as 
taking a more affirmed leap into postmodernism than their American 
contemporaries, particularly in their use of found sound and the recycling of popular 
classics. In many ways, the creative direction of the English movement was a 
fortuitous stepping-stone for Eno’s move into the post-humanist ontology of 
cybernetics. 
 
6.2.6. Eno’s Formulation of Cybernetic Musical Practice 
 
In order to examine Eno’s cybernetic musical practices we must turn to his 
compositions that utilise technology and that have an overt 
human/machine/environment axis at play in the compositional process.  
 
6.2.6.a. Cybernetics & Roxy Music 
 
Eno appears to clearly delineate between his time in Roxy Music and all his other 
musical endeavours; he has never written about his involvement in Roxy Music in a 
cybernetic or musically analytical context. However, there are some notable features 
of his work with the band that exhibit overtly cybernetic characteristics and these 
manifest themselves in two ways: Firstly, in his use of the synthesiser as a 
modulating device. Eno’s first encounter with the synthesiser was through Andy 
Mackay, the saxophone player in Roxy Music, who lent Eno his EMS VCS3 in the 
initial stage of the group’s formation (Sheppard, 2008). The instrument was invented 
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by Peter Zinovieff and David Cockerell in 1969. The VCS3 was notable as it was not 
only one of the first commercially available synthesisers with an affordable price tag, 
but it was also the first portable synthesiser (Boddy, 1994). One of the most 
interesting features of the early iterations of the VCS3 was that there was no musical 
keyboard. This not only attests to the exoticness of this instrument as a musical 
device but it also points to the mode of its practical use, namely that of a modulating 
device for input sound sources or as a tool for creating ‘non-musical’ sound effects 
and atmospheres. There are a number of other important features of the VCS3’s 
design. All other analogue modular synths contemporary to the VCS3 were of the 
traditional ‘boxes joined together with wires’ design. Here, signals from oscillator to 
envelope, or to filter, were transmitted via cables that could be plugged from one 
module to another to form a patch that constituted the resulting sound. Conversely, 
the VCS3 used a non-wire-based matrix patch bay. Here, a series of pins stuck into a 
circuit board determined how signals from the modules were connected together. 
This allowed for more flexible and immediate experimentation and manipulation of 
sound sources. Another unique feature of the VCS3 was that in place of a musical 
keyboard, there was a joystick, which allowed the operator to change pitches or 
settings, or to morph between parameters, depending on how this control device was 
assigned in the matrix. This feature also allowed for very quick and versatile 
experimentation with sounds input from a microphone, or another external source 
such as a guitar.  
 
Of the VCS3, Eno is quoted as saying: “The thing that makes this a great machine is 
that […] you can go from the oscillator to the filter, and then use the filter output to 
control the same oscillator again […] It feeds back on itself in interesting ways, 
because you can make some complicated circles through the synthesiser” (Eno in 
Pinch and Trocco, 2002). While Eno utilises the ubiquitous cybernetic trope of 
feedback in this statement, Andrew Pickering believes that Eno is evoking it here to 
describe another feature of the synthesiser: feedback as described here is not “that 
which enables control of some variable (as in a thermostat), but as that which makes 
a system’s behaviour impenetrable to the user” (Pickering, 2011). The matrix of 
possibilities set up by the feedback loops within the machine is so complex that one 
cannot predict the outcome of the sound experimentation. In other words, the 
synthesiser, in this instance, is a ‘black box’ device; it is only by creative exploration 
that one can find out what sounds may be produced. Thus a performative, cybernetic 
ontology is invoked.21 Pinch and Trocco further elaborate on this interaction: “the 
resulting music was an exchange… between person and machine, both contributing 
to the final results. This may be why analogue synthesists can readily recount 
feelings of love for their synthesisers” (Pinch and Trocco 2002). Pickering also 
believes that Eno’s work with the VCS3 in Roxy Music demonstrates a continuity 
between his practice here and his later work: “Eno was riding the dynamics of a 
generative system – the synthesiser – which he could not fully control. What he 
learned from Beer was to make this cybernetic insight explicit and the centre of his 
future musical development” (Pickering, 2011). 
 
The second way in which Eno’s cybernetic practice manifested itself in Roxy Music 
was through live performance with electronics: In the early 1970s, live performance 





exclusively limited to the use of the synthesiser as musical instrument in 
performance (Holmes, 2012). In the early stages of Roxy Music, Eno, the ‘non-
musician’, transmuted from ‘sound recordist’ to ‘sound manipulator’, feeding 
guitars, keyboards and vocals though the VSC3 to be distorted, modulated and 
manipulated (Sheppard, 2008). Eno’s electronic equipment was not limited to the 
synthesiser but also included two Revox reel-to-reel tape machines, a Ferrograph 
tape recorder, an Ampex tape recorder, and a customised delay echo unit. He would 
take up position at the mixing desk during concerts and manipulate the sound of the 
band in real time (Sheppard, 2008). Andy Mackay recalls: “when we first started, we 
didn't really have amps on stage. I know it sounds ridiculous, but there was a point 
where we used to just be DI-ed [directly injected] through his [Eno’s] synths, a 
mixing desk, and he’d be out in the audience mixing. It was incredibly unsatisfying, 
because you couldn't really hear what you were doing. And then what you were 
doing bore no resemblance to what was coming out, so we soon abandoned that. 
That was probably the most extreme. That was pretty far out for 1972…”(Sheppard, 
2008). This statement highlights that what Eno was attempting with this kind of 
sonic manipulation was more akin to a David Tudor, Gordon Mumma, or John Cage 
type of live performance, with live instruments and technology. It also demonstrates 
the degree to which the performance was being mitigated by the technology. The 
additional fact that this was in real time and that the outcome was ephemeral and 
not fully determinable also points to the cybernetic ontology underpinning Eno’s 
practice at this time.  
 
6.2.6.b. Eno’s Progressive Rock Albums 
 
After leaving Roxy Music in 1973, Eno embarked on a successful solo career writing 
and producing a number of progressive rock albums. While the techniques 
employed on these albums are interesting to the extent that their outcomes are 
shaped by process and mitigated by technologies that are not without cybernetic 
merit, they are primarily concerned with the compositional process and techniques 
of popular music composition, which has its own rules and strictures. These may at 
times coalesce with cybernetic ideas but they are seldom the guiding principles 
engaged in the songwriting process of this genre. They are also not experimental in 
the terms that Eno outlines in Generating and Organizing Variety in the Arts. 
Nonetheless, the processes engaged in writing these albums were far from 
conventional, in the case of the employment of the Oblique Strategies cards, for 
example, or Eno’s phonetic, Hugo Ball influenced lyric-writing technique. It is also 
worth noting that some of his songs lyrically allude to cybernetics, in particular 
Everything Merges With The Night (1975), which refers to the Chilean Allende 
government and in which Stafford Beer implemented the Cybersyn governmental 
system (Beer, 1995). While it is true to say that these popular music albums were not 
overtly cybernetic, the techniques Eno learnt while working on these records helped 
him to attain the technical skill required to engage the studio as a compositional tool 
(Tamm, 1995). 
 
6.2.6.c. Ambient Music 
 
Eno took advantage of his newfound technical competence in the studio and the 
emphasis of his recorded output during the 1970s began to alter. Over the course of 
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his progressive rock albums, Eno began to include many more instrumental songs 
that reflected the technological possibilities the studio had to offer in the 
compositional process. During this period he also talked in interviews of wanting to 
shift music from “Portrait” to “Landscape”; defocusing away from the lead singer 
and bringing background elements forward. For example, on Another Green World 
(1975), only five of the fourteen tracks contain lyrics. Ultimately this was to lead him 
to realise that he was happier with no lead singer at all (Sheppard, 2008).  
 
Eno’s work with the guitarist Robert Fripp, particularly on No Pussyfooting (1973) 
was a strong precursor to Eno’s Ambient Music, especially in the technological 
techniques involved. However, rather than a technological spur for its evolution, Eno 
cites a highly empirical origin for Ambient music:  
 
“I was confined to bed, immobilised by an accident in early 1975. My friend 
Judy Nylon had visited, and brought with her a record of 17th-century harp 
music. I asked her to put it on as she left, which she did, but it wasn't until 
she’d gone that I realised the hi-fi was much too quiet and one of the 
speakers had given up anyway. It was raining outside, and I could hardly 
hear the music above the rain – just the loudest notes, like little crystals, 
sonic icebergs rising out of the storm. I couldn't get up and change it, so I just 
lay there waiting for my next visitor to come and sort it out, and gradually I 
was seduced by this listening experience. I realised that this was what I 
wanted music to be – a place, a feeling, an all-round tint to my sonic 
environment” (Eno, 1996a). 
 
Eno released four albums between 1978 and 1982 under the moniker of Ambient 
Music22. The musicologist and Eno biographer Eric Tamm describes Ambient Music 
as: “A gentle music of low dynamics, blurred edges, and washes of sound colour, 
produced primarily through electronic means” (Tamm, 1995). The first of Eno’s 
Ambient albums was 1978’s Music for Airports. Technologically, the album is in one 
sense a collection of tape-loop experiments. For example the first track on the album 
is a loop of soft piano playing, cut up and arranged in various configurations. 
Nonetheless, the mechanisms at work in the compositional processes are not evident 
in the sound of the resulting pieces, which have a clear aesthetic sensibility. Eno is 
known to have criticised the aesthetic of much overtly process-driven music, telling 
the well-known rock journalist, Lester Bangs: “I think the trouble with almost all 
experimental composers is that they're all head, dead from the neck down. They 
don't trust their hearts, I think, and tend to take themselves with a solemnity so 
extreme as to be downright preposterous. I don't see the point, really. I've always 
abandoned pieces which succeeded theoretically but not sensually” (Bangs, 1979). 
This said, Music For Airports is undoubtedly a ‘process’ record, in which 
technological systems are constructed and subsequently run to produce a class of 
possible goals. The prime exemplar of this method on this record is the 2nd track on 
the album, “2/1”.  
 
This piece of music was made in Germany in the studio of Conny Plank, a renowned 







and Kraftwerk had been a major influence on Eno’s pop music production. During 
his time at Plank’s studio, Eno met Holger Czukay (student of Stockhausen and 
former member of the experimental rock group CAN). He was impressed with the 
tape cut-up techniques that Czukay was employing on his (Plank-produced) 1979 
album, Movies (Sheppard, 2008). Inspired by Czukay’s work, Eno set about re-
imagining some piano recordings he had made of Robert Wyatt improvising during 
a previous recording session and these formed the basis of a number of tracks on the 
album. A different approach was adopted, however, on 1/2: Eno and Plank invited 
some local female session singers to the studio to sing wordless ‘aaahhs’ in harmony 
over the looped piano note clusters, which modulated around the key of F Minor. 
The pianos were then removed and after the vocals had been subtly treated by 
passing them through a synthesiser (which added a small amount of noise and 
envelope, to shape the attack and decay of the notes), the individual vocal sounds 
were recorded onto separate lengths of tape between fifty and seventy feet long 
(Sheppard, 2008). To facilitate these long loops, the tape was spooled around metallic 
studio chair legs. Eno then recorded these non-contiguous loops back onto the 
multitrack tape: “I just set all these loops running and let them configure in 
whichever way they wanted to” (O’ Brien, 1978). The complexity of the piece arises 
as each five-second vocal recording, recorded on to tape loops of differing lengths, at 
times coalesce to form chords and shifting melodies and at others leave silence or 
only individual notes. The aesthetic effect is of a rather sparse angelic choir, singing 
in a magically fluid way. There is no meter or pulse but the notes appear to interact 
in a knowing and predestined way; the structure seems designed but at the same 
time beguiling. 
 
The aesthetic effect of this piece demonstrates Eno’s preoccupation with what 
Nyman called the “cult of the beautiful” (Nyman, 1999), but it also sees him 
engaging in the “new determinacy” techniques employed by his contemporary, 
English experimental composers. However, Eno’s version of the new determinacy is 
a strictly technological one, in which the timing and tone of the piece is mitigated by 
technological means. This is also a probabilistic process, but specifically designed to 
produce a class of goals. It is also noteworthy that the environment is active in the 
technological process. This is seen in the long tape loops, which are passed out from 
the tape recorder and spooled around objects such as metallic microphone stands 
and chair legs, the friction of which will alter the timing of each loop in a slightly 
unpredictable way (Tamm, 1995). 
 
Another feature of this piece and almost all of Eno’s ambient recordings is that they 
could not be achieved as a live performance with instrumentation or singers; only 
the recording studio could attain these results. In this context Eno sees his Ambient 
Music as being the apex of “the studio as compositional tool”: 
 
“Psychedelia expanded not only minds but recording technologies, but there 
was still an assumption that playing with sound itself was a ‘merely’ 
technical job – something engineers and producers did – as opposed to the 
serious creative work of writing songs and playing instruments. With 
Ambient Music, I wanted to suggest that this activity was one of the 
distinguishing characteristics of the new music, and could in fact become the 




Here we see Eno recognising that he is composing in a new way, one in which the 
technology enables and also heavily mitigates the outcome: 
 
“In a compositional sense this takes the making of music away from any 
traditional way that composers worked, as far as I'm concerned, and one 
becomes empirical in a way that the classical composer never was. You're 
working directly with sound, and there's no transmission loss between you 
and the sound – you handle it. It puts the composer in the identical position 
of the painter – he's working directly with a material, working directly onto 
a substance, and he always retains the options to chop and change, to paint a 
bit out, add a piece, etc. […] You can do what the classical composer 
couldn't: you can infinitely extend the timbre of any instrument. You are also 
in the position of being able to subtract or add with discrimination: you can 
put an echo on the bass drum and not on anything else” (Eno, 1983). 
 
On the liner notes of the album Discreet Music (1975), which predates the ambient 
series, Eno states: “I was trying to make a piece that could be listened to and yet 
could be ignored... perhaps in the spirit of Satie, who wanted to make music that 
could ‘mingle with the sound of the knives and forks at dinner’” (Eno, 1975). While it 
is clear that Eric Satie’s “Furniture Music” was very influential on both the sound 
and ethos of Ambient Music, what makes it distinctive is not only its technological 
process, but also the emphasis on timbre over melody. Eric Tamm refers to this as 
Eno’s “vertical colour of sound” (vertical pertaining to harmonics and colour 
pertaining to timbre), which Tamm argues is Eno’s keenest interest in the 
compositional process (Tamm, 1995). This is perhaps because, as a non-musician, 
Eno’s instrument of choice is the studio and ‘making it sound good’ by altering 
timbre is one of the primary functions of the recording studio. Altering timbre over 
time will create a sense of movement and atmosphere in a way that is hard to 
achieve with traditional composition and instrumentation.  
 
Its also worth noting that electronically aided composition that places emphasis on 
timbre over individual notes devalues musical notation as it is unnecessary for it to 
be used as either a source of a composition or as a storage medium.  As Eno himself 
states:  
 
“I think there is a difference in kind between the kind of composition I do 
and the kind a classical composer does. This is evidenced by the fact that I 
can neither read nor write music, and I can't play any instruments really 
well, either. You can't imagine a situation prior to this where anyone like me 
could have been a composer. It couldn't have happened. How could I do it 
without tape and without technology?“ (Eno, 1983)   
 
Furthermore, Eno recognises that notation is a textural language that, if used in the 
compositional process, will shape the outcome in a particular way: “[the traditional 
composer] has to, in fact, use a language that, like all languages, will shape what he 
wants to do” (Eno, 1983). This statement is consistent with McLuhan’s ontology of 
the post-literate society in which outcomes are mediated by technological means and, 
in McLuhan’s terms, it places Eno’s work firmly within the context of the post-
literate society, a society that values the aural above the visual senses and thus 
devalues text in favour of sound. This also places Eno’s thought within a cybernetic 
ontology in which human and machine interact in a dance of agency, which does not 
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require text as a basis for narrative and structure.  
 
The mode of listening Eno requires of the audience also reflects the human, machine, 
and environment aspect at play within Ambient Music, the recognition that 
probabilistic sounds that may occur within the environment (sounds that don't 
emanate from the speakers), combine with the music and figure in the overall 
listening experience. It also encapsulates the volume at which one may listen to the 
music, with lower volumes set on a playback system, there will be more blending 
with the sound world or the environment. In fact Eno makes this aspect explicit: “I 
suggest listening to the piece at comparatively low levels, even to the extent that it 
frequently falls below the threshold of audibility” (Eno, 1975). 
 
The final aspect of Ambient Music to explore is not only Eno’s desire that the music 
mingle with the environment, but the capacity of the studio to allow the creation of 
self-contained sonic landscapes and ecosystems – a ‘world within a world’, so to 
speak. The last of the Ambient Album series, Ambient 4, On Land (1982) is 
deliberately nostalgic for real world environments, with tracks such as Lizard Point, 
Lantern Marsh, Unfamiliar Wind (Leeks Hills), and Dunwich Beach, Autumn, 1960 all 
being evocative of real places or memories of real places. Eno describes these pieces 
of music as being "an attempt to transpose into music something that you can do in 
painting: creating a figurative environment” (Eno, 1982). He also cites Federico 
Fellini’s 1973 film, Amarcord [English title: I Remember] as an influence on the liner 
notes to the album. However, in discussing Stafford Beer’s cybernetic influence on 
Eno’s work and in describing Eno’s Ambient music, Andrew Pickering writes: 
“Beer’s ontology of exceedingly complex systems conjures up a lively world, 
continually capable of generating novel performances. Eno, so to speak, picked up 
the other end of the stick and focused on building musical worlds that would 
themselves exhibit unpredictable, emergent becomings” (Pickering, 2011). This not 
only speaks to Eno’s desire to create self-contained musical worlds, but also to the 
systems Eno employed to create the music, which are indeed generative systems and 
in a ‘closed’ system sense may be looked upon as ‘worlds within themselves’. 
 
It is also interesting that despite the personal introspection of this album, Eno still 
deems it necessary in the sleeve notes to describe an alternative technological 
listening set-up to create a more immersive listening environment. This is a three 
speaker set-up, which may be realised by wiring the two stereo speakers in the 
conventional way and then wiring a third speaker to the two positive speaker 
connections from the amplifier, which is then placed behind the listener. Here, Eno is 
suggesting a listening environment that is achieved through technological means 
and therefore the listening experience is mitigated by technology. 
 
6.2.7. Generative Music 
 
Generative music was a term coined by Brian Eno in 1996, which coincided with the 
release of Generative Music 1 (SSEYO, 1996). The music was released on floppy disk 
by the company SSEYO and required their Koan generative music software and a PC 
with a general MIDI-compatible soundcard for playback. Eno composed a number of 
pieces of music for this release, which were in essence a set of rules encoded into the 
software. Each time the software was run it would play differently, but at the same 
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time retain some sonic consistency. While Eno has composed many pieces of music 
using Koan and it is true to say that this was the first released music by him that was 
different in each iteration from the audience’s perspective, he believes that his work 
in this area extends back to Discreet Music (1975) and is coincident with the inception 
of Ambient Music in the 1970s (Eno, 1996a). This is true in the sense that many of 
Eno’s works are systems-based and that what is heard on record is only one 
possibility from many possible iterations – chosen, it is presumed, because its 
qualities are the most aesthetically pleasing.  
 
6.2.7.a. Generative Music: Influences & Discreet Music 
 
Eno cites two pieces of music as having a major influence on his approach to 
designing musical systems. Firstly, he identifies Terry Riley’s In C (1964), which 
consists of 52 bars of music, centered around the Key of C. Each musician is 
instructed to play each of the bars as many times as they wish and then proceed to 
the next bar. The complexity arises as each musician proceeds through the piece at 
their own speed, producing a myriad of unpredictable combinations. Andrew 
Pickering comments: “Here we find key elements of Eno’s own work. The composer 
sets some initial conditions for musical performance, but leaves the details to be 
filled in by the dynamics of the performing system” (Pickering, 2011). The second 
piece that Eno cites as an over-arching influence is Steve Reich’s “It’s Gonna Rain” 
(1965). Here we also see complexity achieved from some very simple initial starting 
conditions. However, in this case it happens via technological means. The piece is 
made from a tape loop of a preacher saying, “It’s gonna rain”, which is run 
simultaneously on two tape machines. The complexity occurs as the two machines 
slowly go in and out of phase with one another. Eno describes the resulting sonic 
effects: “Quite soon you start to hearing very exotic details of the recording itself. For 
instance you are aware after several minutes that there are thousands of trumpets in 
there… You also become aware that there are birds.” (Eno, 1996b). In some senses 
the combination of these two approaches is the crux of Eno’s generative approach: 1) 
to overlay musical phrases and sounds in a laminar and non-contiguous way, and 2) 
to enable this to happen through the use of technology. 
 
Discreet Music (1975) was perhaps the pinnacle of Eno’s generative musical 
experimentations with analogue technology; an operational template that he has 
reused many times in his compositions. The piece utilises the same tape-loop 
techniques Eno had pioneered 2 years earlier in the making of the album No 
Pussyfooting (1973), which was a collaboration with the guitarist Robert Fripp. In fact, 
Eno had initially intended to use the recording of Discreet Music as a backing track 
for a live performance with Fripp. But on listening to the recording he realised that it 
exemplified the new music he had envisioned while lying in bed recovering from his 
car accident.  
 
The system Eno designed for Discreet Music was based around a long tape loop, 
which allowed sounds to be recorded and layered over each other in a continuous 
five-second loop. Figure 1 depicts a diagram of the system as shown in the liner 
notes on the album cover. Here we see sound from a synthesiser (playing a preset 
arpeggio), which has been routed through a graphic equaliser and an echo unit. The 




probably one of the best things I’d ever done and I didn’t even realise I was doing it 
at the time” (Sheppard, 2008). The liner sleevenotes also point to the importance the 
system plays in the compositional process: “Since I have always preferred making 
plans to executing them, I have gravitated towards situations and systems that, once 
set into operation, could create music with little or no intervention on my part. That 
is to say, I tend towards the roles of planner and programmer, and then become an 
audience to the results”_ (Eno, 1975b). 
 
Here again we see the enacting of a cybernetic ontology, one in which the system (in 
concordance with Beer’s terms) is designed to produce emergent (musical) 
behaviours, which may be altered in real time to effect the outcome; the dynamics of 
the system may be ridden in the direction you wish it to go. Furthermore, we see the 
composer as the author of the work diminished; the composer, technology, 
environment, and the probabilistic processes at play in all three constitute the non-
hierarchical system that produces the music. 
 
6.2.7.b. Generative Music: Eno’s Cybernetic Systems Music – Cellular 
Automata & Koan 
 
In the winter of 1978, Eno took an extended holiday in San Francisco. During his stay 
there he became obsessed with the Exploratorium, the city’s ‘hands-on’ science 
museum and in particular with one exhibit known as the Game of Life. Designed by 
Cambridge mathematician John Conway and based on the computational and 
mathematical work of prominent cyberneticians such as John Von Neumann and 
Norbert Wiener (among others), Conway designed the first computer simulation of 
cellular automata. In practice these consisted of squares on a grid that would ‘come 
to life’ or ‘die’ based on a simple set of rules. The game grew from Von Neumann’s 
research on self-replicating machines. However, in action it uncannily replicates 
biological growth and demonstrates how complex systems can arise from very 
simple initial conditions. Within the game, one is able to set the starting conditions 
by using a cursor to draw in ‘live’ squares on the grid. The game is then run through 
its generations and if squares are in close proximity to each other they will interact 
based on the following rules: “1. Any live cell with fewer than two live neighbours 
dies, as if caused by under-population, 2. Any live cell with two or three live 
neighbours lives on to the next generation, 3. Any live cell with more than three live 
neighbours dies, as if by overcrowding, and finally 4. Any dead cell with exactly 







It would be a number of years before Eno would be able to utilise a software package 
that would allow him to create music in the way he had envisioned from his 
experience with the Game of Life. In Early 1995 Eno received a CD of music that was 
made using the generative music software program called Koan. The pieces had been 
composed in his style and he was struck not only by how similar they were to his 
work, but also by how good they were. He contacted Tim Cole at SSEYO who 
designed the software and asked if he might have a copy of the program (Eno, 
1996a).  Koan is essentially a MIDI sequencing package that allows for non-linear 
rules to be applied to the sequence. Eno explains that the software enables “a 
composer to control about 150 parameters that specify things like sound-timbre and 
envelope, scale, harmony, rhythm, tempo, vibrato, pitch range, etc. Most of Koan’s 
instructions are probabilistic – so that rather than saying ‘Do precisely this’ (which is 
what a musical sequencer does), they say, ‘Choose what to do from within this range 
of possibilities’” (Eno, 1996a). Thus musical works can be composed that utilise the 
same sound set and have a constancy in musical output, but are different in each 
iteration: no two pieces of music will be the same, but each will bear the hallmarks of 
a composer’s style. In other words, each is different but each adheres to a class of 
goals, a characteristic that shares a similarity with biological life.  
 
While Eno is very technically adept with the Koan software and has used it to 
produce many of his recorded generative works and sound installations since the 
mid-90s, he insists that the technicality of the systems he employs to make music is 
not an important component in the music-making process; the fact that the music is 
mitigated by technology is important, the cybernetic axis of human, machine and 
environment is crucial to his ability to make music. However, the inner workings of 
those systems are not important. As long as the system is capable of approaching 
music creation in a new way, how it achieves this is not a concern to Eno: 
 
“In a way the mathematics is not the interesting part for me, the interesting 
part is how you rethink how something is made, how something comes into 
being. Even with the composers you mention [Xenakis], they were quite 
classical composers because in the end they wrote it all out; in a sense they 
described it in advance. Now there were other people like Cornelius 
Cardew, John Cage, Christian Wolff who were doing something more 
interesting, they were inventing systems which produced music. Now, that’s 
a total break from the Western classical idea. The idea is that your job as 
composer is to design a machine or system which you can provide inputs to 
and which will output music. So you forgo the thing that composers usually 
do which is to design music in detail, so that you're no longer exactly the 
architect of a piece of work but more the designer of a musical ecosystem. 
You put a few things in place and see how they react or what they do to each 
other” (Eno in Whittaker, 2003). 
 
In summing up this section on Eno’s generative music, it is worth highlighting two 
sentences from the above quotations: “I think one of the changes of our 
consciousness [is] of how things come into being” (Toop, 2004), and “the interesting 
part is how you rethink how something is made, how something comes into being” 
(Whittaker 2003). Both these statements demonstrate a concern with emergence and 
becoming, which are central themes in cybernetics. However, they also demonstrate 
a concern with being in the Heideggerian sense, and particularly in relation to 
Heidegger’s essay “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954). In this context we 
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may see Eno’s work as a recognition of the enframing nature of technology and that 
subversive participation in the technological milieu may reveal glimpses of the true 
nature of Being (Heidegger, 1954).  
 
While it is very doubtful that Eno is aware of this philosophy, his concern with being 
in relation to generative music demonstrates that the ontological position of his work 
takes precedence over epistemology. He is also attempting to be radical in his 
approach to using technology, to break free of Western classical traditions. Both 
these perspectives align with Heidegger’s philosophy, which in turn aligns with 
many cybernetic precepts.  
 
6.2.7.c. Meaning and aesthetics in generative music 
 
Generative music represents a break with Western music’s hierarchical tradition, in 
which the lone composer disseminates his artistic vision and imbues the piece of 
music with meaning to players and audience. In Eno’s generative compositions, he is 
working to a set of beliefs and influences that hold to an ontological position, in 
which cybernetics plays a significant role, and meaning may be discerned by an 
audience as an emergent property of the composition, not as something prescribed 
by the composer. This lack of imbued meaning through direct authorship is further 
alluded to by Eno himself: “With this Generative Music… am I the composer? Are 
you if you buy the system the composer? Is Jim Coles and his brother who wrote the 
software the composer? Who actually composes music like this? Can you describe it 
as a composition exactly when you don't know what it’s going to be?” (Eno, 1996b) 
 
Eno’s generative and ambient music has a distinct musical quality: soft tones, 
sparseness, quietness, mingling with the environment, evolving loops, oblique 
melodies that never appear to coalesce, and music that is said to be calming and 
beautiful. Inevitably, this style may invoke a response in the listener, perhaps of 
contemplation, relaxation, meditation, and so on. However, while Eno is often 
quoted as saying that he likes the state of “surrender” that certain music engenders, 
this is not the full story behind the artistic and aesthetic impetus behind this music. 
Eno states:  
 
“All of the encouragement of modern life is to tell you to pay attention to 
yourself and take control of things. We can invent technologies and we can 
think of ways of organising the world to our advantage, to our benefit. 
However, the other thing we obviously love doing is almost completely the 
opposite, it’s putting ourselves in situations where we’re not the primary 
figure, where we are not in control, we’re carried along, we’re floating on 
something. And I like that state that I call surrender and other people call 
transcendence, and other people call getting out of it (laughs)” (BBC, Arena, 
2010). 
 
It would seem from this statement that Eno is only advocating ‘surrender’ in the 
musical experience, however, one of his often quoted statements is “For the world to 
be interesting you have to be manipulating it all the time” (Bangs, 1979). 
Furthermore, his interactive iPhone and iPad music apps such as Bloom and Scape 
suggest a more complex relationship with music than merely surrender. Perhaps the 
soundscapes Eno creates may engender surrender, but within this there is also the 
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capacity to manipulate and change the musical environment if desired – even an 
action as simple as turning down the volume is something that Eno see as an 
important consideration (Eno, 1975b). It would appear that the above statements 
concerning ‘control’ and ‘surrender’ are a recognition of this axis within music, a 
sliding scale in which control and surrender exist at polar extremes and the measure 
of a composition’s effect will exist at some point on this scale. And most significantly, 
it is an axis that is concerned with states of being, as opposed to emotions.  
 
 
Other qualities of Eno’s music include its seductiveness, its unpredictability, and its 
constant subtle manipulations of timbre, which mean that his music bears close 
listening as well as merely providing a background. Eric Tamm, for example, 
considers manipulation of timbre to be the defining aspect of Eno’s compositions 
(Tamm, 1995). While timbre manipulation is an important aspect of Eno’s style, it is 
only made possible by the technologies he employs (predominantly EQ and 
filtering). By Eno’s own admission, technology is what makes it possible for him to 
compose music in the first place. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that his 
distinct use of these technologies in totality (not just the use of filters and EQ) in a 
human/machine/environment paradigm, supersedes timbre composition as the 
primary defining aspect of Eno’s compositional style. 
 
Beauty and mystery are also notable characteristics often attributed to Eno’s music 
(BBC “Arena”, 2010). As we have seen, the English new music’s “cult of the 
beautiful” was a strong influence on Eno’s work but it would appear that these 
attributes also have influences of a more personal nature. As a small boy Eno 
developed a love of the doo-wop music played on jukeboxes by the American Air 
Force personnel who were stationed near his hometown. The young Eno had no 
point of reference for this music, which he recalls as being quite unlike anything one 
would hear on the BBC at the time (BBC “Arena”, 2010). He found it to be “alien and 
totally other” (Tamm, 1995), and describes “always being impressed by music that I 
couldn't penetrate the mystery of” (BBC Arena, 2010). This experience combined with 
his recurrent singing of the Catholic mass in Latin as a child, a language he did not 
understand and experienced as “singing as pure sound” (BBC Arena, 2010), were 
both early formative musical encounters for Eno. The music critic Paul Morley points 
to the mystery and beauty of Eno’s music as having religious overtones, even for 
secular listeners (BBC “Arena”, 2010). This religious overtone stems from Eno’s 
prime choice of instrumentation, which often features choir, organs, and bell sounds, 
all of which are associated with the church. Furthermore, Eno employs ‘black box’ 
systems to organise these sounds (Koan, for example, or unsynchronised tape loops), 
whose complexity and unpredictability of organisation, a characteristic shared with 
many organic systems, makes them impossible to penetrate by empirical observation 
(the flow of water in a stream, for example). Again, we also see a concern with being; 
an encounter with the musical other is primarily a state of being, not a definable 
emotion. 
 
Another aspect of Eno’s conceptual thinking is his interest in metaphor. However, 
this is not in the sense of an artistic device in his work, rather that he considers it as a 
form of modus operandi: “Evolving metaphors, in my opinion, is what artists do. 
They produce work that gives you the chance to experience in a safe environment, 
because nothing really happens to you when you are looking at artwork, they give 
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you the chance to experience what might be quite dangerous and radical new ideas. 
They give you a chance to step out of real life into simulator life. A metaphor is a 
way of explaining something that we’ve experienced in a set of terms, a different set 
of terms” (Eno, 1996b). Eno takes the example of the metaphor for an argument, 
which is that of “war”. If this metaphor of war was shifted to one of dance, an 
entirely different discourse might be possible (Eno, 1996b). The ideas Eno exposes 
above, in particular of art creating a safe space in which to play out scenarios, are 
directly taken from Morse Peckham’s thesis in Man’s Rage for Chaos (Peckham, 1967). 
However, Eno’s musings on metaphor in this context suggests a different emphasis, 
one that can change the state of the artist’s practice and present new ways of 
thinking and being. The cybernetician Gordon Pask defined cybernetics as: “the 
science or the art of manipulating defensible metaphors; showing how they may be 
constructed and what can be inferred as a result of their existence” (Pask, 1966). 
While its unclear if Eno was aware of this definition (although he was very familiar 
with the Cybernetic Serendipity exhibition at the ICA, in 1966, at which Pask and Roy 
Ascott both exhibited), it illustrates how closely related Pask’s view of the practice of 
cybernetics and Eno’s ideas of the practice of the artist were in relation to employing 
metaphor.  
 
Returning to the theme of meaning, Eno strongly takes Ascott’s line, that the 
meaning of a work of art is created in the mind of the audience as they experience it: 
“Music is actually a contingent combination of sounds whose emotional resonances 
are entirely dependent on the audience’s personal and shared histories as listeners” 
(Eno, 1996b). Furthermore, that meaning is also contingent on the “frame” or context 
of the artwork:  
 
“One of the interesting things about generative systems is that they depend a 
lot on the observer as well, so one of the things that a lot of my work counts 
on is that if you put something on a CD, people will tend to think its 
probably music (laughter)… but it’s funny, if you put something in a frame 
and put it in an art gallery, people will think it’s a painting and they’ll 
reserve a special kind of attention for that… Something I’m very aware of is 
that people tend to connect things together in their brains, a lot of my work 
involves using light and sound together and I never synchronise them but 
people always think that they're synchronised” (Eno, 2006). 
 
The frame and context also includes the environment. The inclusion of the 
environment places the listener in a real space and time; the immersive experience of 
Eno’s music requires immersion in a real environment. Furthermore, the organic 
nature of the structure of the music reflects the (probabilistic) real soundscape within 
which it is situated. These aspects further emphasise being, as it requires the listener 
to be aware of the environment that he or she exists within, and of his or her 
relationship to it and the music.  
 
The question of meaning in generative music is most prevalent when one considers 
Eno’s fundamental ontological position, which is one of becoming, emergence, and 
self making; an understanding that certain systems (particularly biological ones) are 
able to create order from chaos; and that given some very small inputs, complex 
systems may emerge. From the cybernetic, constructivist standpoint, meaning is only 
formed through action and interaction, there is no intrinsic meaning in things; 





This writing on Eno’s work began by highlighting four aspects of Eno’s 
compositional process that relate to ontology: 1) the de-emphasis of the composer; 2) 
the recognition and use of probabilistic processes in composition; 3) the de-emphasis 
of musical notes in favour of timbral composition; and 4) the role asked of the 
listener. We have seen how each of these positions has been made possible or 
mitigated by technology and how these aspects relate to Marshal McLuhan’s post-
literate society theory, in which the “medium is the message”, and Heiddeger’s 
radical participation in technology that may reveal true ‘being’.  
 
Each of the four perspectives above relates strongly to the cybernetic ontology of 
Emergence and Becoming, and the cybernetic precepts of “order from noise” 
(Wiener, 1948); “non-hierarchical organisation” (Beer, 1972); “black box”, 
performative ontology (Ashby, 1956); and the human/machine/environment 
paradigm (Wiener, 1948). Eno’s cybernetic art-school training and his early 
encounter with Stafford Beer’s work informed his approach to music-making from 
the beginning of Roxy Music, through Ambient Music, and culminating in his 
current work with Generative Music. Furthermore, the role he played in the new 
English music movement of the 1960s and 1970s helped him to further formulate a 
compositional approach and aesthetic. Through his examination of Cardew’s work in 
a cybernetic context, he further cemented an idea of what cybernetic composition 
might sound like in practice.  
 
Eno seeks to define his own compositional path and is suspicious of aligning himself 
wholeheartedly to any musical style or genre, preferring to create his own stylistic 
niches. While process-driven and systems-driven music lies at the conceptual heart 
of his approach, he is keen to assert his own aesthetic sensibilities: he will always 
intervene if the result of his musical system does not match the “beautiful” aesthetic. 
On this topic, he muses: “I wanted the Staffordian approach to do two things: to 
pitch me into aesthetic areas beyond where my taste would normally take me. That’s 
one of the things you find working with systems, that they throw up configurations 
that you couldn't have thought of. I wanted the system to confront me with novelty; 
but I did also want to say, ‘I prefer this part of it to that part, this part doesn’t make 
sense, that part does.’ […] The systemic approach […] is certainly very good at 
imagination expanding” (Whittaker, 2003). 
 
When meaning is considered in relation to Eno’s generative music it reveals a 
preoccupation with being as it relates to the creation of the music and the situation of 
the listener. The ontology that Eno adheres to is a cybernetic one – one that concerns 
emergence and becoming, but also adheres to Heidegger’s conception of revealing 
‘being’ by participating in technology in a radical way. Eno is not interested in using 
technology in a conventional way, but rather in a way that concerns radical (when 
compared to other musical traditions) implementations for creating music.  
 
Eno’s influence on popular music is extensive. Through his work as a producer and 
artistic collaborator with artists such as David Bowie, Talking Heads, U2, and 
Coldplay, he has helped to shape the landscape of popular music for the last forty 
years and gained a reputation as an “experimental electronic producer-composer 
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with a pop audience” (Moorefield, 2005). However, perhaps more important than the 
sound of these records, it is the working practices he has employed with these artists 
that have gained him a reputation as a pioneer. These have involved his use of the 
Oblique Strategy cards with David Bowie and his use of non-hierarchical, ‘network 
composition’ techniques with David Byrne and Talking Heads (Sheppard, 2008). Eno 
creates metaphors and systems that artists can use to expand their creative 
possibilities. Here again we see cybernetic methods employed to shift perspectives 
and modes of being within the creative process. Furthermore, Eno’s use of systems in 
his music making has brought the focus and attention of a wider popular music 
audience to experimental music and the creative possibilities that cybernetics in 









































6.3 Agostino Di Scipio & Iannis Xenakis  
 
This approach, by which one invents and works out interdependencies among real-time 
control variables, already reflects a paradigm shift from interactive composing (as in the 
pioneering work of Joel Chadabe and other composers, in the 1970s) to composing 
interactions. In my view, the shift is especially relevant when composed interactions are 
audibly experienced as a music of sound  (timbre composition), more than a music of notes 
(as is often the case with interactive music systems, especially when instrumentalists are 
involved) (Di Scipio, 2003). 
 
Born in 1962, Agostino Di Scipio is perhaps the most prolific and best known 
contemporary composer and theoretician to utilise cybernetics and systems theory in 
the creation of his musical works. Born in Naples, Italy in 1962, he had a burgeoning 
interest in music in his teenage years, firstly as a self-taught musician and later with 
electronics and computer programming. He also developed an interest in 
experimental theatre whilst studying at the Istituto Universitario Orientale, in 
Naples (Di Scipio, A. 2014). He later studied Composition and Electronic Music at 
the Conservatory of L’Aquila, where his teachers included Michelangelo Lupone, 
Giancarlo Bizzi, and Mauro Cardi. During this time he studied Computer Music at 
the Centro di Sonologia Computazionale, University of Padova (Di Scipio, 2014). 
 
He has been a guest composer at a number of prestigious institutions including CSC 
in Padova (1987–1991), ZKM (Karlsruhe, 2005–06), IMEB (Bourges 2003 and 2005), 
and artist-in-residence for the DAAD Künstlerprogramm in Berlin (2004 and 2005). 
He has held the position of lecturer in live-electronics composition at CCMIX in Paris 
(2001–2007) and has been Professor of Electronic Music at the Conservatory of 
Naples (2001–2013), and currently holds the same position in L’Aquila. In the winter 
of 2007/8, he served as Edgar Varèse Professor at the Technische Universität in 
Berlin (Di Scipio, 2014). He has also been a guest professor at a number of notable 
academic institutions, including the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (2004), 
University of Paris 8 (2013), IRCAM (2013), Johannes Gutenberg Universität (Mainz, 
2004), Simon Fraser University (Burnaby-Vancouver, 1993) and the Sibelius 
Academy (Helsinki, 1995). He also delivered the opening keynote speech at the 
International Computer Music Conference 2013, in Perth, Australia (Di Scipio, 2014). 
 
By his own admission, his research in the area of sound and music is 
“unconventional” (Di Scipio, A. 2011), and yet his notoriety and academic stature 
demonstrate that the ideas he explores in his works speak to important social, 
political, and cultural themes prevalent in modern times, namely those of 
complexity, the coupling of human, machine and environment, and emergent 
structures – all of which are strong themes either within, or born from, cybernetics. 
Di Scipio’s interest in cybernetics and emergent behaviours stems from his initial 
concern with interactive computer music and (granular) micro-sonorities, as 
expounded by Iannis Xenakis.  
 
Di Scipio recounts his creative journey: “I had a very early phase when I gathered as 
much knowledge as possible about computer music techniques and digital signal 
processing. […] In retrospect, I view that time as one of broad explorations in sonic 
materials, which eventually took me, later on, to focus on granular, textural and 
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noisy materials… in short, to micro-composition, i.e. to focus on the finest temporal 
scales in sound – with various degrees of densities and consistencies among sonic 
grains or particles. The idea was that micro-composition would let macro-level, 
gestural properties emerge at larger time scales. I tried to determine a process in 
sound in a way that lower-level processes would bring forth larger sonic gestures” 
(Di Scipio in Placidi, 2010). In the early 1990s Di Scipio also became interested in non-
linear dynamic systems of the kind typically associated with chaos theory and 
sought to implement these ideas as synthesis techniques that could be employed in 
his compositions (Placidi, 2010).  
 
De Scipio sought to formally investigate these two areas (granular synthesis and 
dynamic systems) in studying the work of Iannis Xenakis (1922–2001). In his 
influential work, Formalized music: Thought and Mathematics in Composition (1963), 
Xenakis outlines his ‘granular hypothesis’, in which he states, “all sound is an 
integration of grains, of elementary sonic particles, of sonic quanta” (Xenakis, 1963). 
He further postulates that it is possible to make any existing sound or timbre (as well 
those as yet unimagined) by combining grains in specific arrangements. This was a 
formidable supposition as it significantly predated the sampling and DSP 
technologies that would enable a constructive practical investigation of his theory. 
As a reaction against the complexity of serialism, Xenakis also postulated a move 
away from ‘linearity’ in musical composition. From these insights he developed the 
notion of using probability in music, formulating what he called “Markovian 
Stochastic Music” (Xenakis, 1963). Although the introduction of stochastic processes 
into musical composition was nothing new in the early sixties (Cage, among others, 
had been experimenting in this area for some time), Xenakis’ particular mathematical 
brand of probability manipulation was inspired by cybernetics. Particularly in his 
attempt to “generalize the study of musical composition with the aid of stochastics” 
(Xenakis, 1963), he utilised methodology found in W. Ross Ashby’s 1956 book, 
Introduction to Cybernetics (Kollias, 2008). From this extrapolation of Ashby’s work, he 
further postulated that “second order sonorities” would emerge from the 
interactions of sonic grains; the idea that the interactions of grains over time in the 
compositional process, at a ‘micro level’, would form timbres and compositional 
gestures at the ‘macro level’ (i.e. the grains, when combined in a certain way, would 
exhibit emergent behaviours). Xenakis first implemented his granular compositional 
technique in Analogique A (1958) for string ensemble and Analogique B (1958–59) for 
tape. 
 
Xenakis’ granular theory shares parallels with the cybernetic ‘order from noise’ 
principle, first formulated by the cybernetician Heinz von Foerster in 1960, which 
demonstrates that noise facilitates self-organisation by allowing a system to 
experience a variety of states (in its state space) and increasing the likelihood that the 
system will tend toward a state of equilibrium (Von Foerster, 1960), which would be 
observed as emergent phenomena. In describing self-organising systems, the 
cybernetician Jeffery Goldstein writes, “emergent phenomena are conceptualized as 
occurring on the macro level, in contrast to the micro-level components and 
processes out of which they arise” (Goldstein, 1999).  
 
It is certain that Xenakis was reading Ashby’s book and considering cybernetics 
more generally in the early sixties and it is highly likely that he would have come 
across Von Foerster’s theory or made the logical leap from reading Ashby’s work 
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when formulating his theory of ‘second order sonorities’. While An Introduction to 
Cybernetics (Ashby, 1956) is not specifically about self-organisation (of the ‘order 
from noise’ variety), it does, however, examine the mathematical principles of a 
system controlling complex behaviour. The book is also based (in part) on Ashby’s 
prior work on self-organising systems (Ashby, 1947), which laid the groundwork for 
others, including Von Foerster.  
 
However, Di Scipio is critical of Xenakis’ ‘second order sonorities’. In his 1997 paper, 
“The Problem of 2nd-order Sonorities in Xenakis' Electroacoustic Music”, and again 
in his 2001 paper, “Clarification on Xenakis: The Cybernetics of Stochastic music”, Di 
Scipio attacks the notion that Xenakis’ granular, stochastic compositional method 
produces second-order sonorities: “one may ask whether the stochastic does really 
provide as good a means for higher-order sonorities to emerge from a ground-level 
pattern of minimal sonic units […] just as the pizzicatos of Analogique A could not but 
remain string pizzicatos, however dense their articulation, the electronic grains in 
Analogique B remain just grains and do not build up into a more global auditory 
image” (Di Scipio, 2001). Furthermore, Di Scipio criticises the pieces from a 
cybernetic perspective, stating, “although the mechanism (system) is sensitive to 
initial conditions it is unable to be influenced by the events of its own function. 
Instead, only the composer is capable of influencing the mechanism from the 
outside” (Kollias, 2008). Di Scipio recognises that it is also a “closed system” (Di 
Scipio, 2001) and is therefore not able to produce second-order sonorities, as it does 
not appropriately adhere to the ‘order from noise’ principle, or any other cybernetic 
self-organisation theory. In order to develop a system capable of second-order 
sonorities, Di Scipio asserts that a more advanced systemic notion is required, that of 
the self-organising system (Kollias, 2011). This necessitates an ontological shift in 
approach, one that recognises that any dynamic system is situated within an 
environment and is reactive to environmental conditions. Di Scipio also recognises 
that self-organising systems require a more self-reflexive design ethos, as opposed to 
the closed-system approach utilised by Xenakis. Di Scipio’s criticism of Xenakis’ 
approach neatly reflects some important differences between first-order and second- 
order cybernetics and distinguishes Di Scipio’s investigation as being distinctly of 
the second-order variety.  
 
Consideration of this second-order cybernetic design ethos brings us to another 
important pillar of Di Scipio’s research, namely the question surrounding 
interactivity – or more precisely, interactive music systems and his alternative 
strategy in this area. In his 2003 paper, “Sound is the interface: from interactive to 
ecosystemic signal processing”, Di Scipio criticises the linear approach taken in the 
design of interactive music systems: “a linear design ontology is taken as if it were 
the only one we may think of when speaking of such things as ‘live electronics’ and 
‘interactive music’” (Di Scipio, 2003). He further asserts that almost the entire 
multitude of devices and computer protocols utilised in interactive music systems 





“The very process of ‘interaction’ is today rarely understood and 
implemented for what it seems to be in living organisms (either human or 
not, e.g. animal or social), namely as a by-product of lower level 
interdependencies among system components. In a different approach, a 
principal aim would be to create a dynamical system exhibiting an adaptive 
behavior to the surrounding external conditions, and capable to interfere 
with the external conditions themselves [sic]” (Di Scipio, 2003).  
 
He further states that the system should be capable of being a “self-observing 
system” (Di Scipio, 2003) – independent from an agent/performer – and capable of 
tracking what happens both externally and internally and making adjustments 
accordingly. He cites Gordon Mumma’s Hornpipe (1967) as a pioneering example of 
such a system (Di Scipio, 2003). Here, interaction is no longer a case of ‘agent acts, 
computer re-acts’, as in the linear model. Instead, it becomes a fundamental structural 
element from which emergent properties may arise. The flow of energy in the system 
is no longer one-way (i.e. from the composer); energy may be derived from the 
environment and a composition may be self-sustaining, with little real-time input 
from a composer/performer. It becomes obvious that in such a system the design of 
the interactions, between all the components of the system, are fundamental to the 
construction of the composition; without a considered, ecosystemic design, 
interactions will simply not occur. He states: “I think that these interrelationships 
(between elements of a system) may, instead, be the object of design, and hence 
worked out creatively as a substantial part of the compositional process” (Di Scipio, 
2003). 
 
Di Scipio sees this as an important shift in emphasis, from the dominant approach of 
interactive composing to one of composing interactions. Here the composer does not 
compose the musical result but instead the interactions that create the music. He 
views this shift as one that moves away from “creating wanted sounds via 
interactive means, towards creating wanted interactions having audible traces. In the 
latter case, one designs, implements and maintains a network of connected 
components whose emergent behavior in sound one calls music” (Di Scipio, 2003). 
Furthermore, he sees this shift as being one that is particularly relevant “when 
composed interactions are audibly experienced as a music of sound” (Di Scipio, 2003), 
which he calls ‘timbre composition’ as opposed to a music of notes, which he sees as 
being particularly prevalent in interactive music, especially where instrumentalists 
are involved.  
 
This is an important distinction as it sees the setting aside of the necessity for 
notation in eco-systemic composition. Concentrating on the composition of 
interactions at a micro level negates the need for notation at an intermediate level 
(prior to the macro, perceived-sound level). This view of the redundancy of notation 
is concurrent with pragmatic philosophy’s view of the redundancy of text in the 
modern electronic age. McLuhan and Dewey believed that since the invention of the 
telegraph, text has assumed a subservient role to aural/acoustic forms of 
communication. McLuhan asserted that this elevation of the aural/acoustic was akin 
to an ontology that existed in a pre-literate phase in human history (Coyne, 1995). 
We may see that the history of musical notation has followed a concurrent path to 
that of written text, from its non-use in pre-literate societies to its hegemony in the 




Di Scipio’s most radical assertion in his ecosystemic model is perhaps that the need 
for human intervention in performance is irrelevant. He prefers a 
machine/environment interrelationship (as opposed to the cybernetic human/ 
machine/environment interrelationship), whereby functions of the noise in the 
environment (for example amplitude or frequency parameters) regulate the internal 
functioning of the DSP processes (Di Scipio, 2003). However, as we can see in Figure 
23, in the triangular recursive ecosystemic model, human interaction in performance 
is distinguished as being optional by the dotted line. In performance 
implementation, Di Scipio favours the interaction of human agents only as actors 
within the sonic environment, or as the initial composer of the interactions (prior to 
performance), no human agent interacts directly with the computer interface during 
real-time signal processing in the performance. 
  
In the eco-systemic compositional paradigm, Di Scipio also sees the role of ambience 
and noise as being essential to the process of music creation. In the linear model of 
interactive music systems, noise is something to be eliminated, but in the self-
organising system (and in this case specifically Di Scipio’s conception of interactive 
music), “noise is a necessary element, crucial for a coherent but flexible and 
dynamical behavior to emerge” (Di Scipio, 2003). He sees noise as the medium in 
which the sound-generating system is situated. Noise is also the energy supply; it 
drives the process by which the system can maintain itself and develop. Indeed, the 
system cannot exist separately from the environment it inhabits. Of his sonic 
ecosystems, De Scipio writes: “They are autonomous (i.e. literally, self-regulating) as 
their process reflects their own peculiar internal structure. Yet they cannot be 
isolated from the external world, and cannot achieve their own autonomous function 
except in close conjunction with a source of information (or energy). To isolate them 
is to kill them” (Di Scipio, 2003). He further writes that although it is a paradoxical 
superstition, in this case, without context there can be no text. This idea of systemic 
‘death’ shares parallels to Louis and Bebe Barron’s conception of their compositional 
process, in that their circuits ‘lived’ and ‘died’ during the act of composition, which 
reveals how there has been a common conception of cybernetic composition as an 
organic process from the time of its inception to the present day.  
 
Di Scipio has composed many works that adhere to the cybernetic paradigm. These 
range from more traditional works that (paradoxically) utilise notation, musical 
instruments, and performers, to ‘self-sustaining’ eco-systemic sound installations. 
Certainly, his work in recent years has seen a shift toward ecosystemic composition 
and away from more traditional compositional modes. This work has become well 
known, particularly in the circles of computer music and live electronics (Solomos, 
2014). In the early 2000s, Di Scipio began work on the Audible Ecosystemic Interface 
project (AESI). Initially this was not a formalised model but an experimental 
practical implementation designed to allow him to discover the sonic possibilities of 
the system. The work later evolved into live electronics solos, such as Audible 
EcoSystemics no.1 (impulse response study) (2002), and Audible EcoSystemics no.2 
(feedback study) (2003). The AESI has also been adapted and modified for sonic 
installations such as Condotte Pubbliche (2011). His ecosystemic process was more 
formally espoused in a number of academic papers, most notably the 
aforementioned work from 2003 entitled “Sound is the interface: from interactive to 





In terms of his ecosystemic sound installations (those created after 2003), Di Scipio 
describes the design as such:  
 
“The basic idea reflects a self-feeding loop design (figure 24). A chain of 
causes and effects is established, ideally without any human intervention but 
the practical instalment and set-up of everything needed for the performance 
to take place (loudspeakers, electret condenser microphones, a 
programmable DSP-based workstation, and a mixer console). A compact 
description of the overall process is as follows. (i) The computer emits some 
initial sound (either synthetic or sampled), heard through the loudspeakers; 
(ii) this is also fed back to the computer by two or more microphones 
scattered around the room (their placement is crucial); (iii) the computer 
analyses the microphone signals and extracts information on relevant sonic 
features; (iv) the extracted data is used to generate low-rate control signals 
and drive the audio signal processing parameters (DSP modules I often use 
here include granulators and sample playback modules); submitted to audio 
signal processing is the computer-generated sound itself that was initially 
emitted; (v) meanwhile, the microphone signals are matched against the 
original synthetic or sampled signal, and the difference-signal is calculated 
(the difference in numerical values between original and ambience sound 
signal, reflecting the room resonances added); (vi) the difference signal is 
used to adapt a number of signal processing parameters to the room 
characteristics (the adaptation process takes a variable time-span to 
complete)” (Di Scipio, 2003). 
 
In some senses Di Scipio’s design ethos is very simple: set up a microphone, speakers 
and computer in an environmental space and wire them in such a way as to create a 
feedback loop. Then use measurements of audio parameters of the input signal to 
control digital manipulations of the output sound and round the signal goes until a 
rich sonic environment is created. As Di Scipio states: “The room resonances affect 
the parameters in the DSP methods implemented, and the DSP output affects the 
total sound in the room, generating new sonic material as a function of the 
resonances themselves” (Di Scipio, 2003). However, understanding of the system 
becomes complex when considering how audio and control signals are coupled 
together. Di Scipio is keen to attest that this design is cybernetic, more specifically 
that it is a bio-cybernetic, ‘recursive coupling’ – using terms formulated by Von 
Foerster (1960) – and furthermore, that because of its recursive nature, his system is 
consistent with the mathematics of chaotic systems (Di Scipio, 2003). In practical 
implementation this means that changes in the nature of the audio input create 
changes in how the control data manipulates the audio input, which in turn alters 
the audio output to the environment, which in turn effects the audio input, and so 
on. Each element of the system is coupled together in such a way that changes in one 
time-based iterative element affects all the others, and thus no one element in the 
system is in overall control; control is achieved as a balance of these elements. It is 
important to point out that the control data is also not in control; should a non-linear 
dynamic enter the audio input this will also be reflected by a non-linear change in 







However, in terms of analysing the compositional ethos behind such a design, the 
choices made in what control data is utilised, what DSP manipulations are 
performed, and how the system is coupled together are crucial elements. As Di 
Scipio states, the interactions are a “substantial part of the compositional process” 
(Di Scipio, 2003). To examine this in more detail, the DSP elements utilised equate to 
functions that control, shape and sustain the audio output. These include functions 
that: 1) compensate (reduce the amplitude of audio inputs); 2) follow (copy the value 
of a given value, sometimes with a time delay); 3) control redundancy (to increase 
the number of grains output, thereby increasing the intensity of the overall sound); 
and 4) control concurrency (support a contrasting sonic feature, e.g. boost low 
frequencies when high frequencies are prominent) (Di Scipio, 2003). These functions 
are primarily achieved via granular processing, which is consistent with Di Scipio’s, 
Xenakis-inspired granular approach. These reducing, mirroring, amplifying and 
complementing functions are also highly consistent with cybernetic ideas of 
homeostasis and autopoiesis in that they are regulatory functions designed to control 
entropy in a feedback process. However, it is in describing how these regulatory DSP 
functions are controlled, specifically by control data, that explanations become more 
murky, both technologically and in terms of design ethos. What we already know 
from Di Scipio’s description is that control data is derived from measurements of 
facets of the incoming audio and that these control signals regulate the functioning of 
the DSP elements, a model that is again entirely consistent with a cybernetic 
paradigm. Di Scipio states that he uses several measurements of input audio to drive 
the control data: amplitude, density of events (rate of onset transients), brilliance (or 
other unspecified spectral properties), and the transient delay between the two 
recording microphones, in order to track spatial cues of audio in the environment (Di 
Scipio, 2003). Each of these control elements is subjected to a number of time-variable 
parameters, such as delays and time-reverse functions. This control data is then 
mapped onto the DSP functioning. Di Scipio prefers a matrix approach, where one 
control feature might map onto several DSP processes, or vice versa. He gives this 
example to illustrate the mapping: “Imagine, in a simplest example, the occurrence 
of comparatively ‘dark’ spectra in the ambience sound causing (i) an amplitude 
decrease in lower frequency bands and (ii), at the same time, by complementing the 
numerical value for that variable, a shortening of grain durations (shorter grain 
durations having the effect of a high-pass filter)” (Di Scipio, 2003). Thus the complex 
self-reflexive design of the ecosystemic compositional system is implemented. 
 
The environmental coupling described above allows for a self-reflexive system, one 
that is aware of its internal and also external states and is able to make adjustments 
accordingly to create a homeostatic state. However, what is not clear in Di Scipio’s 
description is what the criteria are for the external mapping. To elaborate, Di Scipio 
states that the system’s interactions are the “by-product of carefully planned-out 
interdependencies among system components, [which] would allow in their turn to 
establish the overall system dynamics, upon contact with the external conditions” 
(Di Scipio, 2003). He also believes that this type of construction is akin to the 
mapping in living organisms that allows emergent behaviour to occur and we 
should note that these statements are all cybernetically consistent. Nonetheless, in 
classic cybernetic design, as employed in machines such as Ross Ashby’s Homeostat, 
a ‘criterion of stability’ (Beer, 1994) is utilised to indicate a change in internal state, so 
that adjustments may be made to achieve homeostasis. In practical implementation 
this is usually some form of threshold switch, something akin to the mechanism used 
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in a thermostat, which will, once triggered, return a certain functioning of an 
organism back to normal operational parameters. It would seem that this type of 
governor, one that is central to any cybernetic design ethos, is missing from Di 
Scipio’s construction. There is no doubt that there must be some form of a criterion of 
stability otherwise the system would fail to achieve a homeostatic state. However, 
not recognising this as a central element in the design process could lead to extensive 
tuning of the input measurements (which in performance transduce into control 
data) in each environmental space the work is placed in, and there is much allusion 
to this ‘tuning’ process in Di Scipio’s description of the set-up of the ecosystemic 
environment, which essentially seems to be a process of tailoring the system to that 
exact space to supposedly garner some desired result. All this conjecture is merely to 
comment that while Di Scipio’s ecosystemic design is technically masterful and 
eminently cybernetic, there are perhaps one or two flaws in elements of its design 
conception that may lead to an excessive tuning process and that perhaps there are 
some more technically simple solutions to some of these self-reflexive design issues.  
 
There are also some further criticisms of Di Scipio’s work. The composer, Phivos-
Angelos Kollias, writes, “In Di Scipio’s approach the composer organises the basic 
organisational elements on a microtemporal level, what he calls microstructural 
sonic design, while any higher organizational level is left in favor of the occasional 
dynamics of the environment. Thus, the composer is giving away his control of the 
overall result. From a systemic perspective, this is a case of one directional bottom-
up organization, where from the interactions in a basic organisational level emerge 
all higher level organizations” (Kollias, 2011). Kollias sees a flaw in this model in that 
it is only a bottom-up process. Whereas many cybernetic models of living organisms 
acknowledge the fact that organisation takes place as a balance between the different 
hierarchical organisational levels – top-down as well as bottom-up. As a solution to 
this perceived flaw, Kollias suggests “the use of the systemic principle of equifinality” 
(Kollias, 2009b). In an open system, i.e. a system in direct communication with its 
environment, including a self-organised system, “the same final state can be reached 
from different initial conditions and after disturbances of the process” (Von 
Bertalanffy, 2006). Kollias’ hypothesis was that “if we consider the music organism 
as an open system, it is possible to create certain conditions in which the organism 
will show a tendency for ‘equifinal’ behavioral states” (Kollias, 2009b, chapter B). In 
other terms, such a conception can allow the composer to “influence the system in 
order to pass from a series of behavioral states, which can be similar in any 
constitution of the same organism under similar circumstances” (Kollias, 2009b, 
Chapter B)” (Kollias, 2011). 
 
It is important to note here that epistemologically, in terms of being consistent with 
cybernetic theory, Kollias is correct; the human/machine/environment paradigm is 
the one most pertinent to cybernetics (many examples of the primacy of this 
paradigm are to be found in Pickering, 2011), as opposed to the 
machine/environment hypothesis, with the human somewhat at a removal, as 
modelled by Di Scipio. Furthermore, Kollias’ assertion that ‘proper’ recursive control 
is ‘top down’ as well as ‘bottom up’ in cybernetic theory is also accurate (e.g. Beer, 
1972) and in Di Scipio’s case, this is perhaps as a consequence of his preoccupation 
with Xenakis’ ‘bottom-up’ constructivist theories and his own subsequent 
development of a personal granular process. Nonetheless, putting these criticisms 
aside for a moment, what is perhaps most pertinent to consider is how Di Scipio’s 
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work undoubtedly stages cybernetic ontological theatre. In this aspect, Di Scipio’s 
work stands as testament to what can be archived in terms of cybernetic music in a 
modern technological context. His work also stands as a challenge to traditional 
conceptions of what interactive music with computers is, and offers a rigorous and 
compelling alternative in both system design and compositional ethos.  
 
The above criticisms are more of an argument as to what cybernetic composition in 
general should be, rather than a criticism of Di Scipio’s valuable and groundbreaking 
musical output. This factor in itself demonstrates that cybernetic music is a self-
consistent entity, with its own internal debates that differ from the standard debates 

















































































7. The Cybernetic Compositional Framework 
 
Agostino Di Scipio states that the principal aim in designing a cybernetic 
compositional system “would be to create a dynamical system exhibiting an adaptive 
behaviour to the surrounding external conditions, and capable to interfere with the 
external conditions themselves” [sic] (Di Scipio, 2003). The following framework, 
derived from the prior research, aims to outline the conditions, precepts, and 
ontological position necessary for meaningful engagement in cybernetic 
composition.  
 
7.1. The Cybernetic Musical Framework  
 
This section seeks to outline the compositional practices that define cybernetic music. 
However, such a study highlights a fundamental paradox that lies at the heart of 
building a cybernetic understanding of knowledge, namely that the cybernetic 
worldview prioritises ontology over epistemology. The cybernetician Ernst von 
Glasersfeld defines this epistemological issue thus:  
 
“The epistemological implications of self-reference have an even wider range 
of influence in the cybernetical approach to the philosophy of science. Here 
there is a direct conflict with a tenet of the traditional scientific dogma, 
namely the belief that scientific descriptions and explanations should, and 
indeed can, approximate the structure of an objective reality, a reality 
supposed to exist as such, irrespective of any observer. Cybernetics, given its 
fundamental notions of self-regulation, autonomy, and the informationally 
closed character of cognitive organisms, encourages an alternative view. 
According to this view, reality is an interactive conception because observer 
and observed are a mutually dependent couple. Objectivity in the traditional 
sense, as Heinz von Foerster has remarked, is the cognitive version of the 
physiological blind spot: we do not see what we do not see. Objectivity is a 
subject’s delusion that observing can be done without him. Invoking 
objectivity is abrogating responsibility, hence its popularity” (Von 
Glasersfeld, 1992). 
 
Attempting to build a framework that justifies a set of cybernetic compositional 
practices and objectifies them as an operational ‘truth’ is therefore not valid in 
cybernetic terms. Instead the reader is asked to take this framework as a set of 
practices that arise from a particular worldview, a way of being, which exemplifies a 
mode of practice that priorities ontology and denies ultimate justifications of ‘truth’. 
In other words this framework is not a list of rules but a set of themes that can be 
explored and understood through interacting with them in a performative context. 
Pertinent to this thesis, this framework outlines a set of compositional practices that 
are aimed at staging ontological theatre, and which point toward facets of true 
‘being’. This Heideggerian ‘revealing’ is the ultimate aim of this practice and 
therefore any mode of operation that achieves this goal is justified, not only the ones 
outlined here. However, examination of the work of the composers in this study 
points toward a common ontology that yields a certain set of practices that may be 
emulated in order to inhabit an ontological position that may facilitate the 




We may also consider this framework in terms of Pragmatism. This thesis (like 
cybernetics more generally) utilises metaphor in its design ethos, most pertinently 
for this thesis in the idea that living organisms are like machines, that cybernetic 
systems (such as Di Scipio’s AESI, examined in chapter 6.3 and Beer’s VSM25 , 
examined in chapter 8.2) may be applied to musical composition, and that cybernetic 
machines stage ontological theatre for us; that they are in some senses a metaphor for 
the way we might understand the workings of the world. In identifying metaphor as 
part of a pragmatic design ethos (as opposed to a conservative design stance), 
Richard Coyne states:  
 
“By recognising the role of metaphor it is possible to abandon the idea that 
there must be underlying principles governing practices. Where there are 
principles, they themselves are artefacts, tools of practice. […] Pragmatism in 
its many guises affirms the priority of engagement in the world over 
theoretical constructs” (Coyne, 1995).  
 
Here again we see echoes of the cybernetic approach to epistemology. Furthermore, 
in consideration of pragmatism in relation to cybernetic research, Andrew Pickering 
asserts that it is “an inquiry into practice in its own right, without a pregiven 
presumption that the end of enquiry has to be an argument about knowledge” 
(Pickering, 2011). Therefore, it is only proper to consider this framework as part of a 
performative idiom, not as a set of rigid edicts, but rather as a matrix of interlinking 
signifiers of possibility in the creation of cybernetic music in which the use of 
analogies and metaphors in the design process breaks down barriers and allows for 
the mapping of viable systems onto nascent ones, thus enabling more effective and 
viable practice. 
 
7.1.1. Ephemeral Performance Works 
 
Cybernetic music is ephemeral and different in each iteration. This is true of the 
works of all the composers examined in this thesis. However, a distinction must be 
made between ephemeral work that is constructed to be staged in an environmental 
space and which uses environmental sound as a key contributing factor to the 
resultant music (for which Agostino Di Scipio’s ecosystemic music project (Di Scipio, 
2003) is the principal exemplar), and other processes involving systems that create 
ephemeral, emergent sonorities that are recorded and subsequently manipulated (via 
editing and the addition of effects) to create musical works. Work of the latter type 
exists in a spectrum of ephemerality, from the highly ephemeral (simply a recording 
of one iteration of a self-sustaining musical system, of which almost infinite 
iterations are possible) to compositions that require a great deal of editing and 
manipulation, subsequent to the initial cybernetic compositional process. The works 
of Roland Kayn (Cybernetics 1, 1968), Alvin Lucier (I am Sitting In a Room, 1969), and 
Brian Eno (“2.1”, from Music for Airports, 1978) exemplify the approach of directly 
recording the performance of a cybernetic music system with little or no subsequent 
editing or manipulation, while the works of Louis and Bebe Barron (Forbidden Planet, 
1956) and Herbert Brün (Futility, 1964) represent the creation of sound elements via 





we may envisage a ‘sliding scale’ of ephemerality, which at one extreme sees only 
the creation of individual sounds via cybernetic processes, and whose compositional 
organisation is achieved through traditional electroacoustic compositional methods 
and holds the final recorded work as the definitive compositional artefact, and at the 
other end of the scale, entirely ephemeral works that only exist at a particular time in 
a particular environment. Here the definitive compositional artefact is the system 
itself, the networks of interactions that produce the work. 
 
In some respects the degree of possibility of truly live cybernetic performance is 
limited by the technology available in the era of its creation. For example, the sounds 
Louis Barron produced with his cybernetic circuits in one of the very first electronic 
studios were truly ephemeral and non-reproducible. However, the sound production 
was short-lived and could not be sustained for long periods as the analogue circuit 
had to be destroyed to produce the desired resultant sounds. The laborious process 
by which Bebe Barron edited and added audio effects to these sounds was what 
turned them into masterful compositions. However, as analogue synthesis and DSP 
became ever more available and ubiquitous in subsequent eras, self-sustainability in 
compositional systems became more feasible. Musical compositions produced by 
Kayn, Eno, and Di Scipio could theoretically last indefinitely (until the technological 
system failed or the electricity was turned off), with the recorded performance of 
these compositions being only a short excerpt from an extended musical continuum. 
 
It is also worth considering the form that this ephemerality takes: specifically, that it 
is not completely indeterminate or aleatoric but that, compositionally and 
aesthetically, each iteration falls within a ‘class of goals’. As Brian Eno would have it, 
the development of each iteration may be metaphorically compared to the growing 
of a tree; each tree is intrinsically different in its construction but at a very basic level 
it can be classified as belonging to the genus of trees (Eno, 1996). In cybernetic 
composition, the mechanism that allows for this type of structure is an heuristic (as 
opposed to a deterministic algorithm), which allows for general instructions that can 
provide indeterminate outcomes, but which still conform to a general class of 
outcomes.  
 
7.1.2. The Non-necessity of Notation in the Post-literate Society 
 
While it can be said that traditional musical structures (chords, melody, harmony, 
etc.) are utilised by a number of composers examined in this thesis (Brian Eno is an 
apposite example in this regard), traditional musical notation is definitely not 
present in the overwhelming majority of the cybernetic works examined in this 
thesis. In a number of instances, graphical scores (as is the case in Kayn’s early work 
and Xenakis’ compositions) and written instructions (as is the case with Alvin 
Lucier’s compositions) are utilised as structural guides and in such cases we may 
view these strategies as a usurping of the technology of notation (Cee, 2010). 
However, in the vast majority of cases, notation in cybernetic composition is not 
necessary. This non-necessity of notation can be seen as part of a paradigm in which 
musical works are ephemeral and thus not designed to be identically repeated in 
each performance. One might think of the work of the Barrons, Kayn, or Eno, where 
the composer might describe the technological process of the composition for the 
benefit of understanding this aspect, but in performance, there is no exactly 
	
	 129	
repeatable sonic result. A recording of such a work is simply the artefact of just one 
possible iteration that the musical system is capable of producing. Perhaps, then, the 
compositional act is not only in designing the musical system, but also in the choice 
of a particular recording that a composer may select as the iteration he wishes to 
stand as a testament and public record of the musical output that such a system may 
create.  
 
The theme of the non-necessity of notation conforms to a Pragmatic philosophical 
worldview in which, in the post-literate society, text is no longer the dominant form 
in relation to meaning-making. The process of meaning-making is more akin to the 
pre-literate society, often taking the form of rite or ritual (these themes are explored 
many times in this thesis). In the post-literate society the auditory sense (as opposed 
to the visual sense, which is prevalent in the previous text-based technological age) is 
once again dominant and our ubiquitous electronic audio communication makes us 
part of a global village. This idea also relates to our use of tools in these different 
technological ages. To reiterate, in the technological age, tools are merely a means to 
an end, the end being a fixed and known goal. However, in the post-literate society, 
we see the incorporation of means into ends, allowing the technology to drive 
process and point to new discoveries. In this post-literate conception, means can 
mitigate ends to such an extent that the “medium becomes the message” (McLuhan, 
1964). We can see this conception at work in cybernetic music in many overt ways 
and this is not to be unexpected in a musical form that encompasses a symbiotic link 
between human, machine, and environment, where technologies are used to drive 
process and with outcomes that are not fixed, but are instead determined through 
‘playing out’ the interaction of these elements. 
 
It is also pertinent to point out that representational models of reality (those that 
utilise symbols such as text) have proved difficult in achieving artificial intelligence 
(Coyne, 1995; and Hofstadter, 2007). Platonic ideas of perfect forms, and Cartesian 
mind/body splits, which are also synonymous with classic A.I. research, have also 
proved problematic in cognitive modelling. It is no surprise then that artificial 
intelligence has moved in recent years to a more constructivist and performative 
view of cognition as an aid in understanding the problems of “hard A.I.” (Thorisson, 
2009). This fact has ramifications in the design of self-referential and reflexive 
machines. It follows, that in thinking about ‘intelligent’ music-making machines or 
real-time interactive compositional systems that incorporate machines as 
autonomous entities, ruling out a cybernetic paradigm would be to close off many 
possibly fruitful lines of inquiry. 
 
7.1.3. The Decentring of the Composer 
 
We see the trait of the de-emphasis of the composer’s role in the compositional 
process in the work of all of the composers selected for evaluation in this thesis and 
perhaps this is not surprising in a musical form that embraces probabilistic process 
and non-hierarchical control structures. Examples of this conception can be found in 
the fact that the Barrons did not initially consider their work as musical composition, 
in Lucier’s assertion that Edmond Dewan was the true composer of Music For Solo 
Performer, in Brün’s theory of ‘anticommunication’, which aims to usurp the role of 
the traditional composer’s ability to imbue meaning in his compositions, in Kayn’s 
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rejection of notation and traditional methods in favour of a 
human/machine/environment paradigm, in Eno’s conception of “being an 
audience” to the results of his compositional systems and in “riding the dynamics” 
of a system, rather than “specifying everything in detail”, and finally, in Di Scipio’s 
assertion that the role of the composer in interactive composition should be to 
compose the interactions and thus relinquish traditional ideas of compositional 
control in performance.  
 
We may see these compositional practices as being precisely aligned with a more 
general decentring of the self that lies at the heart of cybernetic ontology. Andrew 
Pickering attests: “Cybernetic models of the brain, and understandings of the self, 
point immediately to a decentring of the mind and the self […] the cybernetic 
preoccupation with adaptation has continuously eroded the modern understanding 
of the bounded, self-contained, and self-moving individual. Instead, one has the 
image of the brain and the self as continuously bound up with the world and 
engaged in the process of coupled becomings. […] [This conception places the] 
emphasis on undoing the modern self for the sake of an awareness of being, instead, 
part of a larger whole” (Pickering, 2011). Furthermore, the assistive technology 
paradigm associated with cybernetic machines sees the machine as a partner in 
endeavours, rather than merely a tool. Thus, if machines are viewed as partners in 
creative projects, it is possible to see a clear decentring. In the 
human/machine/environment paradigm of cybernetics, no one entity can claim 
entire authorship.  
 
One further comment on this element of cybernetic composition should be noted, 
namely that there is reluctance on the part of some composers to relinquish the 
dominant agency of the composer in the creation of their musical works. This may be 
seen in Eno’s insistence on embellishment, once the systemic process is completed, in 
order that the work is moulded to live up to his desired aesthetic standard, or in 
Lucier’s insistence that the technological process had little to do with the outcome of 
his compositions. Two observations can be made here: firstly, those who have made 
composition their lifework may not want to relinquish some of their authorship for 
reasons of legacy, and perhaps in some cases, for copyright issues. Secondly, the role 
of the composer’s aesthetic is something that should not be ignored in cybernetic 
composition; it is just as valid as machine idiosyncrasies or environmental 
probabilistic elements. The cybernetic system is one that gives equal relevance to all 
parts of the system, as long as no one element is dominant it will conform to 
cybernetic principles. On this point it is worth reiterating that cybernetic composers 
do not intentionally imbue their work with meaning. Cybernetic music does not take 
the audience through a constructed, narrative, emotional journey, as is the intention 
of much composition in the Western art tradition. Instead, meaning is an emergent 
property of the music, which may be freely interpreted by an audience. Here again, 
in this recognition of how meaning is made in cybernetic composition, we can see a 
decentring of the composer. 
  
7.1.4. The Inclusion of the Environment in Composition 
 
The recognition of the role of the environment in cybernetic music is central to the 
compositional ethos. This aspect may be seen in the Barrons’ analogue circuits, 
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which were operationally sensitive to environmental conditions. It is also apparent in 
Lucier’s compositional systems, which transmute information from the human, 
through technology, into the environment and back again, and again in Eno’s 
ambient music, which mingles with environmental sound to create the finished 
work. In cybernetic terms, all entities are situated in environments; they evolve from 
these environments and are inseparable from their contexts. It is through interactions 
with an environment that entities come to be and all learning and cognition are 
formed as a symbiotic coupling with an environment.  
 
In terms of cybernetic music, this fundamental relationship with the environment 
may be considered in a number of different ways. Firstly, it is important to 
remember that cybernetic conceptions of the environment stem from Norbert 
Wiener’s original inspiration for cybernetics, in particular the fundamental 
probabilistic properties of the universe and the ontology of unknowability that this 
precipitates (Wiener, 1948). This worldview lies at the root of much of the 
subsequent cybernetic enquiry leading to the ‘order from noise’ principle (Ashby, 
1947; and Von Foerster, 1960), autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980), and a 
performative model of cognition (Von Glasersfeld, 1999).  
 
To embrace these concepts in composition means to recognise that probabilistic 
processes are at play in the compositional act. If applied to traditional conceptions of 
composition this would mean that a composer would recognise that all the factors in 
the compositional process, from the placing of notes on paper to the work’s 
realisation by an orchestra, are subject to probabilistic processes, and 
acknowledgement of this fact would be made apparent throughout the 
compositional process and also in the playing of the work. As we may discern from 
the orchestral example above, almost all of the probabilistic processes active within 
this conception stem from interaction with an environment, from what a composer 
might have listened to before writing the composition, to the temperature in the 
concert hall microtonally affecting the instrument tuning (or for that matter whether 
a butterfly flapped its wings in Brazil!) – and thus an inexorable link between 
interacting with environmental conditions and probabilistic processes may be seen. 
Of course, in practice, all traces of probabilistic processes are conceptually expunged 
from all stages of this type of compositional process, despite their inevitable 
existence. However, recognition of probabilistic processes is the purview of much 
experimental music (and, for that matter, the music of pre-literate societies and many 
types of folk music (Cee, 2010)).  
 
In his paper “Generating and Organizing Variety in the Arts” (Eno, 1976), Brian Eno 
draws distinctions between types of music that mirror biological systems, which he 
distinguishes as being cybernetic, and those that do not, in other words, those that 
recognise environmental and probabilistic processes, and those that deny their 
existence. This definition links the modelling of biological processes in composition 
with the consideration of environmental conditions and thus we may view this facet 
as being an important conceptual standpoint in cybernetic composition. The 
conceptual linking of biological modelling with environmental processes is 
important, as not all cybernetic music systems appear to have a direct physical 
coupling with the environment (as might be exemplified by a microphone providing 
the sound source for a real-time composition). However, all these conceptions 
conform to a biological modelling paradigm that recognises probabilistic processes 
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and therefore an environmental paradigm has been evoked. The Barrons’ conception 
of biological modelling in their circuit design is an apposite example of the evoking 
of an environmental paradigm. 
 
Furthermore, one may consider that where a direct coupling with a real 
environmental space is not utilised, the composer will often attach additional 
conceptual environmental concerns to the piece. Examples here would be Eno’s 
requirement that his music should be low in volume and mingle with the 
environment, Brün’s desire for a usurping of the expectation of his audience so that 
meaning may be interpreted more freely (a contextual environment), and the 
Barrons’ music being considered as both sound-effects and music, thus mingling 
non-diegetic music with the diegetic sounds of the film’s environment. 
 
Secondly, in terms of traditional composition, probabilistic processes and 
environmental conditions are conceptually viewed as errors that must be erased to 
conform to a platonic idea of a perfect form. Conversely, from a cybernetic 
viewpoint, error is the process by which living organisms learn. Adapting to error 
makes organisms flexible and reflexive (Beer, 1972). Thus, conceptually, in designing 
cybernetic music systems, we must consider the incorporation of error. In cybernetic 
terms, we must consider this concept in relation to variety and noise. According to 
Ashby's law of requisite variety (Ashby, 1956), in order to be self-reflexive, any 
machine or organism must be able to adequately encapsulate all the information it 
receives from an environment in order to process, adapt, and react to it: an 
organism’s internal variety must be equal to the external variety it is presented with 
(Ashby, 1956). Variety in any given environment may be very high and contain a lot 
of informational noise, thus an organism’s receptors must be able to adequately 
capture a full range of environmental signals and must at the same time be able to 
filter out unwanted noise. It is also required to amplify quiet signals when necessary 
(Beer, 1972).  
 
In order to understand how the cybernetic concept of variety might manifest itself 
practically in electronic music terms, it is useful to consider an audio processing 
device known as a compressor. A compressor is a non-linear amplifier that attenuates 
loud signals and amplifies quiet signals. It utilises a transfer function to determine 
the threshold volume of sounds that need to be attenuated or amplified and it 
performs this task automatically, as the audio signal is passed through it, to maintain 
an even volume. Compression is used ubiquitously in popular music production to 
produce a consistent volume level, despite the possibly large variation in the 
dynamics that may exist in an original recording. However, the use of compression 
on quiet signals can often contain a large amount of ambient noise as this sonic 
element is also amplified, along with the pertinent, quiet sounds in the environment. 
In practice, in order to reduce the noise that may be enhanced by the use of 
compression, the threshold of the transfer function has to be set in such a way as to 
produce the maximum level of the pertinent signal with the least noise. Therefore a 
degree of tuning is essential in attaining the desired result. Thus we may see the 
concept of variety in action in audio technology, where signals can be amplified or 
suppressed, and with the correct threshold setting, with the minimum amount of 
noise. It is also interesting to consider that signals that contain a lot of noise are much 
more prevalent in popular music recordings than in recordings of say classical 





In a cybernetic music system ‘error’ or noise can be utilised in a number of ways: In 
the Barrons’ case, the instability of the operation of their circuits would produce 
unintended sonorities. In Eno’s case the unpredictability of the Koan software would 
produce compositional structures that could not be pre-imagined by the composer, 
and in Di Scipio’s case the ambient ‘noise’ of the environment produced probabilistic 
compositional determinants. In Di Scipio’s case, the environmental coupling of the 
composition is perhaps the most organic conception of the use of error or noise in the 
compositional process. Here the noise of the sound itself provides the data for the 
recursive control mechanism operating internally in the computer.   
 
In terms of cybernetic composition, it is worth considering how such a recursively 
coupled system might operate autonomously and also allow a composer to interact 
with it in real time. In this conception a composer would manipulate incoming 
signals using DSP and then react to the resultant audio in order to adapt the overall 
sonic output to produce a desirable outcome. In the cybernetic conception of such a 
design the computer would also be required to operate autonomously if required. To 
facilitate this autonomous functionality, criterions of stability (C of S) (Ashby, 1952; 
and Beer, 1972) would need to be set in the DSP in order that these audio processors 
may react to external conditions in the desired way. In implementation, these C of S 
would be threshold switches (just like the transfer function in the compressor), 
which would be set, usually through tuning when embedded in an environmental 
setting, to a threshold of ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ of any given element, in order that a 
set of operational parameters may be defined for DSP functions that control or 
modulate elements of a composition (for example, changes in amplitude, frequency 
content, note density, etc.). So, in this model of a cybernetic compositional system, 
error (and the testing of it in a tuning process) performs a function in how a system 
learns to adapt to its environment to produce a musical piece that falls within a class 
of goals, rather than a fixed result. Error can never be expunged from such a system 
and often errors can be a useful source of unpredictability and innovation in the 
resultant soundscape.  
 
One final point must be made in relation to the role of the environment in cybernetic 
composition: in the design described above, sound is captured from the environment 
and manipulated via DSP processes and subsequently fed back directly into the 
environment in an on-going feedback process. This recursive coupling is perhaps the 
most vital form of cybernetic composition as it most accurately models how living 
organisms achieve autopoiesis. In this conception of cybernetic composition, the 
environment is not a theoretical construct or modelled representation, but a real 
environment reacting to sound in real time. As Di Scipio notes, in his ecosystemic 
model, “sound is the interface” (Di Scipio, 2003). However, it must be noted that in 
Di Scipio’s system, the human is somewhat removed from the 
human/machine/environment paradigm, as the system is fully automated during 
performance. Thus a spectrum of environmental coupling within cybernetic 
composition may be considered, with Brün’s closed-system computer compositions 





7.1.5. A Systemic Human/Machine/Environment Design Ethos, 
which Necessitates the Composing of Interactions rather than 
Interactive Composing 
 
The use of systemic processes in modern composition, particularly those that utilise 
technology, is pervasive. However, what must be considered here is the specific type 
of system utilised in cybernetic composition and how it differs from traditional 
approaches to composing music with technology. In examining such a system it is 
perhaps pertinent to consider what is meant by ‘music’ in this context. In terms of 
cybernetic composition, music is an emergent property of the interaction of 
structural elements at play within the composition. This musical result is not 
preordained (particularly not by notation), but instead falls within ‘a class of goals’, 
the scope of which is determined by an heuristic conception (think of Pask’s 
Musicolour machine getting ‘bored’ and adapting its behaviour accordingly). In 
practical terms, an heuristic can be modelled via a matrix of interactions and 
criterions of stability that can determine the internal state of a system in relation to 
external conditions. For example, a change in state a in the environment alters the 
condition of modulator b in the computer, which, via the matrix, in turn alters the 
state of modulators c & d, the resultant sound of which is fed back into the 
environment and thus changes state e here, which in turn changes the state of 
modulator c, which then alters the state of modulators a & d, and so on. This matrix 
design of interactions is not arbitrary, but the result of carefully worked-out 
composition, the purpose of which is the production of emergent properties that may 
be considered as music. The compositional emphasis in cybernetic music is on the 
design of these interactions and how they might respond to environmental factors 
and manipulation by a composer in real-time performance.  
 
This emphasis on ‘process over product’ and music as an emergent property of a 
system can be seen in the work of all the composers considered in this thesis, ranging 
from Brün’s modular ‘sawdust’ process26 	producing emergent sonorities in his 
computer compositions, through Kayn’s intricate modular patching matrices 
producing homeostatic soundscapes, to Di Scipio’s emphasis on composing 
interactions as opposed to interactive composing.   
 
In his 2003 journal article “Sound is the interface: from interactive to ecosystemic 
signal processing” (Di Scipio, 2003), Di Scipio makes some useful distinctions 
between traditional interactive, real-time compositional models and the cybernetic 
model. He states that in the traditional real-time compositional model the human 
performer is the only agent capable of altering the internal state of the computer 
device, and is thus the only element in the system that closes the feedback loop from 
environment to the machine. The problem in this model for Di Scipio is that the 
recursive coupling is only made possible by the agent performer. If he/she is 
removed from the system, it leaves only a linear information flow, from the machine 
to the environment. Furthermore, he expresses his frustration that this linear design 
ontology is “the only way we may think of when speaking of such things as ‘live 





new compositional model, one in which the computer is able to register its own 
internal state and affect the sound world in the environment in real time, with no 
interaction from a human agent necessary in performance. In this model, the 
composition occurs prior to the performance, but instead of this being a matter of 
notes on paper, it takes the form of the technological design of interactions that 
determine the emergent properties in the performance.  
 
One criticism of Di Scipio’s ecosystemic approach in relation to this thesis and 
cybernetic music more generally is that it makes the composer somewhat redundant 
in performance and thus the cybernetic/assistive symmetry of human/machine/ 
environment is broken and consequently the role of agent-performer is significantly 
diminished. In criticising standard interactive composition, Di Scipio states:  
 
“On a closer look, the role of the agent-performer appears itself ambivalent 
(no criticism implied), in that it is the only signifier of the system’s external 
conditions and, at the same time, it represents an internal component of the 
overall meta-system including man, machine and environment. Indeed, in 
this common notion of interaction, the agent is indeed the interface between 
the computer and the environment, and, at the same time, it is the only 
source of energy and change” (Di Scipio, 2003). 
 
This critique of a linear design ontology is valid from a cybernetic standpoint, in that 
the machine has very little agency in the systemic design. Furthermore, Di Scipio 
implies that in this conception, there is a systemic imbalance in the role of the human 
agent; she/he is at once the only source of energy and change, but is also an integral, 
internal component of the system. There are some instances in which this linear 
design ontology can yield more equilibrium in the human/machine/environment 
symmetry. Firstly, where sound flows through the environment and back into the 
system in a recursive coupling (via an audio feedback loop), the environment has 
much more agency in the performance. Secondly, where the computer interface is 
designed with inbuilt complexity (for example, a myriad of choices of elements of 
change, engendering more variety or noise, in Ashby’s terms), the human performer 
gains less agency in the shape of the musical output, and thirdly, where the 
performer’s conscious agency is somehow diminished via the interface with the 
electronic system (in the use of brainwaves to drive a performance, for example). In 
each of these conceptions of Di Scipio’s linear design ontology, the 
human/machine/environment symmetry is rebalanced so that the system becomes 
less of a subservient tool for producing fixed results and more of a systemic process 
for driving process and pointing toward new discoveries.  
 
It should also be noted that in Di Scipio’s ecosystemic design, the human interaction 
with the system takes place before the performance and is thus similar to traditional 
composition; in the ecosystemic conception, notes on paper have been replaced by 
the design of interactions. However, Di Scipio does leave open the possibility of 
human interaction by an agent-performer in the ecosystemic model, in his triangular 
recursive connection model (Fig. 23, on page 123 of this thesis; Di Scipio, 2003), and it 
is the contention of this thesis that this open model, one that includes an agent-
performer in the ecosystemic model, is a more cybernetic conception of musical 
composition – one in which the machine is an equal partner to the human agent in 
the compositional process.  
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7.1.6. Compositional Design based on Feedback or Recursive 
Coupling 
 
Feedback is a central cybernetic mechanism. Without acknowledgement of this 
phenomenon, or its actual use as a central element, a compositional system cannot be 
considered cybernetic. A cybernetic system must form a feedback loop between 
human, machine and environment and in its ultimate conception these elements 
must be reclusively coupled in such a way that change in one component affects all 
the others. Embracing feedback in this way is also recognition of the phenomenon of 
circular causality, as opposed to traditional cause-and-effect paradigms. This has 
implications in composition in terms of the human/machine/environment design 
ethos, the necessity of the inclusion of the environment in composition, and (in the 
recognition of circular causality) the decentring of the composer. We may see 
examples of feedback processes in all the composers examined in this thesis: in Louis 
Barron’s feedback circuits; in the ‘slow-motion’ feedback process of Alvin Lucier’s I 
am sitting in a room, not to mention the circular causality implicit in Music for Solo 
Performer; in Brün’s theory of anticommunication, which emphasises a feedback loop 
between audience and music in performance; in Roland Kayn’s recursive coupling 
between sound creation and sound control; in Gordon Pask’s adaptive learning 
machines; in Brian Eno’s network of interactions in his use of the Koan software; and 
finally, in Agostino Di Scipio’s ecosystemic design, in which recursively coupled 
sound becomes the interface.  
 
Design and manipulation of feedback processes is probably the most potent device in 
cybernetic composition. Recognising and controlling the feedback loops in a 
compositional system has the greatest potential for creating self-sustaining and 
reflexive musical systems, ones that are ‘aware’ of their own internal states and 
recognise and respond to changes in the environment to organise sound elements in 
real time in order to create music.  
 
As has been noted previously in this thesis, both positive and negative feedback can 
be used in the design of cybernetic systems; one creates exponential possibilities, the 
other controls them, and thus a state of equilibrium with an environment can be 
achieved. In cybernetic compositional terms, positive and negative feedback is 
utilised via DSP processes in the computer that react to sound in the environment 
and shape the overall parameters of a composition. Again, Di Scipio makes some 
useful distinctions as to how DSP process may be utilised, via feedback mechanisms, 
in shaping the sound of a cybernetic composition. These include functions that 1) 
compensate (reduce the amplitude of audio inputs); 2) follow (copy the value of a 
given value, sometimes with a time delay); 3) control redundancy (to increase the 
number of grains output, thereby increasing the intensity of the overall sound); and 
4) control concurrency (support a contrasting sonic feature, e.g. boost low 
frequencies when high frequencies are prominent) (Di Scipio, 2003). Di Scipio utilises 
bespoke granular processing in order to achieve these control mechanisms. However 
if we apply cybernetic principles, this shaping of the soundscape via feedback 
mechanisms is a question of variety management – as employed in Beer’s VSM (Beer, 
1972) – and in terms of cybernetic composition, may be achieved with any number of 
DSP processors, including ‘off-the-shelf’ audio ‘plug-ins’ that are to be found in the 
majority of sequencing software packages, such as filters, compressors, envelope 
	
	 137	
followers, distortion, delay, etc. However, most musical sequencing packages are 
strictly linear (in playback terms) and therefore recursive coupling is not possible in 
such a system. Thus software systems that allow for recursive coupling in real-time 
performance must be sought (the author’s solution in most instances is either 
Ableton Live or Max/MSP, but many more ‘open-ended’ sound-design and 
organisation software packages are available on the market). In order to allow for 
recursive coupling to take place, the ability for audio to be recorded and played back 
in real time must be available. Furthermore, the capacity to measure particular 
aspects of the incoming audio data must also be available (e.g. amplitude, frequency, 
spatial characteristics, etc.), and the ability to link this data to DSP control parameters 
must also be possible, so that internal automatic manipulations based on external 
conditions can take place. The ability for a composer to interface with the computer 
(usually via a control surface) is also preferable in order that the dynamics of the 
system may be altered in real time, and ‘pushed’ in desirable directions. 
 
In this conception of a cybernetic music system, feedback is the driver of the design 
ethos and careful consideration of this precept is essential to successful design.  
 
7.1.7. Ontological Theatre – Heideggerian Revealing  
 
Finally, we arrive at the underlying purpose of undertaking composition in the 
cybernetic mode, namely that it might reveal facets of true ‘being’, in the 
Heideggerian sense. This could easily be viewed as a hyperbolic enterprise – why 
should it be the purview of composition to achieve such a lofty aim? Nonetheless, 
when we consider that all the composers in this study have a quiet preoccupation 
with ‘being’, this proposition begins to take on a different inflection. Much of this 
pensiveness stems from the ontological questions posed by enquiry into the 
modelling of biological systems and the themes of emergence and becoming that 
surround this enquiry. In Brian Eno’s case, this preoccupation centres around how 
“things come into being” (Whittaker, 2003) in the emergent forms his generative 
music systems precipitate. In Alvin Lucier’s case it is manifest in his expounding of 
W.C. Williams quotation, “no ideas, but in things” (Harder and Rusche, 2013). In 
Roland Kayn’s case, this aspect manifests itself in the mode of listening that 
cybernetic music engenders, where “existential being, as it were, takes the place of a 
logically functioning consciousness” (Kayn, 1977), and even in the Barrons’ very 
grounded approach, the preoccupation with creating synthetic life demonstrates a 
concern with ontological questions.  
 
It is not unsurprising that composers who are influenced by cybernetics demonstrate 
a concern with ontology, as cybernetics itself demonstrates this preoccupation at a 
fundamental level. However, the specific ‘black box’ ontology of unknowability that 
is synonymous with cybernetics leads to a performative worldview, one in which we 
may only know the world through interaction with it. Consequently, all designers of 
cybernetic artefacts (we might think of Norbert Wiener’s Hearing Glove, Ross 
Ashby’s Homeostat, or Gordon Pask’s Musicolour Machine) are directly engaged in 
demonstrating some facet of how the world might work. Thus, as Andrew Pickering 
points out, cybernetic projects stage ontological theatre for us. It therefore follows 
that we should consider cybernetic composers in the same light as cybernetic 
machine builders, with their compositions being stagings of ontological theatre that 
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demonstrate some facet of how the world might work in practice. Here, we also see 
the employment of metaphor as design ethos, the idea that these works are 
metaphors for facets of the way the world might work if we adopt a cybernetic 
ontology.   
 
As has been demonstrated many times in this thesis, this innate capacity to stage 
ontological theatre chimes strongly with Heidegger’s conception of technology’s 
capacity to reveal ‘true being’. Heidegger asserts that technology is intertwined with 
our being; it comes from us and is inexorably tied to our existence. Nonetheless, it is 
a destructive force that conceals true being. However, if we are able to participate in 
technology in a more radical way and thus usurp its intentionality in some respect, 
then we may combat its enframing power and thus reveal facets of true being. So, 
whether intentional or not, all cybernetic composers are engaged in Heideggerian 
revealings as they practically create cybernetic artefacts (musical works realised via 
technological means) that stage ontological theatre for us. We can recognise this facet 
in all of the cybernetic composers examined in this thesis, from Louis Barron’s 
biologically derived circuits, through Eno’s generative systems, to Di Scipio’s 









































































8.1 Oscilloscope – Cybernetic Principles and 
Sonic Ecosystems 
 
Please note: An example recording of Oscilloscope, the computer animation and software files 
can be found on the materials accompanying this thesis. 
 
Oscilloscope is an ecosystemic installation piece incorporating sound and computer 
graphics that was realised in collaboration with Adam Collis who programmed the 
computer animation. The piece was originally designed for the launch night of 
Coventry’s UK City of Culture Bid for 2021 and was first presented at Warwick 
Business School at the Shard in London in June 2015. It was also presented at the 
International Computer Music Conference in Utrecht in September 2016.  
 
The practical design was inspired by the work of two composers examined 
previously in this thesis – namely Brian Eno and Agostino Di Scipio. The generative 
music system was inspired by Brian Eno’s non-contiguous loops, which he utilised in 
tape-based compositions such as “2.1” from Music For Airports (1978). 27  The 
interactive elements of the composition took inspiration from Di Scipio’s ecosystemic 
design ethos, which is exemplified by his AESI project.28 Despite the different idioms 
that these practitioners work in, there are conceptual commonalities in the generative 
music of Brian Eno and the musical ecosystems of Agostino Di Scipio. The work of 
both these artists is influenced by principles of cybernetics, in particular the notion of 
‘emergence’, where the composer’s role is not in designing outcomes but in 
designing systems, whose component interactions produce desirable outcomes. A 
synthesis of these ideas is applied in the design of Oscilloscope. This design ethos 
demonstrates how a system that is relatively simple technologically and has fairly 
trivial initial sonic and visual material can be tuned to produce interactions that 
generate complex results and provide a rich, engaging experience for the audience.  
 
In Oscilloscope, measurements of light from the environment (as opposed to 
measurements of environmental sound in the AESI) feed information to the 
computer about changes in light intensity in the external environment. This 
transduction of light information from the environment is cybernetic in its use of 
metaphor to be found in the mapping of one system onto another; in this case, 
changes in light map to the movement in computer graphics and sequential and 
tonal changes in the soundscape. However, it is important to state that this mapping 
is not of the linear cause-and-effect variety, but is instead achieved through a matrix 
of interactions that also link elements of the animation and music software, thus 
mirroring the mapping in the AEIS, which pertains to a cybernetic modelling of 












8.1.1 The Cybernetic Influence of Eno, Di Scipio and Xenakis on 
the Composition of Oscilloscope.  
 
While both Eno and Di Scipio have explicitly cited cybernetics as an influence on 
their work (Eno in Whittaker, 2003; Di Scipio, 2003), they have also made overt 
reference to other composers who have utilised cybernetic techniques that have 
influenced their compositional process. Of particular interest to the development of 
Oscilloscope is the fact that both composers build on compositional ideas espoused 
by Xenakis (Eno in Whittaker, 2003; Di Scipio, 1997 and 2003). 
 
As examined in chapter 6.3 Xenakis endeavored to “generalize the study of musical 
composition with the aid of stochastics” (Xenakis, 1963). To this end he utilised the 
methodology found in W. Ross Ashby’s 1956 book, An Introduction to Cybernetics 
(Kollias, 2008). From his reading of Ashby’s work, Xenakis proposed that “second 
order sonorities” could emerge from the interactions of sonic grains: that 
interactions of grains over time in the compositional process, at a “micro level”, 
would form emergent timbres and compositional gestures at the “macro level”. 
Although both Eno and Di Scipio have criticised Xenakis’ approach (Eno in 
Whittaker, 2003; Di Scipio, 1997), the idea that emergent (musical) behaviour at a 
macro level can arise from composed interactions at a micro level underpins both 
composers’ working methods and the design ethos of the music and computer 
graphics in Oscilloscope.  
 
At root, both Eno and Di Scipio share the desire to create autonomous musical 
systems that are modelled on the way in which living systems generate complexity, 
which can also manifest as emergent behaviours. Both composers reject the linear 
design ontology of the majority of interactive computer music systems in favour of 
ecosystemic systems design 29 – a constructivist ethos in which the design of 
interactions of a system’s components, prior to performance, takes precedence over 
a macro musical design, shaped by a composer during a performance in real time. 
Di Scipio notes that, “this is a substantial move from interactive music composing to 
composing musical interactions” (Di Scipio, 2003). 
 
As highlighted in chapter 6.2, Eno first encountered cybernetics as an art student in 
Ipswich in the early 1960s under the tutelage of Roy Ascott. He later read Stafford 
Beer’s book Brain of the Firm (1972), from which he has quoted extensively and 
which he has used as a justification for his compositional approach (Pickering, 
2011). Thus we may see a preoccupation with systemic design, one based on 
cybernetic theory, in Eno’s compositional process. Andrew Pickering believes that 
the cybernetic systems that Eno utilises in this compositions “can thematise for us 
and stage an ontology of becoming, which is what Eno’s notion of riding the 
systems dynamics implies” (Pickering, 2011).  In addition, Eno observes that this 
type of compositional system generates “a huge amount of material and experience 
from a very simple starting point” (Eno, 1997), further emphasising the cybernetic 







Eno’s generative music systems have been realised by a number of different 
technological means, including the VCS3 synthesiser, analogue tape manipulation, 
and the Koan generative music software. The method emulated in this composition 
takes inspiration from Eno’s tape-based composition “1/2”, from the album Music 
for Airports (1978). As examined in chapter 6.2, the design of “1/2" consists of 
individual vocal sounds (wordless ‘aaahh-sounds’ in the key of F Minor), recorded 
onto separate lengths of tape between fifty and seventy feet long (Sheppard, 2008). 
These tape loops were then played back simultaneously, but not synchronously, 
and the results were recorded to multi-track tape. The timing of the piece, of when 
each vocal sound would play, was determined by the length of each tape loop, 
meaning that notes would at times coalesce to form chords and shifting melodies 
and at other times there would only be individual notes or silence. In Oscilloscope, 
an analogue of Eno’s tape based has been designed in the Ableton Live software. 
This construction will be examined in section 8.1.3. of this chapter.  
 
Di Scipio’s design ethos is one that encompasses the environment in the 
human/machine interaction, and thus embraces a tenet that is central to the 
cybernetic ontology. In Di Scipio’s conception of ecosystemic design, which he 
implements in the AESI, the structure should be capable of being a ‘self-observing 
system’ (independent from an agent/performer), one that is capable of tracking 
what happens both externally and internally and making adjustments accordingly. 
The system is an environmentally coupled feedback loop, meaning that when 
changes occur in the state of the environment, they are registered by the computer, 
which then alters its own internal state in response to external environmental 
conditions. These internal changes are then played out into the environment and 
thus an on-going feedback process is established. In the AEIS, interaction is no 
longer in the form of “agent acts, computer reacts”, as is the case in the traditional 
linear model of electronic music performance (Di Scipio, 2003). The flow of energy 
in the system is no longer one-way (i.e. from the composer, via the computer, in real 
time); energy may be derived from the environment and a composition may be self-
sustaining, with little real-time input from a composer/performer. 
 
The influence of Di Scipio’s AESI is reflected in this composition in the design of the 
environmental interactions, which drive the tempo and the structure of the musical 
composition and the accompanying computer graphics. The influence of the AESI 
design is examined in section 8.1.4, later in this chapter. 
 
8.1.2 System Design and Implementation  
 
Oscilloscope is an installation featuring sound and computer animations generated in 
real time in response to image data from the installation’s environment captured by 
a camera. The original animation was made in Apple’s Quartz Composer software, 
which reads image data from an attached camera, and from which individual pixel 
data is used to stimulate the movement of the graphics, as well as for controlling the 




Subsequently, however, the generation of the graphics has been changed so that it is 
now performed in Processing 330. Inter-application communication is achieved using 
Open Sound Control. In the system design shown in Figure 25 (above), we may see 
that Computer 1 reads in image data from a USB webcam and reads pixel values 
using Apple’s Quartz Composer software. Within Quartz Composer, this data 
increments the phase of sinusoidal functions, the outputs of which are sent via OSC 
to Processing 3, which generates the visuals to be projected. At the same time, when 
the outputs of these functions reach threshold values, trigger messages are sent via 
OSC to the second computer running Ableton Live in order to play or stop looped 
tracks (Collis and Pickles, 2016). 
 
In the development of the piece, the generative computer animation was designed 
prior to the music and the interactive systems that would link the sound and music 
to changes in the environment. Consequently, the audio material selected for the 
composition reflected the emergent properties of the computer animation, which 
was visually akin to a jellyfish swimming through an ocean, thus the sampled 
sound utilised was metaphorically linked to water to reflect this aesthetic.   
 
8.1.3 Audio Implementation 
The emulation of Eno’s tape-based system is achieved using the Ableton Live 
software. Loops of tape are substituted with non-contiguous loops of audio 
samples, which, when played simultaneously, never repeat the same sequence 
twice. Thus a complex, laminar, and ephemeral composition emerges. The sound 
materials that make up these loops reflect the aesthetics of the visuals.  
Fig. 26 (below) shows a screen shot from the Ableton Live software running the 
Oscilloscope composition. At the top left hand side of the screen we can see the 
Tempo, which is linked via Open Sound Control to the speed of oscillation of the 
animation; as the animation speeds up, so does the tempo. In the middle of the 
screen we can see a matrix of audio clips, which are triggered to play or stop 
depending on changes of levels of light in the environment. At the bottom right of 
the screen we may see inside one of the clips being played. What can be observed 
here is a MIDI piano roll with one note, which will be triggered to play after 19 bars 




Some materials have been removed due 
to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester 
Library - Coventry University.
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Fig. 26. Screenshot of Ableton Live software running the Oscilloscope composition. 
 
Each clip is designed to trigger a sample to play at a predesigned time between 0 
and 40 bars once it has been triggered by changes in light intensity in the 
Environment. This process mirrors Eno’s tape loop compositions as each clip is a 
loop and each loop is non synchronous. Therefore, just as is the case with Eno’s 
compositional system in “2.1” (from Music For Airports, 1978), no two performances 
of a piece are the same.  
 
Fig.27. Example of contents of an Ableton clip in the Oscilloscope composition 
 
Many of the samples are also subject to real-time digital signal processing 
techniques, which are controlled by automated control envelopes. The speed at 
which the envelopes move through their control cycle is determined by the tempo 
and thus changes with alterations in overall light intensity. Thus, through these 
structured interactions, an autonomous autopoietic musical and visual system is 
achieved. 
 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 




Thus, the rate of change of individual sonic and visual components within the 
installation is constantly changing in response to light conditions in the surroundings 
as read by the camera. The speed of one loop of the visual material also determines 
the tempo of the sequencing software so that a higher speed will generate more 
triggering opportunities.  
 
 
Fig.30. Depicting the internal wiring of the ‘Macro patch’ in which a mapping of 12 light 
sources from the camera to MIDI controller data in Ableton Live can be seen (designed by 
Adam Collis 2016). 
 
It is important to state that the musical system in the Ableton Live software can 
operate in a generative way without linkage to the camera and the interactive 
systems. However, the interactive mapping to the camera system allows for a much 
more complex compositional structure and aesthetically interesting composition. 
Furthermore, the system does not have to be recursively coupled to function 
autopoietically. However, in performance, the system may be recursively coupled in 
some creatively interesting ways that represent a staging of ontological theatre. In its 
simplest arrangement, recursive coupling may be achieved by pointing the camera at 
the screen displaying the computer animation, with the sound being the audible 
traces of this interaction, or the camera may be pointed at performers (or dancers) 
who are moving and reacting to both the sound and the animation in a recursive 
way. A performance of this arrangement with the Oscilloscope system was achieved 
in practice with the dancer Polly Hudson at the Vivid Art Projects Space in 
Birmingham on 8 October 2015.  
 
 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 





8.2 Utilising Stafford Beer’s VSM as a basis for real-
time composition 
 
Self-regulation in musical systems is rarely considered, as generally, the composer is 
seen as the sole governing mechanism, author, and arbiter of the work of music. This 
is often the case even in works of music that utilise systemic processes or 
technologies and appear apposite for autopoietic conjecture. However, when a 
composer views technology as an equal partner in the compositional process, no one 
entity, be it human or machine, is solely in control of the compositional outcome, 
therefore the issue of how a piece regulates itself to produce a desirable outcome 
becomes a concern. In many real-time compositional paradigms, human, machine, 
and environment are at play within the music-making process and the complexity of 
the interactions also becomes a design consideration (Eigenfeldt, 2011). Thus, where 
self-regulation of an “exceedingly complex system” (Beer, 1994) is an issue it 
becomes useful to relate these matters to system models, in order to gain a better 
understanding of how self-regulation and autopoiesis may arise. The cybernetician 
Stafford Beer’s Viable Systems Model (VSM) is a representation of the functioning of 
the human nervous system. It was designed to demonstrate how a system may self-
regulate and remain stable despite complex external conditions. Beer reasoned that 
this model might be applied to any number of human systems to assist in their 
smooth running and self-regulation, thus reducing the need for managerial oversight 
or interference (Beer, 1994).   
 
The musical works Sin-Plexus (2013), with Daren Pickles (composer) and Nicholas 
Clifford (animator) and The Beast (2015), Daren Pickles (composer) Glenn Noble 
(Theatre Director), explore a number of cybernetic themes and utilise Beer’s Viable 
Systems Model as a framework for approaching real-time composition. The impetus 
for these pieces arose from the desire to create a works of organised sound utilising 
cybernetic means. Thus, the very simplest of initial starting conditions was desired in 
order to demonstrate the dynamics of the cybernetic system at play within the 
composition. The composer Robert Ashley states that feedback is “the only sound 
that is intrinsic to electronic music” (Ashley in Holmes, 2002). Feedback was 
therefore chosen as a non-divisible sound element, an innate building block with 
which to construct the sound world. The concept of feedback is also a founding 
principle of the science of cybernetics (Wiener, 1948). Feedback can either be positive 
(amplifying – as is the case with audio feedback), or negative (dampening – used as a 
mechanism of control in electronic, mechanical, or biological systems). Positive and 
negative feedback may be utilised so that a system may achieve homeostasis, a state 
of self-sustaining equilibrium in which positive feedback mechanisms amplify and 
enhance deficient areas, while negative feedback dampens and controls overactive 
parts. This homeostatic mechanism is at play within all living systems as they 
attempt to find an equilibrial balance with their environment (Beer, 1994).  
 
Beer’s 1972 book, Brain of The Firm, examines how models of living systems may be 
applied to human enterprises. The book was a formative influence on the musician 
and record producer, Brian Eno. Eno utilised cybernetic principles gleaned from 
Beer’s book to produce compositional systems, which have assisted and defined his 




Although it is clear from Eno’s essay, Generating and Organizing Variety in the Arts 
(Eno, 1976) that Eno has a comprehensive grasp of basic cybernetic principles and 
that he used cybernetic ideas as the foundation of a number of his most important 
compositions (Whittaker, 2003), it is also clear that his work does not fully exploit the 
models and ideas put forward in Beer’s Brain of The Firm (Beer, 1972). In interview, 
Eno discloses that he has not read widely on the subject of cybernetic theory, but that 
he has read and re-read BOTF many times and that this book forms the basis of his 
understanding in this area (Whittaker, 2003). It is also notable that Eno has utilised 
quotations and ideas from the book many times in interview and within his own 
work and writings,31 but that the extent of Eno’s extrapolation only appears to 
extend to part one of the book (Chapters 1 – 6). The first part of the book is an 
introduction to cybernetic theory, written in Beer’s idiosyncratic and charismatic 
style, covering topics such as feedback, elements of information theory, heuristics, 
and autopoiesis. However, Eno has never written, discussed, or implemented the 
mainstay of the subsequent theoretical content in BOTF, namely the Viable System 
Model. For the purposes of preparatory research for Sin-Plexus (2013) and The Beast 
(2015), a further extrapolation is made of the ideas Beer espouses in BOTF. 
Continuing where Eno left off, this chapter aims at furthering understanding of the 
Viable Systems Model, with the purpose of applying it in musical works.  
 
Beer’s Viable Systems Model is a facsimile of the functioning of the human nervous 
system and the body’s major organs. Beer uses this metaphor to map this 
functionality onto the workings of commercial business enterprises (hence the title of 
his book, Brain of the Firm). Beer states: “cybernetics is actually done by comparing 
models of complex systems with each other, and seeking the control features which 
appear common to them all” (Beer 1994). Furthermore, the eminent cybernetician 
Gordon Pask defines cybernetics as “the science of defensible metaphors” (Foerster, 
1992). So we may deduce that cyberneticians are seeking a meta-language of control 
that can be developed and applied in the design of analogous viable systems. Beer 
reasons that to be useful to human endeavours, effective systems must be utilised in 
this type of comparative analysis. Systems like animal ecologies are attractive as they 
demonstrate structural control principles that do not require an overall controller. 
They simply work by the balanced interaction of all the system’s parts. However, this 
system is too unpredictable and open to catastrophic uncertainties (drought, famine, 
earthquake, etc.). They can also be very slow to react to stimulus because they are not 
self-aware. Artificial kinds of ecologies, such as economic systems, are more 
attractive, as they contain many more self-aware elements. However, the most 
successful, self-aware systems known to us are living organisms, and in particular 
the human body, which is highly effective at reacting to complex variety while 






Fig. 33. Beer’s ‘Model of a Viable System’: Two dimensions of neurophysiological control – 
the main vertical command system (somatic) and the sympathetic and parasympathetic 
systems (automatic) (Beer, 1994) 
 
In Figure 33 (above) we can see the subdivision of some of the body’s systematic 
processes and an outline of the command and control structure. Here, subsystems 
that perform automatic functions can operate autonomously from the central 
command axis and, indeed, can ‘talk’ to each other informally and separately from 
the central command axis. They are linked by ‘sympathetic trunks’, which run 
parallel to the central command axis. These subsystem chains govern the stability of 
the internal environment; they are feedback integrators and regulators (Beer 1994). 
There are two control systems at work here: the ‘sympathetic nervous system’ (which 
equates in Beer’s metaphor to middle management), and the ‘parasympathetic 
nervous system’ (senior management). These controvert each other, often performing 
contradictive forms of control on the same organ. The sympathetic system runs on 
adrenalin, while the parasympathetic runs on another set of chemical impulses 
(cholinergic). These impulses have differing effects on different organs of the body, 
but one will act as a stimulator, while the other acts as an inhibitor. In this way, one 
system ‘checks’ the other and stability is achieved. So the automatic functions of the 
body have two ‘masters’. However, the parasympathetic system has a much larger 
connection to the brain and is able to enact conscious decisions. An example of this 
functionality would be the operation of the respiratory system, which operates 
automatically, but can respond to signals from higher up the command chain (e.g. 
Hold Breath). 
 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party 
copyright. The unabridged version can be viewed in 
Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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Fig. 34 The automatic system of a firm having subsidiaries A, B, C and D (Beer, 1994) 
 
Figure 34 (above) demonstrates Beer’s extrapolation of this neurophysiological 
model and its application in the modelling of a business enterprise. Here, each 
subsystem (1 through 5, and A to D) performs a different function within the 
enterprise. Subsidiaries A to D represent factories or manufacturing plants that 
directly engage with the outside environment. They deal with taking orders, 
manufacturing goods or services, and directly interfacing with the external 
environment in physically responding to demand. System 1 is responsible for the 
control of these subsidiaries; it provides the local management tools specific to each 
subsidiary. System 2 is an automated regulatory centre, which provides a local 
interaction between System 1 and its subsidiaries. This interconnection serves to 
regulate System 1 and its subsidiaries and acts as an interface with System 3. System 
2 prevents uncontrolled oscillations between the divisions and is designed to be 
automatic and therefore fast in response to changes in the environment. System 3 
performs the function of an operations directorate, overseeing the automatic 
functions of Systems 1 and 2, but providing the mechanisms and ability to override 
the automatic functioning should the need arise (for example, closing production in 
an unproductive division). It provides an interface between the ‘conscious’ decision-
making of the higher board level and the automatic functioning of the lower 
production levels. System 4 is the Development Directorate; it acts as the company’s 
‘eyes and ears’ and is able to recognise changes and patterns in the external 
environment. The information generated by System 4 feeds the highest level of 
decision-making. It also contains a map or model of the organism. System 5 takes 
decisions based on these perceptions. It is in effect senior management. System 5 is 
able to contain a representation of the sensory and motor information of the outside 
world generated by system 4. These two types of information (motor and sensory) 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd 
party copyright. The unabridged version can be 
viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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are connected in system 5 in a ‘sensorium’, which demonstrates an Ashby-type self-
returning homeostasis. And thus, the homeostatic loop between sensation and 
action, between affect and effect is closed. System 5 attempts at all times, with the 
service of System 4, to adjust its output to its latest input, based on the prognosis, 
which the input sensorium is able to generate by rapid time simulation. This is 
known as ‘foresight’ (Beer, 1994). 
 
The idea of systemic recursivity is also central to Beer’s model; in terms of command 
and control, each subsystem is systemically similar or identical, despite them 
performing differing physical functions. Subsystems may exist in series or parallel or 
(more integrally) in recursive hierarchies. For example, Subsystem 1 is incorporated 
into and forms part of Subsystem 2, which in turn forms part of System 3, and so on. 
At the top of this hierarchical chain sits the brain. Each subsystem may have its own 
‘language’ of control but each is systematically the same and fundamentally 
interlinked. However, it is important to note that command and control does not just 
reside in the brain, but is distributed throughout the system, so that the smallest of 
changes or decisions made at the ‘bottom’ of the hierarchical chain can effect the 
‘highest’ command and control mechanisms as well as vice versa. In management 
terms, the ‘inline’ chain of command means that each element in the chain has 
responsibility and is capable of making autonomous adjustments. It is also 
noteworthy that while the bodily system is self-contained, it also resides in greater 
systemic hierarchies, which constitute the outside environment. They also extend 
down into the realm of subatomic particles. This type of non-hierarchical command 
structure, involved in conscious decision-making, is also postulated in the book I Am 
a Strange Loop (Hofstadter, 2007) by the Professor of Cognitive Science, Douglas 
Hofstadter. 
 
Beer’s model of a viable system is an extrapolation of the control principles found in 
the human body, but it is also prescriptive, as a model of best practice for command 
and control structures within an enterprise. It is possible to apply this model to other 
organisational structures, as Beer does in Part 4 of this book, which is an application 
of his viable system model to the running of the Allende government in Chile from 
1971 to 1972. Unfortunately, project Cybersyn was never fully realised due to the 
toppling of the Allende government by a military coup-d’état in October 1972. 
However, the documentation of that implementation is provided in the book in some 
detail (Beer, 1994).  
 
For the purpose of the adaptation of Beer’s model for use in real-time composition, a 







enables interaction. Systems 4 and 5 form the perception and enactment of aesthetic 
judgments within the system. They are based on the pattern recognition of System 4 
and the perception of the effects of actions taken by System 5 on the external sound 
environment.  
 
This model allows for the possibility that all elements in the system may be 
completely automated. However, in terms of producing viable compositions, the 
pattern recognition of System 4 would have to be highly developed and the criteria 
of System 5 would need a strong technological, epistemological and ontological basis 
from which to operate. Beer does outline some of the mathematical basis that might 
underlie such a system, but development in this area is beyond the current scope of 
this research.32 It is therefore more consistent that Systems 1, 2 and 3 are wholly or 
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Fig. 36. The classification and function of effects processing in achieving stability  
 
It is also important to note that the classification and function of effects processing in 
achieving stability seen in Figure 36 (above) is made at the author’s discretion and as 
such is knowingly open to criticism and further study. These concerns are not the 
issue of this chapter, which is not intending to provide a fully prescriptive 
implementation of Beer’s Viable Model to musical composition, but to indicate the 
viability of the model mapping in practice and to indicate now this is done in the 
compositions in the subsequent chapters. Suffice to say that Beer’s model 
demonstrates that cybernetic analogies can be useful in the design of musical 
composition systems, especially those that utilise electronic technologies, seek self-
regulation, and require a meta-language beyond formal notation that speaks to what 












8.3 Sin-Plexus   
 
Please note that a recording of Sin-Plexus, the computer animation, recordings of rehearsal 
and development work and the Ableton Live session files can be found on the accompanying 




Sin-Plexus draws influence from a number of cybernetic themes, the primary focus 
being the cybernetic mechanism of feedback, both audibly and in control 
functionality, to facilitate musical composition. The initial musical inspiration came 
from feedback processes in Steve Reich’s Pendulum Music (1968) and Robert Ashley’s 
The Wolfman (1964), and a desire to reinterpret these ideas using modern computer 
technology. It was felt necessary to conceptually rid the composition of any 
extraneous affectation, similar to Alvin Lucier’s assertion that his main activity in 
composition is to eliminate all possibilities within a piece, leaving only the essential 
components (Harder and Rusche, 2013). In this instance, Lucier’s method of 
elimination for creative purposes pertained to using audio feedback as the sole 
sound source for the piece.  
 
In order to conceptualise how flows of information within the cybernetic musical 
system might be managed, Stafford Beer’s VSM (Beer, 1972) was adapted from its 
original conception as a cybernetic management model and implemented as a 
control framework for the composition. Use of this model offered the conceptual 
possibility of using methods of variety (in Ashby’s terms, Ashby 1952), suppression 
of unwanted ‘noise’, and the use of variety enhancers for desired signals. Certain 
DSP functions were utilised to perform the suppression and amplification controls. 
Di Scipio’s conception of the DSP functions utilised in his Audible Eco-Systemic 
Interface project (AESI) was used as a theoretical guide to the type of DSP that would 
be viable in enhancement or suppression of wanted or unwanted sound elements (Di 
Scipio, 2003). A dissemination of what may constitute as variety enhancing and 
variety reducing DSP can be found in Fig. 36 in the previous sub chapter (Chapter 
8.2). However, the proprietary DSP used by Di Scipio was not a possibility in this 
instance and therefore a set of standard manufacturers’ audio effects in the Ableton 
Live33, MAX for Live,34 and Native Instruments35software packages were utilised to 
provide similar functionality. Another structural design choice that differed from Di 
Scipio’s AESI was the utilisation of loops of audio, recorded during the performance 
and saved in the memory of the DAW as a basis for the structure of the composition. 
In the AESI, sound passes directly through the audio buffer and is manipulated in 
real time with little storage to memory. However, Brian Eno’s tape-looped 
compositions, especially Discreet Music (1975) were a more apposite model for Sin-
Plexus in so much as the non-contiguous, laminar structure of the tape-loops was 
highly analogous to the loops of recorded audio in Ableton live. Furthermore, the 
use of recorded loops also enabled the potential use of time manipulation, which is 








sensitivity. The environmental space also plays a major factor in the resultant 
feedback tone and therefore some ‘tuning’ of the feedback tone (moving the 
microphone differing distances from the speaker) may be required to gain the 
desired initial tone. The feedback tone is the first indication to the audience as to the 
mechanism of the systemic composition; i.e. that the entire piece is derived from 
feedback.  
 
The performer makes choices about when to record the feedback tone. This recording 
is then looped in the DAW and the performer chooses when to play this looped 
material back into the environment. Each loop has a series of DSP processing effects 
acting upon it that alter the sound of the recorded loop. Some effects are designed to 
‘enhance’ the signal and others are designed to ‘dampen’ and control the signal. This 
set of processes is signified in the VSM by System 1 (control procedures, in this case 
DSP effects) and System 2 (amplification and dampening control, in this case control 
information that operates the DSP effects), which can be seen in Fig. 35 from the 
previous sub chapter (chapter 8.2, P-156). Each loop, with the addition of audio 
processing, is played back into the environment via the speakers and further loops of 
the resultant audio are captured creating further layering, density, and complexity in 
the soundscape. The performer carries out these operations via the computer 
keyboard and a MIDI control surface, this represented by System 3 of the VSM, 
‘Automation command’ in Fig. 35 in the previous sub chapter (chapter 8.2, P-156). 
 
The perception and the choices made by the performer close the performance 
feedback loop and are represented by System 4 (composer’s perception) and System 
5 (composer’s decisions) in Fig. 35 (chapter 8.2, P-156). 
 
The system is designed to create complexity, operating with multiple layered loops 
and DSP manipulations occurring in real time. Many of the parameters of the DSP 
effects are also automated. The composer “rides the dynamics” (Beer, 1994) of this 
system and attempts to push the performance towards an aesthetically pleasing 
outcome. However, the computer and the acoustic environment are also active 
agents in this process, meaning that no one agent in the 
human/machine/environment system is solely responsible for the artistic outcome; 
each has agency within the performance, and each is tied together in a system of 
feedback loops. It is also important to note that the work is ephemeral; its outcomes 
are unpredictable and different in each iteration.  
 
8.3.3 Technological Compositional Structure 
 
In a performance of Sin-Plexus, the signal from the microphone is fed into the 
computer soundcard via an auxiliary (aux) output on the mixing desk (see Fig. 37, 
above). The signal is recorded into individual audio tracks in the Ableton Live 
software running on the computer, in loops of approximately 10 seconds duration. 
 
These audio loops can be seen on the left of the screen in Fig. 38 (below). The 
software continuously plays around the 10-second loop and further loops are 
recorded onto subsequent tracks so that a laminar soundscape is formed.  On the left 
of the screen the names of the individual can be seen (e.g. track 1) and to the left of 
the track name further functionality can be seen. For example in individual track 
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panning, volume, muting and routing. At the top of this column of tracks we can see 
that they are grouped together (in Group 1, seen on the right of the screen in Fig. 38). 
This grouping relates to the ‘malleable’ and ‘automated’ plug-in sets which are be 





















Fig. 38. Screen shot of Ableton Live software during a performance of Sin-Plexus. 
 
There are two distinct types of audio tracks that have been designed to be utilised in 
the performance of Sin-Plexus: a) those that have been designed to be utilised for real 
time manipulation by a performer, and which have been denoted as ‘malleable’ 
audio tracks as can be seen below in Fig. 39 (Below) and b) those that have been 
designed to manipulate the incoming audio with automated DSP plug-ins, as can be 
seen in Fig. 40 (Below). 
 
Fig.39. Example of plug-ins on ‘malleable’ audio tracks 
Fig.40. Examples of plug-ins on ‘automated’ audio tracks 
 
What follows is a brief description of the DSP plug-ins to be found on each type of 
audio track, their function and their basic use within the composition. It should be 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The 
unabridged version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry 
University.
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged 
version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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made clear that not all these plug-ins are employed at any one time or manipulated 
uniformly across each of the tracks. Rather, decisions are made in real time by the 
performer as to which plug-ins are to be engaged and when, and how they are to be 
manipulated based on the sound being emitted by the speakers. The plug-ins appear 
in the order they are placed in the audio chain and are as follows:   
 
a) The plug-ins on the ‘malleable’ audio tracks (Fig. 39, above) are all generic plug-
ins to be found in the Ableton Live Software: 1) Saturator: this is a simple 
gain/distortion effect, used to increase the volume on the incoming signal where 
necessary and on occasion to produce harmonic distortion. 2) Gate: this is used to cut 
out unwanted quiet passages. If the signal has repeated loud and quiet sections, or a 
succession of staccato transients, the gate may act to exaggerate the rhythmic 
qualities. 3) Dual Shifters: this effect is the combination of 2 pitch shifters set at an 
octave above and below the original signal; it also incorporates delay. This effect is 
used to enhance the incoming signal, adding depth and higher harmonics when 
required.  4) Utility: this is a further gain stage, should the signal require additional 
volume. 5) Resonators: this effect is a series of feedback delays, which oscillate at set 
pitches to create tonal harmonics, which can be mixed in with the original signal. In 
compositional use, this may add harmonic content to a non-pitched input, or create 
resonant chords or harmonies to augment pitched content. 6) Frequency Shifter: this 
effect alters the pitch of an input signal allowing for rapid and fluid pitch alteration, 
which, when used on a feedback tone, is akin to a Theremin-type sound.  It also has 
the capacity to pitch shift in ring modulation mode, which has an audible effect 
reminiscent of changing the channel on a shortwave or AM radio, or indeed akin to 
the sound of the Ring Modulators that Louis Barron employed in the soundtrack to 
Forbidden Planet. 7) Audio Filter: this is employed as a low pass or high pass filter to 
reduce or (via the addition of resonance) to boost higher harmonics. It also has an 
automated LFO, which may modulate the cut-off point and create rhythmic filter 
sweeping effects. 8) Auto Pan: this effect has an automated LFO, which may 
modulate the signal rhythmically between the left and right speakers, or the effect 
may be set to mono mode to create more direct rhythmic tremolo effects. Changing 
the LFO rate will determine the speed of the amplitude modulation pulses. 9) Beat 
Repeat: this effect samples small snippets of audio to repeat in succession. This 
repetition may occur on beats of a bar or at randomised intervals. It is used 
compositionally to create sporadic rhythmic punctuations. 10) Grain Delay: in terms 
of Sin-Plexus, this effect is used more than any other to ‘play’ the pitch of the 
incoming audio. There is an x/y controller, with frequency on the x-axis and pitch on 
the y-axis, and this is manipulated in real time to produce a playable pitch-orientated 
audio track. In addition, the signal may be broken into dispersed grains by 
increasing the ‘feedback’ and ‘spray’ settings.  
 
The plug-ins on the automated tracks (Fig. 40, above) are made by the Pluggo 
software company and are MAX for Live plug-ins: b) the plug-in chain is as follows: 
1) Wheat: this is a granular plug-in with many of the usual controls associated with 
granular processing, such as grain speed, crossfade, length and pitch. It also has an 
LFO, which, when employed in conjunction with the feedback tone and appropriate 
granular settings, creates pitch sweeps with strong rhythmic noise-like qualities. 2) 
Feedback Network: this effect creates random feedback times of varying pitches and 
amplitude tones. It also has a delay line and when used in conjunction with a 
recorded feedback tone is reminiscent of Robert Ashley’s The Wolfman (1964) and the 
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Barron’s soundtrack to Forbidden Planet (1956). 3) Harmonic Filter: this effect is an 
automated 25-band graphic equalizer. The automation of each individual frequency 
band is controlled by a cellular automata algorithm. 4) Dit Dit Dah: this is a 32-step 
sequencing effect that chops the audio into 32 individual triggered envelopes, which 
loop in a BPM sequence defined by the DAW. Individual envelopes can be turned on 
or off to create a stuttering staccato rhythm. 5) Audio Rate Pan: this is a sophisticated 
auto panner, which synchs to the audio rate and allows you to change the depth and 
frequency of auto panning. 6) Auto Pan: this is the same plug-in as used on the 
malleable audio track, but here it is used only to rhythmically chop up the sound 
when required.  
 
 
Fig.41. The Native Instruments Travelizer granular effect processor. 
 
In addition to the automated tracks, which predominantly contain automated effects 
designed by the company Pluggo, there are 3 further audio tracks. Each contains a 
granular effects processor made by Native Instruments and known as the Travelizer 
(Fig. 41 above), into which recorded audio can be loaded during a performance. This 
effects processor contains standard granular controls including the likes of grain 
speed, crossfade, and, length, but also automated pitch and grain position, which 
create movement and variety. It also contains a resonator, filter, delay and an x/y 
controller, which makes these parameters very accessible and mutable in real-time 
performance.   
 
The ratio of manual and automated effects were evenly distributed with the 
environmental factors at play within the composition, in order to reflect a balanced, 
human/machine/environment structure. Many granular plug-ins were also chosen 








Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The 
unabridged version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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8.3.4 Computer Graphics 
 
Fig.42. Two photographs of live performances of Sin-Plexus demonstrating the projection of 
computer graphics: ICMC, Aug. 2013, Perth, Australia (Left), Klangland Festival, April 
2014, Kassel, Germany. 
 
The emergent aesthetic properties of the soundscape form the artistic impetus for the 
accompanying computer graphics, which were designed by computer animator 
Nicholas Clifford. There was a desire to use the most basic graphic components, 
again to demonstrate the system at work within the composition. The overriding 
impression of the soundscape, particularly in the initial stages of the piece, is that the 
generated feedback tones are analogous to audible sine waves, which converge, 
overlap, and mutate into a complex web of interconnected sound elements. Thus the 
computer graphics utilise visual representations of sine and cosine waves that weave 
around each other to form a 3-D, circular, evolving knot that speeds up and slows 
down according to fluctuations in the sound amplitude of the piece. The computer 
animation was initially built in the Houdini computer animation software using the 
inputted equation: x=cos(t)*cos(t*time). The program was later adapted to be 
interactive for live performance using the Unity game engine. Here a performer may 
run the graphics in real time in conjunction with the music, and further direct the 
speed and movement of the graphics by touching an iPad screen. The combination of 
the audio and visual elements inspired the name of the piece: with ‘sin’ standing for 
sine waves, and plexus, meaning knot.  
 
The purpose of the visual element was to further demonstrate, via cybernetic means, 
how organised sound and graphics might emerge from exceedingly small initial 
inputs to create a complex and evolving soundscape and visual accompaniment, a 
process that reflects the workings of living organisms and demonstrates how order 








Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version can 
be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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8.3.5 Compositional Analysis  
 
Conceptually, not unlike Di Scipio’s AESI pieces, Sin-Plexus is a composition of 
interactions that is prefigured in software and hardware design by the composer and 
then enacted in a real-time performance. Each iteration is different in compositional 
structure, but falls within a set of aesthetic and acoustic parameters. Although the 
piece required conceptual forethought and design, particularly in how the audio 
feedback was to be created and controlled utilising the adapted model of Stafford 
Beer’s VSM, a number of rehearsals were required before the initial performances of 
the piece before an audience. After initial tests by the composer, it was decided that 
extra variety and complexity would yield more multifaceted and stimulating results. 
To this end, another performer – my colleague at Coventry University and fellow 
electronic music composer, Nicholas Peters – was asked to assist in rehearsals and 
the live performance of the composition. Both performers used the Ableton Live 
software and DSP-processing in similar configurations as those described above.  
 
In the first instance, rehearsals were required to test the validity of the VSM system 
for composition, as it was not initially known if the system would produce anything 
compositionally interesting in the time required for a live performance. In the second 
instance, rehearsals were used to hone the skills of the performers in using the 
software so that they might direct the performance into a more stimulating and 
viable set of pieces.  
 
Although the design of the system was prefigured, some further rules were applied 
in the rehearsal stage to reinforce the cybernetic ethos during the performance. The 
main instance of such a rule being applied was for the performers to utilise the 
heuristic of ‘boredom’, as inspired by Gordon Pask. The application of this rule 
manifested in exactly the same way Pask had applied it in performances of the 
Musicolour Machine (Pask, 1971). Put simply, if an element of the soundscape is 
‘boring’, the performers attempt to alter it by adjusting parameters of the DSP 
functions in real time, via a control-surface interface. However, as with the 
Musicolour Machine, the interface being utilised by the performers in Sin-Plexus is 
complex, with many available parameters; the audible soundscape, once established, 
is constantly evolving due to the continuous laminar feedback process. Therefore, it 
is not always apparent what element will affect the performance in a desirable way, 
leaving the performers to “ride the dynamics of the system” (Beer, 1972; Eno, 1975) 
in an attempt to push it in an aesthetically desirable direction.  
 
Through the rehearsal process it was found that Sin-Plexus is a performance piece of 
indeterminate length. Various public performances have been realised of between 10 
to 50 minutes in duration. However, rather than the work existing in a theoretical 
continuum in the mode of works by Eno or Di Scipio, Sin-Plexus has a definite 
starting point and an end point; the work unfolds over time, developing from one 
initial feedback tone into a complex web of interacting sound elements. The start 
point occurs when the system is first fed with energy and the end point arrives when 
the performers have exhausted the criterion of stability. This compositional 
conception conforms to Kayn’s statement that “the process of creation is integrated 
into the acoustic supersignal, and remains transparent. The control structure lies 




results rather than constantly reacting to the soundscape and attempting to push it in 
one direction or the other. These organic, gentle, and reflective moments often had 
an almost pastoral quality, reminiscent of Eno’s work and sections from Roland 
Kayn’s pieces, and it was felt that this aspect should be included in any definitive 
performance. Examples of this type of passage can be heard in D & N 6.1 (from 
8’30”) and in the recording of the 10-minute piece (from 7’00”). These can be seen as 
being represented in the score as occurring between minutes 4 and 6 (see 
accompanying audio material for this thesis).  
 
After a number of rehearsals, which can be found in the supporting audio material to 
this thesis 37  the piece was performed and reconstituted until it adhered to the 
required 10-minute format, a final version of which was recorded for the ICMC 
submission.38 While this is a successful piece in many respects it is problematic 
conceptually, since while it maintains many of the cybernetic precepts outlined in the 
compositional framework (chapter 7), it is nonetheless forced into a time-limited 
format and a somewhat repeatable status, rather than being allowed to evolve in a 
purely organic and truly ephemeral way. Suffice to say that while the 10-minute 
piece is perhaps representative of a more aesthetically idealised form of the piece, in 
compositional terms, it lacks the spontaneity and ephemerality of a truly cybernetic 
composition. However, it did fulfil its function of being heard by a wider audience of 
peers and it also served as the basis for the subsequent composition, The Beast, which 
is also considered within this thesis and which is seen by the composer as a more 




To conclude, four further significant aspects in relation to cybernetic composition 
were found in the development of this piece. Firstly, even though the piece was 
significantly different in each iteration, it always conformed to a class of outcomes; it 
could be demonstrably recognised as the same piece of music. Thus a cybernetic 
precept was seen to work in practice through the embracing of heuristic design 
principles. Secondly, unlike the AEIS, minimal tuning to the environmental space 
was required. Here, the desire to rid the piece of any extraneous affectation appeared 
to produce an ease of operation that was initially unexpected. Thirdly, the audible 
complexity that resulted from such simple design precepts, the fact that at a certain 
point the piece “took on a life of its own” was an unexpected benefit of the system, 
allowing the performers to experience the “riding of the dynamics” of the system in a 
visceral way. Finally, the piece audibly shares many commonalities with the Barrons’ 
Forbidden Planet (1956) soundtrack. While this was perhaps to be expected, as many 
similar technological ideas were being played out in the performance, this was an 
unexpected outcome for the performers that also appeared to demonstrate a 










8.4 The Beast: Long-Form Improvisation, Feedback 
Loops and Cybernetic Music 
 
Please note: Film of the performance of The Beast and its development in rehearsal can be 




The Beast utilises cybernetic music in a work of long-form improvisational theatre. In 
conjunction with supporting video extracts, this chapter explores a specific 
collaboration incorporating improvisational practices and audible performance 
ecosystems. There have been several public performances of the work, most notably 
at the Theatre and Performance Research Association conference at the University of 
Worcester in September 2015. The example included in this thesis was recorded in 
April 2016, at the Ellen Terry Theatre at Coventry University.    
 
8.4.2 Rehearsal and Development 
 
From a compositional standpoint, the technical construction of The Beast is identical 
to the one utilised in the Sin-Plexus piece. However, speech and the actors’ 
movements on stage during the performance are used as sonic material from which 
the real-time composition is formed. This mirrors the use of speech by a number of 
cybernetic composers, including Alvin Lucier (I am Sitting in a Room, 1969) Herbert 
Brün (Futility, 1964), and Roland Kayn (Cybernetics 1, 1968). Another unexpected 
symmetry between this work and the work of a number of cybernetic composers in 
this thesis is that both Agostino Di Scipio and Gordon Pask had an overt interest in 
the creative possibilities of the theatre. We may also consider the Barrons’ work in 
films and Kayn’s extended performance happenings (Kayn, 1977a) to display a 
similar interest in acting and theatrical performance. Pask’s theatrical learning 
machines, in particular, demonstrate this connection between cybernetics and 
theatrical performance. Perhaps this link to theatre is not as surprising as it might 
first seem, since these cyberneticians and composers were preoccupied after all with 
a performative view of the world and in the staging of ontological theatre. However, 
it is striking how this metaphor has spilled over into actual theatre in the case of 
several of the composers highlighted in this thesis. To directly reflect this ethos, the 
actors and composer of The Beast held the theme of ‘ontological theatre’ to be a 
central tenet in the development of the piece. 
 
The form of the piece was developed in numerous rehearsals, with different 
iterations revealing different facets and performance possibilities. In keeping with 
the precepts of cybernetic music and long-form improvisation, the content of the 
performance was different in each iteration.  
 
The materials accompanying this thesis include eight videos that document the 
rehearsal process that led to the formulation of the performance of The Beast.39 The 






before the first public performance. The rehearsals involved the author of this thesis 
and the co-creator of the piece, the actor Glenn Noble. In addition, two other 
members of Coventry University staff were involved in the rehearsals, the actor and 
Senior Lecturer in Theatre, Joff Chafer, and the dancer and Senior Lecturer in Dance, 
Katye Coe. Joff Chafer and Katie Coe also performed The Beast at the Theatre and 
Performance Research Association conference at the University of Worcester in 
September 2015. However, they were unable to take part in the April 2016 
performance at the Ellen Terry Theatre at Coventry University. In this instance, the 
actor Jamie Greer took part, along with Glenn Noble and the current author.40 
 
The video and sound in this recording are of poor quality and the recording was 
only intended to be used as a reference for the performers in subsequent rehearsals. 
Nonetheless, these recordings offer a valuable insight into the development of the 
piece and some elements of the artistic process that were involved. The videos will 
subsequently be referred to as the Rehearsal Videos, or RV1, RV2, etc. in order to 
distinguish them from the video of the public performance. 
 
The rehearsals that were recorded are simply different iterations of the improvised 
piece, each lasting approximately 30 minutes, with some being slightly longer or 
shorter. Unlike the ICMC performance of Sin-Plexus, no stopwatch was used to 
define the length of the The Beast and no score was made. The length of the piece was 
purely defined by the performers’ instincts. 
 
What can be seen in these rehearsal tapes is an experimental ‘working through’; an 
examination of different ways the piece might be performed. Distinctive 
considerations can be seen in each iteration, as certain aspects are tried and adopted 
for future iterations and other strategies are rejected. In the early iterations of the 
piece, the performers are evidently not clear about which parts of the performance to 
prioritise; music, dance, and acting are sometimes explored with equal priority and 
on other occasions one element is chosen to the exclusion of other forms. For 
example, music becomes the priority for all the performers at certain times in these 
early rehearsals. In the following examples, the performance becomes solely musical 
with little or no regard to other elements: RV1 (1’40”): rhythmic elements are 
explored; RV4 (16’20”): a choir is formed by looping the performers’ voices41.  
 
Similarly, in the following examples, acting and spoken narrative become the 
primary focus of the piece: RV1 (9’00”): a sea captain’s book narrative; RV2 (15'00”) 
cataloguing: RV3 (4’20”): “you can see for miles”; RV3 (9’50”): planning a robbery. 
Similar phenomena occur for dance and movement arêtes. In the following examples 
only dance and movements are performed, to the exclusion of music or spoken 
narrative: RV1 (12’30”): pointing duet; RV2 (4’00”): planting seeds and pulling up 










As the pieces progress, however, elements become much more integrated. For 
example, a moment occurs in RV1 (5’00”) where movements and vocalisations build 
up into a complex rhythm. Here we can see movements and dance creating the 
musical sound track. Nonetheless, the performance becomes most successful when 
all elements – music, dance and acting – coalesce to form a coherent narrative scene. 
This usually does not occur until the midpoint of each of these rehearsals, when a 
number of prior elements combine to form a coherent whole. Examples of this type 
of autopoietic narrative can be found at the following points in the rehearsals: RV1 
(6’45”): an underwater scene emerges; RV2 (9’40”): Neanderthal man’s footprints; 
and RV3 (8’30”): butterfly collecting. 
 
In the rehearsal videos it is possible to see that a ‘stage’ has been drawn on the floor 
using white masking tape. This was done deliberately in order to define when the 
performance would start and end. When the actors crossed this line into the space 
this signalled the start of the performance and, conversely, leaving this space 
denoted the end of the performance. It was felt that defining a threshold in this way 
heightened the ritualistic atmosphere we wished to evoke from the performance. The 
other signal for the beginning of the performance was the initial feedback tone 
generated to create material for the musical soundscape.42 
 
A number of significant events that played a pivotal role in how the piece developed 
can be found in the rehearsal tapes. For example, at the beginning of RV2, problems 
occur in getting a low frequency feedback tone with the radio microphones. 
Attempts are made to find the best position for the actors to stand, in order to 
achieve the best initial feedback tone. Having a large-diaphragm condenser 
microphone positioned near to the speaker to create the initial feedback tone 
eventually solved this problem. 
 
As the performances progressed it became natural to leave more gaps within the 
music to allow for speaking narratives to evolve and silences to be heard. This 
became an important device and appeared to precipitate a much more balanced and 
cohesive narrative. A very good example of this phenomenon can be found in RV3 
(9’50”) where all the elements coalesce for a long period around a narrative about a 
robbery. Here we can hear that the music comes and goes in a natural rhythm, 
leaving silences for spoken-word narratives to develop and thus reinforce the scene’s 
emotional content with music where necessary.  
 
In RV4, with the introduction of the dancer, Katie Coe, the piece becomes much more 
dance orientated. There is a continuous movement flow to the piece that wasn't there 
previously. However, there is a loss of natural pauses (both in terms of music and of 
movement) in this version, which makes it hard for a spoken-word narrative to 
develop. Nonetheless, an interesting musical phenomenon occurs at 16’20”, where 
the performers start to hum and sing in tune to the electronically modulated sounds. 
These vocalisations are then looped and played back into the space and the 
performers again sing over this loop, and so on, until a multi-layered choir emerges. 







In RV7, the emphasis is on experimenting with sampling and playing back vocal 
narratives and phrases into the performance space. This precipitated the 
performance becoming much more oriented toward recollecting and acting out 
memories. At RV7 (7’20”), we can see Glenn recalling childhood memories of riding 
his BMX bike, a theme that is revisited in the public performance in the Ellen Terry 
Theatre in April 201643. However, in this iteration (RV7, 7’20”), Glenn recounts and 
acts out a very moving true story of a boy he knew who died after cycling off the end 
of a pier. Performing this iteration crystallised the notion that this method of 
replaying voices from a previous time in the performance had a powerful effect on 
enabling the performers to recall memories and that this interleaving of remembered 
narratives, accompanied by the music, formed an evocative and commanding 
performance piece. At the end of the piece in VR7 (26’30”) and continuing onto VR8, 
the performers discuss the implications of this performance, the memories that were 
evoked, and the emotional darkness at the heart of the piece. There is also a 
discussion of the implications of having more or fewer performers. 
 
Two aesthetic consequences of the piece emerged that had not been considered prior 
to the initial rehearsals. Firstly, that the role of replaying snippets of the actors’ 
speech back into the performance space, sometimes several minutes after they were 
initially spoken, had unexpected implications in forming the overall narrative arc of 
the piece. These vocal audio snippets would often serve to link themes from previous 
scenes into present scenes within a performance, so that all the minor narratives 
appeared to be interlinked in an overarching performance narrative. Furthermore, 
these disembodied voices in space evoked filmic, non-simultaneous, sonic flashbacks 
(Bordwell and Thompson, 1985), where characters in a film might recall a memory. 
Consequently, in the performance of the piece, the actors’ improvised narratives 
often explored themes surrounding memory and remembering. This is a prime 
example of the feedback mechanism between the cybernetic composition and the 
improvising actors working symbiotically to create self-referential, autopoietic 
structures from emergent properties.  
 
Secondly, and perhaps rather unsurprisingly – since the performance utilised the 
same compositional system as Sin-Plexus – the piece was again aesthetically similar 
to the soundscapes of Forbidden Planet (1956). In this instance, the interesting facet of 
this similarity was that the soundscape not only provided a musical mood for the 
actors to react to, but also sound effects that might link to an actor’s actions, or 
invoke facets of an environmental space for them to inhabit.  
	
8.4.3 Theoretical Starting Points in the Development of the Piece 
 
In the context of this performance, cybernetic theory is used to inform process and 
understand how emergent behaviours and autopoietic narratives may be formed. 
One of its primary concerns of cybernetics is the study of information flows between 
components in a system and how this may lead to emergent behaviours. The concept 
of feedback is a crucial component in understanding how information can coalesce 
into organised systems and form autopoietic entities; from the cybernetic viewpoint, 






acting upon it or within it. This may be a simple mechanical agent, such as a 
thermostat, or an exceedingly complex one such as a human being. If an agent is 
capable of registering changes within the environment and acting upon them, it can 
be said that it receives feedback from the environment and is able to adapt its own 
behaviour to it. Thus a feedback loop is established between the agent and its 
environment, and this may continue proliferating in an on-going dance of agency 
between all the components of a system.  
 
The name cybernetics is derived from the Greek kybernetes, which means 
‘steersman’. In the case of this performance, steersmanship	may be seen as a critical 
metaphor for the actors to adopt as they take in feedback and adjust internal 
parameters to adapt their performance to form emergent narratives. In the human/ 
machine/ environment paradigm of the performance, one in which no one entity has 
overall control, steersmanship becomes a viable strategy, one which recognises the 
limits to agency but at the same time derives the ability to ride the dynamics of the 
system and make attempts to push it in the direction one may wish it to go. 	
 
8.4.4 Description and Evaluation of Performance 
 
These ideas are reflected in the performance in several ways: the work begins with 
an audible feedback tone, generated by driving the input gain of microphones placed 
around the room and radio microphones worn by the performers. This feedback tone 
is recorded into the computer and manipulated by a performer using digital signal- 
processing software. The feedback tone is used as a basis from which to create sound 
and music, which is subsequently fed back into the space for the actors to hear and 
react to. As the performance unfolds, the words spoken by the actors are also 
recorded, adapted, and manipulated, and the resultant audio is played into the space 
in an ongoing feedback loop. The sound and speech recorded into the computer is 
captured in loops of approximately 20 seconds duration, which are layered on top of 
one another to create a complex web of looped audio material.44 The composer 
manipulates the audio in real time and determines what may be manipulated and 
what may be fed back into the environment. For example, unaltered snippets of 
speech may recycled from a previous time in the performance, recalling a memory or 
previous trope. At other times, a complex layering of adapted musical sounds may 
be heard, providing an underlying musical mood, or an emotionally evocative 



































Fig. 44. Technical Performance Set-Up for The Beast 
 
What follows is an evaluation of the performance from the actors’ perspective. Here, 
the actor Glenn Noble describes the process and events that take place during the 
performance, making direct reference to 3 video clips of the performance that 
accompany this thesis45. 
 
8.4.4.a. In Reference to Video Clip 1: 
 
To signal a beginning, entrances are made into the performance space, 
which, for the purposes of our improvisation, we focus upon as “a kind of 
liminal space, where not knowing is […] sought, explored and savoured [...] 
where getting lost is constructively deployed alongside wonder, secrets and 
play” (Fisher and Fortnum, 2007). This strategy is important to the work, as 
unlike other types of long-form theatre improvisation, there are no pre-
planned structures or frames within which to fit the improvisation, and there 
are certainly no audience suggestions or prompts to ‘prove’ the 
improvisational practice in operation. Once in the space, an explicit taking 
and shaping, moulding and manipulating of space is instigated. Discovery is 
demonstrated and emphasised, as initial, mimed vignettes become apparent. 
This discovery leads to the establishment of early narrative contexts and the 
performativity or self-reflexivity of the live event is reflected in the playful 
connection with the audience. In this way, we invite the audience to engage 
with us as complicit parts of the live event – as essential parts of the simple 
system. 
 
Each performer echoes this same entrance principle and a process of physical 
agreement and interaction begins. A simple chain of mantras operates – 
‘mirroring, heightening, exploring and transformation’ – and this is the 






All of these separate mantras are creative strategies in themselves and they 
find their origins in Viola Spolin’s work, first outlined in her book, 
Improvisation for the Theater, in 1963. This practice specifically calls for an 
interaction with, and transformation of, found ‘space-objects’, as a route to 
procedural memory, personal significance, and a reconnecting with lived 
experiences to elicit spontaneous context. This particular embodied process 
gradually leads to dialogue, recollected memories, narration, and 
confessional elements, which are captured and shaped by the sonic artist 
utilising audio software. We make explicit the role that Daren plays as an 
equal collaborative improviser, rather than a lowly ‘sound technician’, not 
only by his presence within the performance area, but by ensuring that he 
also has a performative ‘arête’-style entrance, or an “and this is me” for the 
audience at the start.   
 
8.4.4.b. In Reference to Video Clip 2: 
 
The particularity of our collaboration explores why this specific sound 
improvisation has had the effect of eliciting autobiographical material – 
narratives from memory and personal reminiscence that are shared, 
embellished, and fictionalised. The practice explicitly relies upon the body 
connecting with procedural memory to offer instant context to the 
improviser, but the effect of feeding back voices and reincorporating spoken 
content from minutes earlier has created a particular performance 
environment for this exploration of lived narratives. Around ten minutes 
into the work, the space is now full of pathways and areas of significance 
relating to discovered spatial context: a bicycle rider; door-to-door police 
enquiries; a father and daughter preparing to leave the house on the 
morning of her wedding; a photograph; a preoccupation with a hand 
signifying some terrible act; a picket line and brazier, etc. These fragments 
establish separate narratives threads, and reincorporation, transformation 
and montage are beginning to happen – the work is starting to become self-
referential. 
 
8.4.4.c. In Reference to Video Clip 3: 
 
Around twenty-five minutes into the work and the separate narrative 
threads begin to tie together through reincorporation, or continued feedback. 
With the sense of the closed system self-referring and self-constructing, of 
tying itself together, an autopoietic system or narrative becomes more 
apparent to the improvisers and audience, themselves part of the system, 
who provide their own ‘feedback’ within the system, be that laughter, 
applause, or the close engagement and palpable ‘pin-drop’ silences around 
dramatic discoveries. 











8.4.5 The Further Influence of Theory on the development of the 
piece 
 
It is important to note that the musical software system that facilitates this 
soundscape is designed to create complexity and operates with multiple layered 
loops and sonic manipulations occurring in real time. Many of the procedures that 
create this soundscape are also automated within the software. This means that the 
human performer cannot direct the performance solely in the way that he or she may 
wish to46. That is to say that the computer is also an active agent and partner in the 
creative process. Furthermore, no one agent, whether it be man, machine, or 
environment, is responsible for the creation of the performance; all agents interact in 
a non-hierarchical way, each having agency within the performance.  
 
The complexity that this represents, coupled with the ever-evolving performance of 
the actors reacting to the proliferating soundscape, creates an unpredictable 
performance outcome, one in which there are set parameters that are designed to 
create a performance that will fall within a ‘class of goals’, but which is different in 
each iteration, complex in narrative and unpredictable in outcome. 
 
From the cybernetic viewpoint it is important to emphasise this type of complexity; 
for the cybernetician, exceedingly complex systems are ‘black boxes’ that we can 
never fully comprehend just by studying their inner components (the human brain is 
a good example of such a system). However, we may gain a great deal of insight by 
studying how these black boxes interact with the world, their range of behaviours, 
abilities, and idiosyncrasies. From the cybernetic perspective, the world is not a 
series of set truths about things that lay waiting to be unearthed, but rather one in 
which meaning is made via interaction; a complex system’s emergent behaviour can 
only be discovered in a performative context. Similarly, the meaning and unfolding 
of a cybernetic performance can only be discovered through interaction in a 
performative context. It is important to note that this is a distinctly non-modern 
ontology, which is not centred on Cartesian thought, hierarchical worldviews, or 
epistemologies.     
 
At their best, cybernetic art projects stage for us what the philosopher of science 
Andrew Pickering calls ‘ontological theatre’. This describes how cybernetic machines 
or systems ‘act out’ this non-modern, non-hierarchical worldview. Pickering states 
that cybernetic projects stage ontological theatre for us in two senses: Firstly, as an 
aid to our ontological imagination, helping us to consider a different understanding 
of our being in the world and as an invitation to think that the world in general 
might operate in such a way. Secondly, cybernetic projects are examples of what 
might happen in practice if we adopt this non-modern imagining of the world and 
enact a performative ontology (Pickering, 2011). 
 
Another important aspect to consider within this piece of work is the setting in 
which transformation takes place. When considering the work’s staging, the 
processes of rites and rituals were important touchstones in its inception. The 





the causality of the process. This was in particular reference to considering how the 
meaning-making process operated in this kind of ex nihilo performance.  
 
Pragmatic philosophy, which shares many commonalities with cybernetics, in 
particular the performative ontology, is helpful when considering these questions. 
Marshall McLuhan’s theory of the ‘post-literate society’ points toward a way of 
viewing this type of improvisational practice that incorporates technology. McLuhan 
states that there are three human ages: the pre-literate society, the literate, and the 
post-literate (the society in which he claims we now dwell). Different types of 
technologies and how they are used define these epochs.  
 
To recap this philosophy: In the pre-literate society means (or technologies) and ends 
(their uses) are immediate and inseparable. Tools are important and intimately 
connected to the objects they fashion. The pre-literate society is not text-based; it is an 
aural culture, in which collective meaning is made via rites and rituals that are 
transformative, but without fixed or known outcomes. McLuhan believed that the 
advent of the printing press signified the beginning of the literate society. Here, 
means and ends become separated, technologies are subservient tools that fashion 
fixed outcomes; the means become subservient to the ends. This is a text-based 
society, dominated by visual media, such as books and painting. In the post-literate 
age, electronics have made communication immediate and pervasive; the world has 
once again become ‘a global village’. Here, means and ends become blurred; 
technology is no longer subservient, but can instead be used to drive process and 
point toward new discoveries. McLuhan’s famous phrase, “the medium is the 
message”, reflects this blurring of means and ends. McLuhan believed that the post-
literate world was akin to the pre-literate society in being an aurally dominated 
culture, in which frameworks that resembled rites and rituals intertwined with 
inseparable technologies, and that these rites and rituals were once again the 
dominant form of meaning-making in society. The performance of The Beast is rooted 
in the notion of the types of performances – intertwined with technologies – that 
adhere to the post-literate society.  
 
So this performance work resides in the cybernetic ontology of emergence and 
becoming and it also inhabits McLuhan’s framework of the post-literate society; this 
performance has no score or text, and no fixed outcome. The performers and 
audience enter the ritualised space of the theatre and a system or set of parameters is 
created in which narrative and meanings may emerge through transformational 
processes. There is no fixed outcome, only the desire that transformation will occur. 
Technology is utilised in the performance as an equal partner, driving process, and 
pointing toward new outcomes.  
 
Finally, in considering the use of technology within this work and in the desire for 
the work to stage ontological theatre for the audience, it was felt that it was 
important to explicitly demonstrate how the work was being made within the 
performance in real time, to ‘show the scaffold’, so to speak, as the performance 
unfolds. This was done in several ways: the initial feedback tone, its recording and 
playing back into the space, demonstrates at the outset how the audio technology 
operates and the system that is at play within the performance. This is reflected in 
the actors’ improvisations, which begin with the shaping of amorphous space and 
slowly develop over time into interactions, speech, and narrative scenes; the 
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performance organically grows over time with no forced precepts. The audience is 
constantly reminded of the technological processes at play within the performance, 
as looped snippets of speech and sound from previous moments in the narrative are 
brought back into the space and interact with current themes. This explicit type of 
‘revealing’ of process included within the performance chimes with Martin 
Heidegger’s views on technology and its role in the world. Heidegger believed that 
technology is inseparable from us; it is intertwined with our being. Furthermore, 
technology is a malevolent force that conceals our true being. We cannot escape the 
all-consuming power of technology. However, Heidegger believed that it was 
possible to glimpse true being, on occasions, if technology could be used in a more 
radical and subversive way, one that made an attempt to reveal technology’s true 

















































































Spiegel: “And what takes the place of Philosophy now?” 
Heidegger: “Cybernetics” (Martin Heidegger, 1981). 
 
Throughout this thesis conclusions have been drawn, primarily in chapter 7, The 
Cybernetic Musical Framework. Seven indicators of cybernetic music were defined, 
which enabled practical investigation in the formulation of new, original cybernetic 
works. The following conclusion is a summary of the research and the main 
arguments put forward in this thesis. In addition, future areas of work are 




This thesis traced the development of a movement of music that draws direct 
influence from cybernetics. It encompasses composers who have directly utilised 
cybernetic theories in compositional practice and cyberneticists who have been 
involved in work with audio devices and music. The thesis began in Chapter 3 by 
examining cybernetic music in context, outlining a brief history of algorithmic 
composition and process music with electronics, and its relationship to cybernetic 
music.  
 
In Chapter 4, a number of philosophical positions that related to cybernetics in 
music, in particular, writings concerning technology and praxis by philosophers such 
as Marshall McLuhan, Martin Heidegger, and Richard Coyne were examined. 
Coyne’s work in particular, specifically his book Designing Information Technology in 
the Postmodern Age: From Method to Metaphor (1995) was critical in the formulation of 
the approach of this study. Coyne posits a pragmatic (as opposed to positivist or 
theoretical) approach toward computers in praxis, and asserts that ontology (and 
metaphor) is more useful in designing information technologies than epistemologies. 
Thus an emphasis on ontology was prevalent in this thesis both in the hermeneutical 
study of texts and in the investigation into the praxis of cybernetic music. In addition 
the phenomena of feedback was examined in detail. This examination was vital to 
understanding how systems interact and adapt to environments and therefore 
important to understanding the work of cybernetic composers and the formulation 
of the authors own practical work. 
 
The musicological investigation proceeded in Chapter 5, with an examination of the 
founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, and his work with the development of an 
assistive audio technology, the Hearing Glove. The work of Louis and Bebe Barron 
(Section 5.2), the founding pioneers of cybernetic music, was examined in the context 
of their work with John Cage and in the composition of the cybernetically composed 
music to the seminal science-fiction film Forbidden Planet (1956). Alvin Lucier’s work 
(Section 5.3) with feedback and brainwaves was assessed in a cybernetic context, 
linking his philosophical pragmatism with his technological, compositional practice. 
The composer Herbert Brün’s  (section 5.4) close links with cybernetics and in 
particular his friendship with the eminent cybernetician, Heinz von Foerster, was 
explored as a direct influence on this work in computer-based composition. Roland 
Kayn’s (section 5.5) relevance to electronic composition was also evaluated. His 
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disagreements with the Darmstadt school and his prolific output of cybernetic music 
exemplify the juxtaposition of traditional electroacoustic music and cybernetic music, 
and point toward some of the unique qualities of this type of compositional practice. 
All of the aforementioned composers had close ties with the very earliest and most 
prestigious electronic music studios in Europe and America. They exemplify a 
different approach to electronic composition that existed between the end of the 
Second World War and the mid-to-late 1960s.  
 
The composers examined subsequently in Chapter 6 reflected the sociological turn 
that cybernetics took in the late 1960s and the greater influence it exerted on artistic 
and popular culture as a result. The work of these composers reflects not only the 
possibilities that advancements in technology presented in this era, but also the 
extended philosophical discourse taking place within cybernetics at this time. 
Cyberneticist Gordon Pask’s (section 6.1) work on his musicolour machine is 
examined and defined as one of the first ‘learning machines’ to be employed in 
creative music-making. The music producer and composer Brian Eno’s (section 6.2) 
lifelong association with cybernetics and its influence on his musical output were 
also evaluated. Reflecting the influence of cyberneticist and friend Stafford Beer and 
his art school tutor and cybernetic artist, Roy Ascott, Eno’s influence on popular 
music and his association with English minimalism make him perhaps the best-
known advocate of cybernetic composition. Finally, the work of Agostino Di Scipio 
(section 6.3) and his cybernetic compositional ethos are examined in relation to the 
cybernetic compositions of Iannis Xenakis and Herbert Brün, bringing the historical 
musicological study up to the present day. Compositional structure, technological 
design, cybernetic influence, philosophical underpinnings, and relationships to 
cybernetic ontology were considered in the examination of each composer’s works in 
order to assess commonalities in each aspect and to create an overriding 
compositional framework that defines practice in the area of cybernetic music. 
 
The preceding literature review chapters (3, 4, 5 & 6) culminated in the cybernetic 
compositional framework in chapter 7, which postulates seven precepts necessary 
for engaging meaningfully in cybernetic composition. These precepts were presented 
as follows:  
1) Ephemeral performance works 
2) The non-necessity of notation in the post-literate society 
3) The decentring of the composer 
4) The inclusion of the environment in composition 
5) A systemic human/machine/environment design ethos, which necessitates 
the composing of interactions rather than interactive composing 
6) Compositional design based on feedback or recursive coupling 
7) Ontological theatre – Heideggerian revealing 
 
Chapter 7 formulates the theoretical, aesthetic and methodological basis of the 
practical work undertaken by the author in the subsequent chapter.  
 
Chapter 8 of the thesis is an evaluation of three of the author’s original cybernetic 
compositions. Each of these compositions adheres to the compositional framework 
and reflects the interrogation of different aspects of cybernetic music undertaken in 




First performed at ICMC 2016 in Utrecht, Holland, the first original composition 
analysed in chapter 8 was Oscilloscope (section 8.1), an interactive sound installation 
that utilises changes in light in an environmental space to trigger the tempos and 
ordering of a cybernetic musical system. The composition was based on Brian Eno’s 
generative music systems and Agostino Di Scipio’s sonic ecosystemic design. The 
camera and generative music system utilised in the design are also linked to an 
interactive generative computer animation created by Adam Collis, which reacts to 
the same changes in light intensity in the environment. Although all the original 
compositions adhere to every precept of the cybernetic compositional framework, 
Oscilloscope in particular was concerned with designing a composition based on 
feedback or recursive coupling and as such drew on ideas discussed in chapter 6 of 
this thesis.  
 
Section 8.2 examines the cybernetician Stafford Beer’s ‘Viable System model’ as a 
basis for real time composition. The methodology described here formed the basis of 
the subsequent compositions discussed in sections 8.3 (Sin-Plexus) and 8.4 (The Beast) 
 
The second original composition examined in chapter 8 was Sin-Plexus (section 8.3), a 
live electroacoustic performance work with an accompanying computer animation, 
first shown at the International Computer Music Conference (ICMC) 2013, in Perth, 
Australia. The work utilises audio feedback as a basis for an emergent musical 
composition and has a complimentary interactive computer animation that responds 
to changes in the amplitude of the music. The work’s technological design is based 
on Stafford Beer’s VSM, as outlined in section 8.2. While this work extended ideas 
exploded in Brian Eno’s work discussed in chapter 6.2, it also owes much 
aesthetically to the work of Louis and Bebe Barron, and the compositional ethos of 
Roland Kayn, both of which were examined in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
 
The third original piece to be examined in section 8.4 was part of an improvised 
theatre work; The Beast, which incorporates long-form improvisational theatre 
accompanied by real-time cybernetic music that is generated from the sound of the 
actors’ movements and speech. The music is fed back into the theatre space and acts 
as a springboard for scene-setting and further improvised narratives. The Beast was 
first performed publically at the Theatre and Performance Research Association 
conference at the University of Worcester, in September 2015. This performance 
work is in essence an extension of the compositional work undertaken in Sin-Plexus, 
with essentially the same feedback process being employed in the compositional 
design. However the work of Gordon Pask, discussed in chapter 6.1, in particular his 
Musicolour interactive learning machine, also had a major influence on the design of 
the interactions between the performers and technology within the work.  
 
The 3 original compositions in chapter 8 drew influence from the previous musical 
applications and implementations of cybernetics in music and interrogated the 
theoretical, aesthetic, semiotic, and musicological ideas of cybernetic compositional 
practice through practical investigation. These original works also exemplify a 
practical application of the cybernetic compositional framework outlined in chapter 
7, which enabled the exploration of the interrelationships of theory, practice, 




9.2 Future work 
 
The cybernetic music framework, outlined in chapter 7, provides fertile ground for 
future research in the area of cybernetic music, both as a spur for analytical study of 
electronic music and as a basis for future musical compositions.  
 
Using the guiding principles of the cybernetic music framework, the author’s own 
original compositions can be developed further, particularly in being more 
responsive to the environment and in recognition of its own internal states.  In the 
composition of Sin-Plexus, some DSP automation was achieved via Max/MSP MIDI 
implementation but this aspect was underdeveloped in the final implementation due 
to processing constraints. However, this may be solved in future iterations via the 
use of two computers, one to process the audio functions and one to process the 
MIDI control functions. Further research in this area is underway. 
 
A pertinent area of inquiry for future consideration by the author is in the realm of 
virtual and augmented realities. The development of these technologies is closely 
aligned to A.I. research (Coyne, 1995) and as such they have tended toward a 
Cartesian design ethos. The author believes that the application of cybernetics to this 
field of research will yield many interesting research questions relating to music, 
particularly when considering aspects such as immersion, interaction, intelligence 
and what constitutes a world, environment or reality. Sound and Music have a vital 
role to play in interrogating these questions and the cybernetic compositional 
framework offers a strong ontological position from which to enter this inquiry.  
 
9.3 The Further Implications of Cybernetic Music 
 
In order to define cybernetic music as a subset of electroacoustic music, we may 
return to the argument postulated in Chapter 4, concerning the role of the reductive 
and the generative paradigms in composition that utilises technology. In the 
reductive paradigm, electronic technology is a subservient tool that may assist in the 
compositional process and produce fixed and known outcomes. Here, the technology 
of notation is employed as the representational system utilised by the computer and 
the composer in order to accomplish the composition. This model is conceptually 
aligned to research in artificial intelligence, which utilises symbolic logic and 
representational systems as a means for a computer to understand external 
environments (Hofstadter, 2007). In the generative paradigm, the computer is used 
as an equal partner in the compositional process. The composition may be thought of 
as a ‘seed’ that grows into a musical structure. Here, outcomes are not fixed but 
adhere to a class of goals, which are defined by a heuristic conception imposed by 
the composer. Musical notation is no longer necessary as the composition is achieved 
not via representational means but by the design of interaction of components within 
a system. The composer Brian Eno sums up this compositional approach in the 
following terms: “instead of giving a set of detailed instructions about how to make 
something, what you do instead is give a set of conditions by which something will 
come into existence" (Eno in Toop, 2004). Design of a generative system is not 
predicated on an epistemology of music but on an ontology of biological systems. 
Needless to say, this model is aligned to cybernetics, which encapsulates a 
performative worldview in which an entity may only know its environment by 
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interacting with it.   
 
This thesis has examined this cybernetic standpoint and its influence on electronic 
music. Brian Eno notes that the cybernetic approach to composition is really one that 
is concerned with design and that this interest reflects a wider change in design ethos 
that has begun to permeate modern thinking. He observes that this reflects the: 
“change from an engineering paradigm, which is to say a design paradigm, to a 
biological paradigm, which is an evolutionary one. In lots of areas now, people say, 
how do you create the conditions at the bottom to allow the growth of the things you 
want to happen” (Eno in Toop, 2004). We may see this paradigm shift in solutions to 
many modern design problems that deal with complex systems, from river 
management to political and economic theories. So, in turn, we may also view 
cybernetic music’s preoccupation with biological design as part of a larger paradigm 
shift that deals with how one might proceed in terms of interacting with and 
managing complex systems. This fact also highlights that cybernetic composers view 
the act of music composition as a complex system, which may only be understood 
through a biological design paradigm. 
 
Thus we see a vastly different view of composition to traditional approaches. To 
further highlight this difference, we may consider music composition in the romantic 
tradition, where a lone composer hierarchically disseminates a platonically ‘perfect’ 
form for orchestras to play impeccably as the composer intended. Emotional 
meaning is imbued by the composer to be directly disseminated by an audience with 
no loss of transmission between the intentions of the composer and the interpretation 
of the audience. While many modern forms of composition seek to usurp this 
hierarchy (one may think of graphic scores or aleatoric processes), the mode of 
romanticism, which exalts the lone composer and the hierarchical dissemination of 
genius, was a prevalent concept in modernism and continues to pervade much 
current thinking. Cybernetic music obviously offers a different, non-hierarchical 
perspective, one that is particularly attuned to certain approaches to working with 
technology. Andrew Pickering notes that cybernetics offers a “constructive 
alternative to modernity. It humanises attractive possibilities for acting differently”, in 
other words, it offers an alternative idea of how to ‘go forward’ in a world of 
exceedingly complex systems.  
 
So, for the composer, the question of whether one might utilise cybernetic 
approaches in music making is not only about how one views the compositional 
process, but also one of how we might view the world, either as a rational and 
ultimately knowable place, or one that is exceedingly complex and ultimately 
unknowable. However, it is worth considering that while these two worldviews 
seem diametrically opposed, most modern composition with technology falls 
somewhere on a spectrum between these two polar opposites. One might imagine 
that were the framework espoused in this thesis more widely known, composers 
might have a yardstick by which to measure the ‘cyberneticness’ of their electronic 
compositions. This is somewhat to miss the point, however, as this thesis is intended 
to signpost a direction rather than impose rules. Nonetheless, It should also be noted 
that for many composers, the romantic and modernist traditions represent 
established and well-understood norms, while cybernetic music, by comparison, is 
obscure at best and for many represents unexplored territory. However, it is not the 
assertion of this thesis that cybernetic music should ‘do away’ with modernity 
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altogether, but that it should be recognised as a legitimate strategy that might be 
adopted in music making. In speaking of how far the challenge to modernity that 
cybernetics represents should go, Andrew Pickering attests that while modernity is 
undoubtedly productive under certain circumstances (he cites power stations and 
modern physics as positive examples), its enframing nature is, however, very 
destructive: “what I have learned form Heidegger and cybernetics is to see it [the 
assumption of modernity’s triumph] as a sad one. It closes us off from what the 
world has to offer; in the mode of enframing, the unexpected appears as a negative 
sign in front of it, as a nuisance to be got around. The stance of revealing, in contrast, 
is open to the world and expects novelty, for better or worse, and is ready for the 
former” (Pickering, 2011). 
 
In terms of this thesis, the Heideggerian revealing that Pickering speaks of is the 
truly radical conception that cybernetic approaches offer us. So we may, once again, 
consider for a moment these revealing properties and why this is important to 
cybernetic composition. For Heidegger, the all-consuming enframing power of 
technology was destructive, as it concealed true being (and we should bear in mind 
here that Heidegger considered such things as writing and musical notation as 
technology, as well as computers). While he considered technology’s enframing 
power to be inescapable, he did feel that resistance was possible in participation with 
technology in more radical ways and would thus reveal, if only fleetingly, the true 
nature of being. Heidegger’s conception of how this mechanism of resistance might 
operate was the idea that the ‘earth’ was still present in technologies, that no matter 
how abstract and technologically sophisticated a thing is, it is still made of elements 
that can never be truly separated from their true being and that by revealing the 
‘things in themselves’, we may come to a better understanding of true being. Richard 
Coyne gives an example of how a Heideggerian revealing might be beneficial. In 
examining the philosophy of Hubert Dreyfus and Thomas Kuhn, Coyne concludes:  
 
“Dreyfus demystifies Heidegger’s concept of the earth within things by 
relating it to Kuhn’s characterisation of anomalies in normal science. 
Heidegger’s impenetrable earth is analogous to an anomaly that forces 
a revolution in science. As long as there are such anomalies and we are 
aware of them as such, there is the possibility of a breakdown in the 
current paradigm and the development of a new one. In the new 
paradigm, the anomaly becomes the focus of the new truth” (Coyne, 
1995).  
 
To evoke a speculative cybernetic music analogy, through the practice of cybernetic 
music it might conceivably be revealed that composers are not the sole arbiters of 
works of music. Environmental and technological factors also play an equal role in 
the construction of the work of music, and therefore, this aspect could plausibly be 
accepted as a new paradigm in composition.  
 
Finally, perhaps the most radical conclusion to be drawn from this study is that 
cybernetic music (in some guise or another) is becoming the norm in terms of 
compositional mode, particularly in terms of electronic music. This thesis has 
returned many times to Marshal McLuhan’s theory of the post-literate society 
(McLuhan, 1964) and has seen many parallels with these ideas and the form that 
cybernetic music presents. In illustrating McLuhan’s ideas of the post-literate society 
in action, the postmodernist novelist Will Self has asserted that the novel is already 
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dead as an art form because the technology that permitted its creation, the codex, is 
in rapid decline, superseded by interactive electronic media (Self, 2014). We might 
certainly draw parallels here with the demise of the Vinyl LP and its sister format the 
CD, leading to the demise of the album as the dominant art form in popular music 
(Helmore, 2013), and we must recognise that this undoubtedly also has major 
implications for the consumption of classical, avant-garde, and experimental music. 
If the recorded work no longer denotes the definitive performance of a piece of 
music, what does this imply for fixed media in general as a format for music? 
Certainly, questions of ephemerality and electronic media become more prevalent in 
this conception of a post-literate world and here we can see an alignment with 
cybernetic music. We may also see the negation of text-based forms, such as notation, 
as being a trope of the post-literate society, which in turn points toward cybernetic 
music (or something similar to it) as being the mode of meta-modern composition. 
These indicators do not predetermine the complete death of notation, popular music, 
or books, for that matter. As Self points out, it is the purview of the academy to 
preserve these art forms (Self, 2014). However, if we accept McLuhan’s theory, these 
text-based and fixed-media forms are about to be superseded by some other mode. 
Cybernetic music points us to a way that we might ‘go on’ in this scenario. Certainly, 
a mode of revealing, rather than one of enframing, presents a more positive 
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